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INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

A. Contrasting Destinies of Industrial Art and Industrial Literature

Because industrial design partakes of both art and industry, it sits
astride the Berne and Paris Conventions, I which otherwise purport to subdivide the world's intellectual property system into mutually exclusive spheres
dominated by the copyright and patent paradigms. 2 Empirically, ornamental designs of useful articles (or "appearance designs" as they are called
today) seldom behave like the subject matters that either of these paradigms
typically governs. Viewed as industrial property, appearance designs seek
protection under design patent laws 3 or sui generis design laws that traditionally operate on modified patent principles. 4 In practice, relatively few
1. "A design. . . is an ensemble of lines, surfaces, volumes, and profiles connected with
each other in subtle or unique ways so as to give a characteristic external appearance to
an article . . . . " 2 S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRarECTIoN 829 (1975). For international regulation of
this subject matter as either artistic or industrial property, see Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, last revised at Paris, July 24,
1971, art. 2(1) ("The expression 'literary and artistic works' shall include ... works
of applied art. "), id. art. 2(7) ("Works of Applied Art and Industrial Designs and
Models") [hereinafter Berne Convention], reprinted in 3 WIPO & UNESCO, COpyRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, Berne Conv., item H (1987); Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, last revised at Stockholm,
July 14, 1967, art. 5 quinquies, 21 US.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923,328 UN.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention] ("Industrial designs shall be protected in all the countries of the Union."); see also Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, arts. I,
IV, 6 US.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, last revised at Paris, July 24,
1971,25 US.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868 [hereinafter U C.C]. See generally S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PRarECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS:
1886-1986 267-82 (1987); A. BOGSCH, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL
CONVENTION 50-51 (1968); 2 S. LADAS, supra, at 827-44.
2. Compare Berne Convention, supra note I, art. 1 (constituting "a Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works") with Paris Convention,
supra note 1, art. 1 (1) (constituting "a Union for the protection of industrial property")
and id. art. I (2) (defining object of protection as "patents, utility models, industrial
designs, trademarks. . . and the repression of unfair competition").
3. The prototypical example is the Act of August 29, 1842 [U.S.A.], ch. 263, § 2, 5 Stat.
543 (1842) (codified as amended at 35 US.C. §§ 171-73,289 (1988». See generally I
D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 1.04[1] (1988). For examples of other design laws largely
shaped by the full patent paradigm, see the Registered Designs Act, 1949 (Design Statute) [United Kingdom], 12, 13 & 14 Oeo. 6, ch. 88, reprinted in UNESCO & BIRPI,
DESIGN LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, United Kingdom, item I, (A. Bogsch ed.
1969-71) [hereinafter DESIGN t-Aws] (1949 text), amended by Copyright, Designs, and
Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, §§ 265-273; Industrial and Commercial Property (Protection) Act (Ireland], 1927 (Part III, Designs); Industrial Designs Act [Canada), R.S.C.
ch. 1-8 (1970). See generally R. MERKIN, RICHARDS Bun..ER ON COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS
AND PATENTS: THE NEW LAw 308-26 (1989); I. MORRIS & B. QuEST, DESIGN-THE
MODERN LAW AND PRACTICE 10-59 (1987); C. FELLNER, THE FUTURE OF LEGAL PRoTECTION FOR INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 11-20 (1985). The Japanese design law also follows
the patent model. See infra note 82.
4. See, e.g., Uniform Benelux Designs Law, annexed to the Benelux Designs Convention,
signed at Brussels on Oct. 25, 1966, effective Jan. I, 1975, reprinted in 13 INDUS. PRop.
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designs meet the formal and substantive prerequisites these laws normally
impose. s Viewed as works of applied art, appearance designs seeking
copyright protection become embodied in mass-produced useful articles of
every kind. 6 With the notable exception of France, courts and legislators in
most industrialized countries limit copyright protection of three-dimensional appearance designs7 in order to defend the capacity of their industrial
property systems to mediate between innovation and competition on the
general products market. 8 Trapped between the patent and copyright para177-83 (1974); Law on Designs and Models (Design Law) [France), July 14, 1909,last
amended by decree of Apr. 24, 1980, reprinted in DEsiGN LAWS, supra note 3, France,

5.
6.

7.

8.

item I (English version 1909 text); Act Concerning Copyright in Designs of January
II, 1876 (Design Act (Geschmacksmuster» [Fed. Rep. of Germany), as last amended
Dec. 18, 1986, effective Dec. 18, 1986, and July I, 1988, reprinted in GERMAN INDUS·
TRIAL PROPERTY, COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST LAws 82-89 (F.K. Beier, G. Schricker, and
W. Fikentscher 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter GERMAN LAws]; Decree No. 1411 on Models
and Designs of Aug. 25, 1940 [Italy), as amended May 23, 1977, June 27, 1979
(Decree No. 338), and Feb. 14, 1987 (Decree No. 60) [hereinafter Italian design law),
reprinted in DESIGN LAws, supra note 3 ,Italy, item I (1940 English version), reprinted in
ARMONIZZAZIONE DELLA NORMATIVA IN MATERIA Dt BREVETrI PER MODELL! E DtSEGNI
INDUSTRIALI CON LE DtSPOSIZIONI DELL'AcCORDO DELLJ\JA DEL 6 NOVEMBRE 1925, E
SUCCESSIVI REVISIONI, RATIFlCATE CON LEGGE 24 OrrosRE 1980, N. 744 [legge 14
Febbraio 1987, n.6O) (L.c. Ubertazzi ed.), II LE NUOVE LEGal ClVICI COMMENTATE
589-90 (1988) (Italian text) [hereinafter ARMONIZZAZIONE DELLA NORMATlVA]; Nordic
Design Laws, reprinted in 10 INDUS. PROP. 223-40 (1971) (English version) (effective in
1970 in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and in 1971 in Finland). For citations to, and
summary descriptions of other foreign (,Iesign laws, see A.M. GREENE, DESIGNS AND
UTILITY MODELS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (1989).
See infra text accompanying notes 319-31,813-17,845-58,889-95.
See, e.g., B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF CoPYRIGHT 55 (1967) (warning of "the
dangers of injecting copyright into complex, going market mechanisms"); see also
Comment, CopyrighJ Protection for Mass-Produced, Commercial Products: A Review of
the Developments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. CHI. L. REV, 807 (1971) [hereinafter
Comment, CopyrighJ Protection).
France allows all ornamental and some functional designs of useful articles to claim
concurrent protection in copyright law whether or not eligible for protection under its
sui generis.design law. See, e.g., Gaubiac, La tMorie de ['unite de ['art, III R.l.D.A. 2
(1982) (describing and criticizing French regime of total cumulation under the "unity
of art" doctrine); Desbois, Le systemefrancais: La theorie de ['unite de ['art, reprinted
in LES PERSPECTIVES D'UN DROIT COMMUNAlrTAIRE EN MATIERE DE DESSINS ET
MODELES INDUSTRIELS 74 (Centre Universitaire d'Enseignement et de Recherche de
Propri~te Industrielle (CUERPl) ed. 1977) [hereinafter LES PERSPECTIVES]; see also
infra text accompanying notes 813-47.
See infra notes 44-46,832-47 and accompanying text. For recent comparative surveys,
see, e.g., Perot-Morel, Les enseignements du droit compare europeen etles perspectives
communautaires [hereinafter Perot-Morel, Les enseignements), in LES DESSINS ET
MODELES EN QuESTION: LE DROIT ET LA PRATIQUE 147-230 (A. Fran~on & M.A.
Perot-Morel eds. 1986) [hereinafter LES DEsslNS ET MODELES EN QuESTION]; Benussi,
Protection of Industrial Designs in Italian and Comparative European Law, 25 INDUS.
PROP. 61 (1986); Duchemin, General Report-The Protection of Designs and Models
[hereinafter Duchemin, General Report) in ALAI, LA PROTECTION DES DESSINS ET
MODELES 47-79 (1985) [hereinafter ALAI 1984) (proceedings of the Symposium held
at Paris, Apr. 5-6, 1984); Cohen Jehoram, Protection of Industrial Design Between
Copyright and Design Laws: A Comparative Study [hereinafter Cohen Jehoram, Comparative'Study], in ALAI, CONGRESS OF THE AEGEAN SEA 77-104 (1984) [hereinafter
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digms, yet ill-served by both,9 industrial design constitutes a legal hybrid lO
whose cyclical path through history still destabilizes the world's intellectual
property system II despite some two hundred years of regulatory action. 12
Although the United States has never enacted a sui generis design protection law like those adopted abroad l3 and did not recognize works of
applied art until 1954,14 its intellectual property system registers the same
disruptive tendencies attributable to the design phenomenon that other
industrialized countries have long experienced. IS Historically opposed to
copyright protection of industrial art under the French "unity of art" doctrine, I this country's intellectual property authorities struggled to exclude
commercial designs from the Copyright Act of 1909 while petitioning Congress to enact an innovative design protection law built on modified copyright principles. 17 Between 1955 and 1976, the United States thus seemed
ALAI 1983] (proceedings of the Congress held in Greece on Apr. 13-20, 1983). For
most recent source, see also DiSEGNO INDUSTRIALE E PROTEZIONE EUROPEA (1989)
(proceedings of the Internalional Conference held at Treviso, Italy, on Oct. 12-13,
1988). For earlier comparative studies that remain authoritative, see generally DESIGN
PRoTECrION (H. Cohen Jehoram ed. 1976); F. PERRET, L'AurONOMIE Du REGIME DE
PROTECrION DES DEsSINS ET MODELES (1974); M.A. ~ROT-MoREL, LES PRINCIPES DE
PROTECrION DEs DEsSINS ET MODELES DANS LES PAYS Du MARCHE COMMUN (1968)
[hereinafter M.A. ~ROT-MoREL, LES PRINCIPES]; Duchemin, La protection des arts
appliques dans la perspective d'un depot communautaire en matiere de dessins et
modeles industriels, 97 R.l.D.A. 4 (1978) [hereinafter Duchemin, La protection].
9. For the anomalous application of both the Berne and Paris Conventions, supra note I,
to the same matter with different legal results contingent upon artificial distinctions
between "applied art" and "industrial design," see generally, Perot-Morel, Les contraintes conventionelles, IN LES DEsSINS ET MODELES EN QuESTION, supra note 8, at
117-46.
10. M.A. ~ROT-MoREL, LES PRINCIPES, supra note 8, at 16.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 781-865.
12. The first legislation on designs was reportedly a British Act of 1787 "for the encouragement of the arts of designing and printing linens, cottons, calicoes and muslins." 2 S.
LADAS, supra note 1, at 829. Although this act appears to follow the principles of artistic property law, the French design law of 1806, which made designs a branch of industrial property law, was the model followed by the rest of the world.
13. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
14. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); infra text accompanying notes 333-34.
15. Compare infra text accompanying notes 782-810 (pendular swings in domestic law)
with infra text accompanying notes 811-65 (over- and underprotection in foreign law).
16. See, e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note 1, at 836 (noting British and American opposition to
French "unity of art" doctrine at Hague Conference of 1925); Fisher, The Operations oj
the Copyright Office (address before the meeting of the ABA Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, Aug. 30, 1960) [hereinafter Fisher AddressJ, reprinted in
PRocEEDINGS OF THE ABA-SECrION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK & CoPYRIGHT LAw 202,
207-08 (1960) (stressing dangers of applying copyright law to commercial designs).
For the "unity of art" doctrine, see supra note 7; infra note 43 and accompanying text.
17. See generally Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law:
From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1143,
1174-82, 1186-1213, 1223-49 (1983) [hereinafter Reichman, Designs Before 1976);
Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of
the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'y U.S.A. 267, 298-324, 350-66
(1984) [hereinafter Reichman, Designs After 1976J.
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committed to a noncumulationist solution that would have combined the criterion of "separability" familiar from Italian copyright law with an American regime of special design protection that aimed to be a model to the
world. '8
When, in 1976, Congress passed the General Revision of Copyright
Law after some two decades of lacerating deliberations, the accumulated
tensions surrounding the treatment of borderline utilitarian works issued in
two contradictory sets of provisions. At one extreme, Congress apgc;ared to
reject a "unity of art" heresy brewing in the federal district courts' by codifying the criterion of separability as the sole basis for distinguishing copyrightable works of applied art from noncopyrightable industrial designs. 2o
The new definitions of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works" and of
"useful articles" set out in section 101 effectively denied copyright r.rotection to most three-dimensional, modern designs of useful articles. I The
proposed sui generis design bill, however, still .pending in early 1976 as
Title II of the General Revision Bill, was deleted at the last minute by the
vote of a closely divided House Subcommittee, and that bill was never
restored to the Final Act signed into law on October 19, 1976. 22
18. See Fabiani, La protezione delfarte applicata e dell'industrial design in ltalia e neg/i
USA, 57lL DIRITTODI AUTORE 414 (1986) [hereinafter Fabiani, lA Protezione del/'arte
applicata); Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1181-1200,1213-23 (citing authorities); see also infra notes 74, 341-42. 920-34 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g .• Esquire. Inc. v. Ringer. 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding design of
outdoor parking lamp to be a copyrightable work of applied art). rev 'd. 591 F.2d 796
(D.C. Cir. 1978). cert. denied. 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Eltra Corp. v. Ringer. 194 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 198 (E.D. Va. 1976) (finding that typeface design was copyrightable). affd on
other grounds. 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978).
20. See 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988) (definition of "pictorial. graphic. and sculptural works"
plus definition of "useful article").
21. 17 U.S.c. § 10 I (1988). The new definitions read as follows:
"Pictorial. graphic. and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and threedimensional works of fine. graphic. and applied art, photographs. prints and
art reproductions. maps. globes. charts. technical drawings. diagrams. and
models. Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the
design of a useful article. as defined in this section. shall be considered a pictorial. graphic. or sculptural work only if and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently oj, the utilitarian
aspects of lhe article.

A "useful article" is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.
An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a "useful
article."
1d. (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659-801 (stressing effort to clarify "the distinction between works of applied art protectable under the bill and industrial designs not subject to copyright protection") (emphasis added); infra text accompanying notes 343-475.
22. See Reichman. Designs Before 1976. supra note 17, at 1261-64.
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At the other extreme, Congress proceeded to codify language, pending
since 1964 in the very same section of the Copyright Act, which in effect
instituted a "unity of literature" approach to computer programs. 23 In so
doing, Congress declined to treat computer programs as "useful articles,"
and it did not carryover to industrial literature any of the doctrinal limitations it had just imposed on applied art, including the highly exclusionary
criterion of separability.24 When Congress further enacted the Software
Protection Act of 1980,25 it confirmed t~e liberal dispositions concerning
the copyrightability of industrial literature as codified in 1976,26 without
any clarification of the restrictive and altogether contradictory dispositions
concerning industrial art that were adopted-without a special design
law-in the General Revision of 1976. 27

B.

Noncumulation Without a Design Law

The provisions codified in 1976 shunted most three-dimensional
designs of useful articles to the Design Patent Act of 1842. 28 But few com23. See Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications 0/
Copyright Protection/or Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 641.
690-96, 693 n.288 (1989) [hereinafter Reichman. Programs as Know-How) ("Aberrations of the 'Unity of Literature' Approach"). The definition of "literary works" in 17
US.C § 101 was devised to include computer programs, while the definition of "useful
articles" excluded computer programs because they are presumably works that "convey
information." See supra note 21. There is no test of separability for industrial literature built into the definition of literary works, nor can computer programs be "designs
of useful articles" since they "convey information." Also of capital importance for
computer programs viewed as "literary works" was the elimination of the visibility rule
previously applied to all copyrightable subject matter. 17 US.C. § 102(a) (1988).
Finally, § 113(b) of the 1976 Act applies to industrial designs but not to computer programs. This provision (sorely needed these days in foreign law) prevents any two-dimensional depiction of a useful article, such as an engineering drawing or blueprint,
from protecting the article so portrayed when given a three-dimensional embodiment.
See 17 U.S.C § 113(b) (1988) (codifying prior law); Reichman. Designs Be/ore 1976.
supra note 17. at 1201-13 (explaining the evolution and purpose of this provision); infra
notes 356-59 and accompanying text. However, no comparable provision was added or
extended to verbal blueprints that portray or depict machine parts beyond an express
exclusion for ideas. methods of operation. concepts, principles. procedures, processes,
systems or discoveries in 17 US.C § 102(b) (1988). See generally Carey. Copyright
Registration and Computer Programs. II BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 362 (1964).
24. Compare authorities cited supra note 21 with authorities cited supra note 23.
25. Software Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517. § lO(b), 94 Stat. 3015. 3028
(1980) (codified as amended at 17 US.C. §§ 101. 117 (1988». Besides enacting the
current version of § 117, which deals with user rights to make copies for archival purposes or for purposes of certain adaptations, the 1980 legislation added the following
definition of computer programs to the list of definitions in § 101: "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Id. § 101. See generally Samuelson.
CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in
Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DuKE L.J. 663, 727-49 (1984) (discussing utilitarian
character of machine-readable computer programs).
26. See supra note 23.
27. Compare provisions quoted supra note 21 with provisions quoted supra note 23.
28. See supra notes 3, 20-22; infra notes 68, 370-74 and accompanying text. Two-dimen-
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mercial designers could satisfy the high standards of patentability under the
best of circumstances,29 while judicial hostility to this institution had rendered even issued design patents so vulnerable to invalidation in the past
that some authorities deemed them hardly worth the cost and effort to
obtain. 30 As regards unfair competition, moreover, the United States
Supreme Court, in the Sears-Compco decisions of 1964,31 had ruled that
neither state nor' federal laws appealing to the misappropriation rationale
could protect" unplltented, noncopyrightable industrial designs against slavish imitation as sucb.. 32 ..
The Copyrig'ht Act of.J 97f, thus appeared to consign the bulk of the commercially most valuable appearance designs to the public domain, notwithstanding this country's obligation' to protect industrial designs under article 5
quinquies of the Paris Convention. 33 This result satisfied those who opposed
sui generis legislation on the grounds that the case for exempting industrial
designs from free competition had not been established. 34 It contrasts with
the view prevailing abroad, which assigns design protection an important role
in world trade;35 and it ignored the past tendencies offoreign courts to expand

29.
30.
31.
32.
. 33.
34.

35.

sional designs remained subject to copyright protection under longstanding judicial
and administrative practice. See, e.g., I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COpyRIGHT § 2.08[H)[2] (1988) [hereinafter M. & D. NIMMER] (citing cases); as did certain
three-dimensional product designs in traditional or representational shapes. See I P.
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT-PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 151-58 (1989); infra notes
352-68 and accompanying text. Moreover, noncumulation between the Copyright Act
of 1976 and the Design Patent Act of 1842 is not absolute in the sense that a copyright
registration will not impede the grant of a design patent if the other prerequisites are
met. See, e.g., In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Given a one year novelty
grace period in regard to commercial exploitation under the Design Patent Act, 35
US.C. §§ 102, 171 (1988), it is technically possible for a design that satisfied both the
separability test of copyright law and the nonobviousness test of patent law to remain
protected by the former until the grant of protection under the latter. See, e.g., I O.
CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[5], at 1-234. As a practical matter, this wiJI rarely
occur. Moreover, once a design patent issues, the Copyright Office wiJI not register a
copyright claim to the same design. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 202.IO(a)-(b) (1989);
Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929). But see
Clarke v. G. A. Kayser & Sons, Inc., 205 US.P.Q. (BNA) 610 (W.O. Pa. 1979).
See infra notes 69,89-97, 110-44 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
Compco Corp. v. Oay-Britel:ighting, Inc., 376 US. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 US. 225 (1964); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 US. 141 (1989).
See, e.g., 17 US.C. § 301(a)-(b) (1988) (codifying Sears-Compco in part); Brown,
Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1359 (1987); infra text
accompanying notes 527-29 .
See Paris Convention, art. 5 quinquies, quoted in supra note I.
"The Department of Justice strongly opposed the creation of this new form of intellectual property on the grounds that no need for it had been demonstrated." 122 CONGo
REC. 31,979 (1976) (Statement of Chairman Robert W. Kastenmeier). Both the Copyright Office and the Commerce Department had, however, strongly favored the design
protection bills deleted from the General Revision of Copyright bills in 1976. See generally Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 358-61.
See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GREEN PAPER ON COPYRIGHT
AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGy-COPYRIGHT ISSUES REQUIRING IMMEDIATE
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copyright and unfair competition laws in order to compensate for a lack of sui
generis design protection. 36 If, in short, Congress intended to maint~in
healthy competition in the design industries, it had neglected to indicate just
how the United States could accomplish this result without an op:rative
design law when the other industrialized countries had failed. 37
1.

Early Judicial Responses: 1976-1982

That the federal appellate courts in this country were no more disposed
to tolerate systematic design piracy than their foreign counterparts became
increasingly evident in the period between 1978, when the new copyright
law took effect,38 and 1982, when a specialized appellate tribunal began to
hear patent appeals. 39 In this period, for example, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit attempted to expand the protection of appearance
designs as copyrightable works of applied art by magnifying the ambiguities inherent in the separability criterion codified in 1976.40 Some federal
appellate courts, including the Second Circuit, also began to treat product
and container configurations as unregistered trademarks protectable within
the federal unfair competition law developing around section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. 41
As these early trends gathered momentum, comparative analysis
revealed striking affinities between the different responses to the design
problem emerging in domestic law and the conflicting approaches to the
same problem that have long prevented the Berne Union countries from

36.
37.

38.
39.
40.
41.

AcnON 2, 16 (Com. (88) 172 final, June 7, 1988) (hereinafter EC GREEN PAPER). The
Commission stresses the economic role of "goods to which considerable value has been
added through the application of technology, skill and creativity;" it notes that the
"superior performance and non-material attributes of such goods, such as their design
or image, constitute their main competitive advantages;" and it warns that economic
expansion will be lessened by tolerating losses to these industries due to unauthorized
copying. Id. at 2. See also Posner, The Legal Protection of Industrial Designs-Some
Community Aspects, in D1sEGNO INDUSTRIALE E PRarEziONE EUROPEA, supra note 8, at
333,335.
See infra note 37; infra notes 521-24 and accompanying text. The Copyright Office
feared the pressures that victims of design piracy were exerting on the copyright and
unfair competition laws in this country and abroad. See Fisher Address, supra note 16.
Consider in this light the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands, which were the only
countries in the European Community to operate 'without a design law in the period
1950 to 1975. See Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 283-97. In Belgium, the copyright law expanded to accommodate virtually all commercial designs;
in the Netherlands, unfair competition law expanded to accommodate many commercial designs. Both countries enacted a special design law, effective in 1975. See supra
note 4.
See 17 U.S.C. Trans. & Supp. Section 102 (1988).
For a discussion of the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
1982, see infra notes 141, 145 and accompanying text.
See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); infra
text accompanying notes 374-95.
See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981); Truck Equip.
Servs. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 563 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861
(1976); infra notes 530-53 and accompanying text.
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reaching a consensus concerning applied art and industrial designs. 42
Three orthodox positions are still recognized in foreign and international
law. At one extreme, partisans of the "unity of art" doctrine codified in
France advocate full and cumulative copyright protection for all industrial
art, regardless of any protection otherwise available from sui generis design
laws operating under the aegis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property.43 At the opposite extreme, partisans of noncumulationas codified in Italy oppose copyright protection of industrial desl§ns and
look to sui generis design laws governed by the Paris Convention. Partisans of a third position, which the High Court of Germany has implemented
since the turn of the century, prefer a regime of partial cumulation to either
of these extremes. This school allows full copyright protection to a few
exceptional designs of useful articles under a case-by-case test of artistic
achievement while relegating most commercial designs to a sui generis
regime. 4s Although individual member states sometimes change their
affiliations, the Berne Union countries as a whole remain divided into irreconcilable camps along these Iines.46
42. For the laCK of consensus among the Berne Union countries as reflected in the Berne
Convention, supra note I, art. 2(7), see generally S. RICKETSON, supra note I, at
267-69,280-82. The Berne Convention, supra note 1, as revised at Brussels in 1948,
obligated member countries to recognize some works of applied art, but it left the member countries free to determine the line of demarcation between copyrightable works of
applied art and noncopyrightable industrial-designs that remained subject to domestic
design laws and, later, to article 5 quinquies of the Paris Convention, supra note I. See,
e.g., S. RICKETSON, supra note 1, at 276-79 (discussing articles 2( I), 2(5) of the 1948
text of the Berne Convention); see also Geller, International Copyright: An Introduction
§ 4 [I][c][i), in I INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAw AND PRACI"ICE (P. Geller ed. 1990)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CoPYRIGHT LAw). These provisions, with their discordant
application of reciprocity, were carried over to article 2(7) of the present Berne text.
However, the duration of protection for works of applied art was extended to a minimum of twenty-five years in article 7(4), and the notion of reciprocity as regards works
"protected in the country of origin solely as designs and models" was refined to ensure
that, in countries where no design law existed, copyright protection must be afforded.
See Berne Convention, supra note I, arts. 2(1), 2(7), 7(4); S. RICKETSON, supra note I,
at 279-80.
43. See supra note 7 (citing Gaubiac and Desbois); Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra
note 17, at 1153-59 (discussing unity of art doctrine in France).
44. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1182-86 (dissociation theory in
Italy); id. at 1213-23 (criterion of separability in Italian law); infra text accompanying
notes 374-80.
45. See, e.g., Reimer, The Rell1tions Between Copyright Protection and the Protection of
Designs and Models in Gemuln Law, 98 R.I.D.A. 38 (1978); infra notes 393, 401-03
and accompanying text (citing other authorities).
46. The situation today is thus no clearer than it was in 1948. See Perot-Morel, us
enseignements, supra note 8; Cohen Jehoram, Comparative Study, supra note 8;
Duchemin, General Report, supra note 8, at 58-62; see also S_ RICKETSON, supra note
I, at 281-82 (summarizing "three broad national approaches to the protection of works
of applied art in Berne Union countries"); EC GREEN PAPER, supra note 35, at 16
(deferring legislative initiatives concerning designs and models until "the time is ripe"
and stressing that "(a]t present ... it would be unrealistic to think that such legislative
proposals could be launched with a reasonable chance of success"). The positions of
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy remain essentially unchanged. The
Nordic countries and Switzerland reportedly follow a regime of partial cumulation
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After 1976, United States courts and administrators increasingly succumbed to the same divisive tendencies that had long plagued the Berne
Union. For example, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh
and District of Columbia Circuits appeared to align themselves with the
neo-Italian regime of noncumulation that the Copyright Office had formally
endorsed since 1958. 47 In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit pursued a regime of partial cumulation closely resembling that of the Federal Republic of Germany.48 Those federal appellate
courts that began to apply section 43(a) of the Lanham Act49 displayed the
same protectionist bias that had induced Netherlands courts to shelter
industrial designs in unfair com~etition law until the Uniform Benelux
Designs Act took effect in 1975. 0 Meanwhile, individual judges on all

47.
48.

49.
50.

more or less along the lines of the Federal Republic. Spain also appears to follow a
regime of partial cumulation like that of the Federal Republic, as does Austria. See
Lastres, Refiexiones sobre Ia figura del modelo industrial en el derecho Espanol, in
DtSEGNO INDUSTRIALE E PRorEZIONE EUROPEA, supra note 8, at 119, 123-24; Walter,
The Legal Protection of Industrial Design in Austria, in DtSEGNO INDUSTRIALE E
PRarEZIONE EUROPEA, supra note 8, at 101-05. The Benelux countries formally
adhered to a similar regime in 1975, but courts have continued to expand cumulative
protection of industrial designs in copyright law, especially in the Netherlands. See
Cohen Jehoram, Netherlands § 2[4][c], in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAw, supra note
42; Braun, Les systemes de cumul partiel de protection par les lois specifiques et par Ie
droit d'auteur, in LA PRon:.cTloN DEs CREATIONS D'EsTHETIQUE INDUSTRIELLE DANS
LE CADRE DE LA C.E.E.-OBJECTIF 1992, at 97-106 (C.UE.R.P.I. & A.D.E.R.P.1. eds.
1988) [hereinafter OsJECTIF 1992] (proceedings of the international conference held at
Chateau de Sassenage, France, June 17, 1988).
The United Kingdom allowed cumulative protection in copyright law after 1968
(while admitting some purely functional designs to full copyright protection in the
same period). But the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, §§ 213-64,
may have eliminated cumulative protection for all commercially exploited industrial
designs in conjunction with the enactment of an unregistered design right. See generally Fellner, The New United Kingdom Industrial Design Law, 19 U BALT. L. REV. 369
(1989) [hereinafter Fellner, New U.K. Law]. For the implications of this development,
see infra text accompanying notes 938-63.
See Norris Indus., Inc. v. lIT, 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818
(1983); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cerr. denied, 440 US.
908 (1979); infra text accompanying notes 369-73.
See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 E2d 905,909-11,914-15 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1982); L.
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 480 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
857 (1976). See generally Reichman, Designs After 1976. supra note 17, at 312-50
(quantitative and qualitative creativity in the Second Circuit). For more recent cases
that struggle with and appear to retreat from this nascent regime of partial cumulation,
see Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); Carol
Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985); infra text accompanying notes 374-520.
See supra note 41; infra notes 526-52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 37. For current tendencies to treat slavish imitation as tortious misappropriation actionable in unfair competition law, especially with regard to' new technologies, see, e.g., P.l. KAUFMANN, PASSINGDFF AND MISAPPROPRIATION 83 (1986); Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT
Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 781-94 (1989) [hereinafter Reichman,
GAT[ Connection].
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these courts openly endorsed the views of the late Professor Melville Nimmer, whose influential treatise downplayed the codification of separability in
1976 and continued to advocate broad copyright protection of industrial
designs in keeping with the unity of art thesis established in France. 51
2.

Current Trends and the Quest for a Universal Solution

That it took the federal appellate courts only a few years to recapitulate
on these shores the chequered history of design protection law abroad
testifies to the universality of the phenomena under investigation. 52 Viewed
prospectively, moreover, comparative analysis made it plausible to advance
three predictions concerning the future evolution of design protection law in
the United States on the basis of past developments abroad.
The first prediction was that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which took office in 1982,53 would dismantle the judge-made barriers
to design patent protection inherited from the past and thereby enable the
Design Patent Act to implement its original goals. 54 A second prediction
was that efforts to fashion a regime of partial cumulation between copyright
law and the design patent law would falter under pressure from judges and
commentators who refused to compromise with the principle of nondiscrimination. 55 A third prediction was that the federal courts would
aggressively expand trademark and unfair competition law in order to prevent slavish imitators from appropriating innovative commercial designs
that found no haven in positive intellectual property law. 56
These predictions are borne out by a survey of the empirical data .for
the period 1983 to 1990. Part II of the present Article accordingly
describes the evolution of United States design protection law after 1982,
with a view to demonstrating both the accuracy of these predictions and the
amplitude of their fulfillment. 57
Part III considers why comparative analysis could predict legal outcomes so different from those Congress ostensibly meant to obtain when it

51. "The Mazer opinion can be read to mean that any useful anicle, at least if it is aesthetically pleasing in appearance, is subject to copyright protection with respecl to its
form." I M. & D. NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.08[B](3]; see also Reichman, Designs
Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1152, 1211 n.347 (noting testimony of Barbara Ringer,
who identified Professor Nimmer's views with "the concept of unity of an that some
countries follow" and contrasted them with the opposing views of Professor Derenberg); Latman, Fifteen Years After Mazer v. Stein: A Brief Perspective, 16 BULL. Copy·
RIGHT SOC'y 278 (1969).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 781-865.
53. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
54. See Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 362-65.
55. See id. at 381-82. For recent developments in Benelux law consistent with this same
prediction, see, e.g., Cohen Jehoram, Netherlands. supra note 46; Braun, supra note 46.
at 104-06.
56. See Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 335-36, 379, 382.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 319-31,476-524, 725-80 (summarizing and evaluating these findings).
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jettisoned the sui generis design bill in 1976. 58 This inquiry will show that
the behavior of industrial designs under domestic law has followed a cyclical pattern that oscillates between states of chronic underprotection and
states of chronic overprotection. 59 When this behavior is compared with
that of industrial designs uneler foreign intellectual property laws, the same
cyclical pattern emerges as a common characteristic of the design phenomenon in all relevant legal environments. 60
.
The study then examines the underlying causes of, and potential cures
for, this cyclical behavior pattern that has so singularly disrupted the world's
intp.llectual property system. D~parting from the observation that industrial design is the oldest legal hybrid falling between the patent and copyright systems, the study finds that past regulatory action was distorted by an
ingrained tendency to analyze the design problem in terms of either "art" or
"inventions," that is to say, in terms of false premises suggested by the dominant legal paradigms. 61 In contrast, recent difficulties in securing adequate legal protection for new technologies, such as semiconductor chip
designs and computer programs, suggest that it is more fruitful to view
iridustrial design as a precursor of the many legal hybrids that world intellectual property law would struggle to accommodate in the latter half of the
twentieth century. 62
From this angle, the commercialization of applied scientific know-how
appears to suffer from the same regulatory disabilities as have always afflicted industrial designs, and efforts to protect new technologies increasingly
manifest the same cyclical pattern of behavior: 63 This finding helps to
explain why the demand for copyright protection of these technologies has
grown so strident in recent years and why actual delivery of such protection
frustrates many of the regulatory goals it is supposed to advance. 64 Assimilating the problems that applied scientific know-how currently encounters to
the difficulties that industrial design has always encountered also explains
why sui generis design laws built on modified patent principles seldom succeed. By the same token, adoption of a modified copyright model could
break the cyclical behavior patterns characteristic of both old and new legal
hybrids operating in different legal environments. 65
The study recommends that those seeking to harmonize the design
laws of the European Community should focus their attentions on a modified
copyright approach not unlike that which the United States Congress
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 782-810.
See infra text accompanying notes 811-65.
See infra text accompanying notes 866-79.
See infra text accompanying notes 880-98.
See Reichman. Programs as Know-How. supra note 23. at 648-67; infra text accompanying notes 873-79.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 901-17.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 880-972.
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neglected to enact in 1976. 66 Such a model, once implemented by leading
industrialized countries, could then influence the future course of design
protection in the United States. It could also facilitate the elaboration of a
sui generis law capable of dealing with advanced technological know-how
on its own terms without the excesses of under- and overprotection that
recur whenever incremental innovation is squeezed into legal paradigms
devised for the regulation of art and inventions. 67
II.

MORPHOLOGY OF UNITED STATES DESIGN PROTECTION
LAW IN THE 1980s

A.

A New Court Revives an" Old Design Law

Although the Design Patent Act of 184268 recognized ornamental
designs of useful articles as patentable subject matter, it did nothing to soften the formal and substantive prerequisites of the full patent paradigm in
the interests of promoting the decorative arts. 69 In the early years, the federal judiciary appeared to accept the statutory policy at face value and
allowed industrial designs to qualify for protection on fairly relaxed conditions. 7o As the "substantive prerequisites applicable to utility patents grew
more stringent, however, courts began to question the social value of design
patents that too readily enabled manufacturers to avoid competition by
claiming to improve the appearance of articles reproduced in series. These
doubts soon found expression in strict standards of nonfunctionality and of
inventive height that exposed even design patents that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) had issued after full examination of the prior art to a
high risk of judicial invalidation in the course of actions for infringement. 71
66. See infra text accompanying notes 935-37.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 917-72.
68. Act of Aug. 29, 1842 [US.A.], ch. 263, § 2,5 Stat. 543 (1842), (codified as amended at
35 US.c. §§ 171-73,289 (1988». See generally 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[1];
Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent Protection in the United
States, 30"J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 380 (1948). In 1982, Congress eliminated the possibility
of paying lesser fees for shorter periods of protection and made all design patents issue
for a period of fourteen years. The Patent Fee Act, 35 US.c. § 173 (1988).
69. Section 171 of the Design Patent Act provides as follows: "Whoever invents any new,
original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. The provisions of this
title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided." 35 US.c. § 171 (1988). The purpose of the Act was to stimulate the
production of superior designs and not merely to recognize the creators' natural rights.
See, e.g., Hudson, supra note ~8, at 380-81; Nimetz, Design Protection, 15 CoPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 19, 80 n.l (1967). The decision to follow a patenl approach was
influenced by the industrial nature of the material support as well as by purely historical factors. See id. (citing authorities).
70. See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 122-25 (citing authorities).
71. See, e.g., id. at 83 (stating that "the hostility of the courts to patents in general and to
design patents in particular makes a design patent a most uncertain form of protection"); id. at 113-28 (high standards of nonfunctionality and invention);" see also infra
notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
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Three Decades of Suspended Animation: 1952-1982

By 1952, when the patent law underwent its last general revision, most
observers believed that the design patent provisions had become too dysfunctional to accomplish their original purpose.72 But the revisers chose to
ignore these provisions on the premise that a sui generis approach to the
design problem was more consonant with the reform movement gathering
momentum both here and abroad.73 In this spirit, the American intellectual property authorities developed an innovative, sui generis law providing
short-term protection for ornamental designs of useful articles under a
modified copyright approach that departed from the modified patent
approach heretofore used in foreign law. 74 When Congress ultimately
rejected these ~roposals in 1976, it left the Design Patent Act exactly as it
stood in 1952. 5 This law still requires patentable designs to meet the same
tests of semi-absolute novelty and of nonobviousness that are applied to utility patents76 and to undergo the same procedural ordeal of an examination
at the Patent and Trademark Office based on a search of the prior art. 77

a.

Novelty and Nonobviousness Compared

Ironically, most foreign design laws impose a more lethal standard of
novelty than that found in the United States Design Patent Act. 78 For exam72. See, e.g., Derenberg, Copyright No-Man's Land: Fringe Rights in Literary and Artistic
Property, 351. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 627,693-706 (1953); Reichman, Designs Before 1976,
supra note 17, at 1190 n.245 (citing Ringer, Bogsch, and Judge Giles S. Rich).
73. See generally Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1164-67, 1165 n.115
(citing authorities); id. at 1176-77,1186-1200. In the 1950s, the United States played
an active role in the movement to strengthen the international protection of industrial
designs within the framework of the Hague and Paris Conventions.
74. See H.R. 8873, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) (Willis Bill) (copy on file at the Center for
Research Libraries, Chicago, Illinois), refined by S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959)
(O'Mahoney-Wiley-Hart Bill). For the view that these proposals still bear on a universally valid solution to the design problem, see infra text accompanying notes 935-37.
75. See supra notes 17-18, 22 and accompanying text. See generally Reichman, Designs
Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1176-77, 1180-82, 1186-1200. Proponents of the sui
generis law had intended to keep the design patent law on the books, and not to repeal
it, in part because this would prevent courts from elevating the threshold of protection
underthe special design law. Id. at 1191 & n.254.
.
76. See 35 U.S.c. § 102 (1988) (novelty); id. § 103 (nonobviousness); id. § 171, quoted in
supra note 69; 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2), at 1-184, who states:
A design, consisting of the configuration or surface ornamentation of an article of manufacture, is patentable if it meets the general requirements of novelty, originality, and nonobviousness and is ornamental. A design need not
meet the requirement of utility and indeed will not be p.atentable if its form is
dictated solely by considerations of function.
A quirk of the general novelty requirement, however, is that its absolute
barrier extends only to publications, whereas prior use of either an invention or
a design outside the United States does not of itself defeat novelty.
1d.; see 35 U.S.c. §§ 102(a), 171 (1988).
77. See, e.g., 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[3]; P. RoSENBERG, PATENT LAw FUNDAMENTALS § 15_03 (1988); Fryer, Industrial Design Protection in the United States of Amer·
ica-Present Situation and Plans for Revision, 27 INDUS. PROP. 115, 118 (1988).
78_ 35 U.S.c. §§ 102, 171 (1988)_ .
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pie, the novelty standard in some foreign laws disglays a mQre absolute character as regards antecedent designs in prior use, 7 although there is a recent
tendency to limit the field of prior art both in temporal and geographical
terms. 80 Foreign design law may also insist on more quantitative distance
between a candidate design and the prior art than the novelty standard customarily requires in this country. 81 Apart from Japan and, lately, the Federal Republic of Germany,82 moreover, the novelty standard present in most
foreign design laws lacks any grace period whatsoever. 83
The lack of a grace period means that even proprietors who com mer79. See. e.g .• Duchemin, General Report, supra note 8, at 63 (finding that foreign design
laws characteristically require "objective and absolute novelty, implying the absence of
precedents, with no limitations of time or space").
80. For example, the Benelux countries "adopt the concept of objective but relative novelty:
only models which during the fifty years preceding the deposit were actually familiar in
the Benelux industrial or commercial circles concerned and which have not been
deposited are taken into consideration." Id. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the
concept of novelty is also objective but relative to antecedents that are "familiar among
specialized circles within the country or accessible to them without great difficulty."
Id. at 64. In the United Kingdom, novelty under the Registered Designs Act "is in
theory absolute, but particular attention is paid to designs registered or published in the
UK." Fellner. United Kingdom, in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 141-42.
81. Compare infra note 89 and accompanying text with Duchemin, General Report, supra
note 8 (stressing emphasis on objective novelty in Nordic countries, the Benelux couotries, the Federal Republic of Germany. the United Kingdom, and Canada). Italy, however, has consistently applied a flexible standard of novelty to ornamental designs. See,
e.g., Duchemin, General Report. supra note 8. at 64; Reichman, Designs Before 1976,
supra note 17. at 1214 (stating that the "novelty requirement, although strict with
regard to prior divulgation, is otherwise satisfied by a relative rather than an absolute
measure of differentiation from the prior art") (citing Fabiani). France, of course, is
also an exception, since the concept of novelty under the Law on Design and Models of
July 14, 1909, approximates that of originality in French copyright law. See. e.g.,
Duchemin, General Report. supra note 8, at 64 (quoting Perot-Morel). For the atypical
structure and character of the French design law owing to the influence of copyright
law on all aspects of design protection under a regime of total cumulation, see, e.g.,
Perot-Morel, France, in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at J 17-18.
82. See Law No. 125 of April 13, 1959 (Design Law) [Japan], as revised through 1975,
reprinted in JAPANESE LAws RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (J.P.O. rev. ed. 1979).
Although article 3( I) of the Japanese Design Law adopts the principle of absolute novelty, an exception under article 4(2) enables creators "to test the marketability of their
designs by way of test sale, public display or distribution of samples." T. DOl, THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OF JAPAN 100, 103-04 (1980). As regards the Federal
Republic of Germany. § 7(a) of the Act Concerning Copyright in Designs as amended
in 1986, supra note 4, introduced a six-month novelty grace period. See, e.g.,
Loschelder, The New German Model and Design Act, 191.1.C. 622, 629-30 (1988); see
also E. GERSTENBERG, GESCHMACKSMUSTERGESETZ 54-56 (2d ed. 1988); O. VON
GAMM, GESCHMACKSMUSTERGESETZ (2d ed. 1989); B. ENGLERT, GRUNDZUGE DES
RECHTSSCHlTfZES INDUSTRIELLEN FoRMGEBUNG 50-78 (1978).
83. Compare 35 U.S.c. §§ 102(b), 171 (1988) (one year novelty grace period in respect of
public use and on sale bars) with Duchemin, General Report, supra note 8, at 65 (noting
that "[w]ith the exception of France [and now the Federal Republic], all the [EC] countries require that the model not be disclosed before it is deposited"). In France, owing
in part to the system of total cumulation between design law and copyright law, disclosure before deposit has no effect on the validity of design protection. See Duchemin,
General Report, supra note 8, at 66; supra note 81.
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cialize very creative designs without first meeting the costly deposit and
registration requirements will destroy their own novelty and forfeit protection. 84 What limits the availability of design protection in foreign law,
therefore, is not just a cumbersome set of formal prerequisites85 or stiff
standards of nonfunctionality86 and qualitative originality.87 Often a major
84. Compare, e.g., Loschelder, supra note 82, at 629 (praising amendments to design law in
Federal Republic of Germany that now permit test marketing before registration) with
Wibbens, The Relation Between Copyright and Industrial Property Law Protection oj
Designs and Models, in ALAI 1983, supra note 8, at 255, 258 (complaining that the
Uniform Benelux Designs Law of 1975, supra note 4, provides no opportunity to testmarket designs prior to registration without destroying novelty).
85. The "obligatory formalities of deposit and registration ... [are] considered to be the
most reliable way of proving ... the date of creation and ... anteriority." Duchemin,
General Report, supra note 8, at 65. In most of the industrialized countries, "there is
no prior examination of substance nor any procedure for opposition" beyond "a purely
formal check" that the applicant has complied with the regulations. Id. at 67. However, an opposition procedure is pennitted in Italy and in the Nordic countries, and the
Italian authorities may control whether the deposited design meets the prerequisites of
eligibility. See, e.g., id.; Fabiani, I Modelli e Disegni Industriali [hereinafter Fabiani,l
Modelli], in 2 DIRllTO INDUSTRIALE-INVENZIONI E MODELLI INDUSTRIALI 213,
253-54 (T. Rav!, M. Fabiani, & P. Spada eds. (988) [hereinafter INvENZloNI E
MODELU INDUSTRIALI]. While these formal requirements are far less demanding than
those under United States design patent law, see infra notes 93-96 and accompanying
text, they are nonetheless costly and burdensome, especially for small- and mediumsized producers. See, e.g., Loschelder, supra note 82, at 637-38; Wibbens, supra note
84, at 258. In Japan, registered designs appear subject to a full examination like that
in the United States. See, e.g., T. Dol, supra note 82, at 100-01. The situation in the
United Kingdom under the Registered Designs Act of 1949, supra note 3, resembles
that in the United States, given that a design in the u.K. "is examined for formal compliance with the regulations for application; to ensure that it fulfills the definition of a
design; and for novelty. There is no opposition procedure." Fellner, United Kingdom,
in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 143. For developments in the U.K. after 1988, see
infra notes 846,943,948-49 and accompanying text.
86. In the United Kingdom, designs dictated solely by function were excluded from the
Registered Designs Act of 1949, supra note 3, and the House of Lords has stated that
"those features of a design whose shape or configuration is determined by the job they
do, and which therefore have received no design effort directed to their appearance as
opposed to their function, are excluded from registration." Fellner, United Kingdom, in
ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 142. At the opposite extreme, the Nordic design laws purport to embrace "all new forms regardless of technical effect or functionality." See,
e.g., Levin, Nordic Countries, in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 135-36. "However, it can
be assumed that [a] purely functional design in most cases is to be regarded as 'banal,'
i.e., only containing such elements which ought to belong to the general public['s] stock
of forms." Id. at 136. Moreover, Swedish courts recently have excluded highly functional designs altogether. Id. Italian design law insists on some ornamental or decorative character and excludes purely technical or functional designs. See, e.g., Fabiani,
Italy, in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 131. The same is true in the Federal Republic of
Germany, but in practice, "it rarely occurs that a form producing an aesthetic effect is
exclusively technical." Dietz, Allemagne, in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 87 (trans.).
French design law, instead, makes no reference to a requirement of ornamentality and
absorbs highly utilitarian designs, but it excludes purely technical and functional
designs under several tests, notably a "multiplicity of fonns test." See Perot-Morel,
France, supra note 81, at 118-20. For the introduction of a similar test into recent
United States law, see infra text accompanying notes 269-302.
87. The fundamental substantive prerequisite under all foreign design laws is objective
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handicap is the inability of proprietors to test-market designs in order to
preselect a few that are worth the cost of registration from the many that are
not. 88
The situation under the United States Design Patent Act was just the
opposite. The federal courts flexibly interpret the novelty requirement so as
to disqualify only those designs that, viewed as a whole, do not differ from
pre-existing designs in the eyes of an ordinary observer. 89 More to the
point, section 102(b) of the Patent Act of 1952 provides a one year novelty
grace period for utility patents,90 which the provisions applicable to ornamental designs incorporate by reference. Designers in this country thus
obtain some opportunity to test the market before incurring the expense of
patent prosecution. 91

88.

89.

90.

91.

novelty, which may be absolute or relative in its scope depending on the different
domestic design laws. See, e.g., Duchemin, General Report. supra note 8, at 63; supra
notes 79-80 and accompanying text. Besides this requirement of novelty in the sense of
an absence of references to prior 2rt. most design laws superimpose some qualitative
standard as well, which is either cast in terms of "originality" or as a subtest of the general novelty requirement. See, e.g .• Duchemin, General Report, supra note 8, at 63-64
(discussing the cases of Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom). The meaning of "originality" in the United Kingdom became uncertain after
1988, but was in the past treated as a qualitative factor. See Fellner, United Kingdom,
in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 142; infra note 948. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the qualitative originality standard excludes the products of a routine designer.
See. e.g., Dietz, Allemagne. supra note 86, at 88. Italy distinguishes between intrinsic
and extrinsic novelty; the former requires a creative contribution or some qualitative
originality but not progress in the art nor an innovation that is the fruit of creative intellectual activity. See. e.g., Fabiani. I Modelli. supra note 85, at 240-43. In countries
that appear not to require qualitative originality, such as the Nordic countries and the
Benelux countries, courts may in fact demand more in the way of objective differentiation from the prior art. See. e.g., Duchemin. General Report. supra note 8, at 63-64;
Levin, Recent Developments in Nordic Design Protection, 19 1.I.c. 606, 608 (1988)
[hereinafter Levin, Recent Developments) (stating that an "additional prerequisite [in
Nordic law] ... is a certain 'design level,' which means that, in order to be registered,
a design must 'differ substantially' from what is previously known"); see also Levin,
supra note 86, at 137 (stating that the requirement of a certain "design level" is reflected in judicial insistence on "essential difference" from prior art).
See. e.g., Loschelder, supra note 82, at 629-30; Duchemin, La Protection, supra note 8,
at 34-36, 88-90; Gregory, Les enjeux economiques, in LES DEsSINS ET MODELES EN
QuESTION, supra note 8, at 231,248-54.
35 U.S.c. §§ 102, 171 (1988); see. e.g., Contico Int'!, Inc. v. Rubbermaid Commercial
Prods., Inc., 665 F.2d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1217
(C.C.P.A. 1981). To fail the novelty test, a claimed design must exactly resemble a reference from the prior art or constitute a mere modification of it, and courts may not
decompose or subject the design to piecemeal analysis for this purpose. See. e.g.,
Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778,779 (8th Cir. 1978); Rains v. Cascade Indus.,
Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 242 (3d Cir. 1968); Fryer, supra note 77, at 118.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), which provides that a person shall be entitled to a patent unless
"the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this country or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States...." 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1988).
See id. § 171; see also supra note 69; 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2]. Test marketing must not extend beyond the one year novelty grace period of § 102(b) because
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If the American design law, as an integral part of the patent law, thus
benefits from a workable novelty standard, the major disadvantage of this
same linkage is that it brings into play all the formal and substantive prerequisites applicable to utility patents, including the requirement of nonobviousness. 92 That the United States still requires protectable designs to
undergo a search of the prior art and a qualifying examination,93 in addition
to the obligations of deposit and registration,94 means that design protection
here is slower and costlier to obtain than in many other industrialized countries. 95 These procedural requirements are unsuited to the fast-moving but
short-lived product cycle characteristic of today's market for mass-produced
consumer goods. 96
Nevertheless, it was primarily the nonobviousness requirement that
limited the availability of statutory design protection in this country from
the 1920s on. 97 Although the United States. patent authorities issued some
88,000 design patents between 1959 and 1983,98 the patentees whose
designs met the substantive prerequisites according to the examiners seldom
benefited from the statutory monopoly when seeking to enforce their rights.
On the contrary, the federal courts routinely invalidated design patents in
the course of litigation by applying a stricter nonobviousness standard than
that of the examiners99 and by superimposing rigid requirements of orna-

92.
93.
94.
95.

96.
97.

98.

99.

the Federal Circuit declines to apply the experimental use exception to design patents
that are otherwise subject to the public use bar. See In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1988). In contrast, the best mode requirement of § 112 does not apply to design
patents because the "mode" is determined by the drawings. Some verbal description
may usefully explain the illustrations. See, e.g., Racing Strollers, Inc. v. TRI Indus.,
Inc., 878 E2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
See 35 US.C. §§ 102-03, 171 (1988); supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
See 35 US.c. §§ II3, 171 (1988); supra note 77.
See supra note 85.
Until recently, some major European countries, notably France and Italy, operated
without an examination system for utility patents, and even today Italy seems to have
retained a system of registration and publication of research results rather than a true
examination system. See, e.g., Ubertazzi, Note inlroductive, in Ubertazzi, ed.,
ARMONIZZAZIONE DELLA NORMATIVA, supra note 4, at 558-59. Most European Community countries that examined utility patents had abolished such a requirement for
industrial designs subject to sui generis legislation. See supra note 85; see also
Duchemin, Les difficultes relatives a l'organisation d'un depot communautaire en
fTUltieC'e de dessins et modeles industriels [hereinafter Duchemin, us difficultes1, in LES
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 173-81, 184-85, 190-203. Exceptions include the
United Kingdom (registered designs), Ireland, and Japan. See supra note 85.
See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 121; Thompson, Industrial Design Protection in the
U.S., 3 CANADIAN INTELL. PRoP. REV. 155, 170 (1987).
See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 125-28. The nonfunctionality requirement was a
close second. See id. at 113-21.
See Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality?, 10 OKLA. CITY
UL REV. 195, 204-07 (1985). About 16.5% of these were granted to foreign inventors; the percentage of design patents granted to foreign inventors increased to 23% in
the period 1973 to 1983. Id. Altogether some 272,000 design patents reportedly issued
between 1842 and 1983. [d.
See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 119 (noting that, despite the presumption of validity
to be accorded examiners' decision, "the courts have had their own 'view' of how to
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mentality and nonfunctionality that could eliminate any design that happened to survive these other ordeals. 100
The traditional hostility of the federal judiciary to this particular
branch of the domestic intellectual property system lOI has been statistically
demonstrated. For example, one survey of some 130 cases litigated between
1964 and 1983 found that the underlying design patent ·had been invalidated
on various legal grounds about seventy percent of the time. 102 But this
figure was probably too optimistic for the 1960s as a whole, and it is
definitely too pessimistic for the 1980s as a whole. 103 A more significant
finding is that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one
of the nation's premier intellectual property courts, upheld only two design
patents challenged for obviousness between the 1920s and the 1970s. 104
Still more revealing was a set of official statistics published for the period
1968 to 1972, which showed an invalidation rate at the appellate level of one
hundred percent,105 notwithstanding decisions by the patent examiners
favorable to the patentees in each and every case.
As will be seen from data examined later in this Article, the rate of
appellate invalidation tended to decrease from 1974 to 1983,106 and it has
dramatically decreased since the establishment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. 107 The fact remains that relatively
few industrial designs could promise their creators sufficient commercial
rewards as to justify the expense of obtaining and defending a patent under
the best of circumstances,108 while the prospects for enforcing issued
design patents prior to the 1980s were so bleak that, in the words of Judge
Giles S. Rich, "many felt it was not worth the effort and the protection [was]
illusory. ,,109

100.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

106.
107.
108.
109.

apply the obviousness standard"); Nimetz, supra note 69, at 125-28 (finding that "very
few design patents were likely to be sustained in litigation" as of 1965).
Patentable designs must be ornamental in the sense that they "appeal to the eye," and
the claimed design features must not pertain to matter that is dictated or primarily
determined by functional considerations. See generally 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3,
§ 104[2](c]-[d] (citing authorities); Nimetz, supra note 69, at 115-21. The extent to
which visibility in normal use is required remains controversial.
See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 83. Nimetz observed, however, that United States
courts were hostile to utility patents during the same period.
See Lindgren, supra note 98, at 207,209.
See infra text accompanying notes 143-44, 323-31.
See B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGIIT 158 (3d ed. 1978). For the leading
role of the Second Circuit in fostering a stricter approach after 1926, see Nimetz, supra
note 69, at 125-26.
See Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1190 n.245 (citing authorities).
According to another study, nearly two-thirds of all patents-including design patents-adjudicated between 1935 and 1973 were ruled invalid. See Baum, The Federal
Couns and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the Record, 56 J. PAT. OFf; SOC'Y 758, 763
(1974).
See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (observing that period of 1974 to 1983
shows trend more favorable to design patent protection).
See infra text accompanying notes 323-31 (discussing period from 1982 to 1990).
See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 82.
Hearings on S. 1884 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights o/the
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b. Nonobviousness Means What It Says
In voting against a sui generis design law in 1976, some legislators
seemed to believe that the federal courts could make the existing Design
Patent Act more workable. 110 If so, the standard of nonobviousness
remained the logical place to start. III In regard to utility patents, courts
administered this standard by asking whether a given achievement would
have been obvious at the time of invention to "a worker with ordinary skill
in the art who had full knowledge of the prior art.,,112 In the case of
designs, courts had likewise conjured up a fictitious "designer with ordinary
skills in the pertinent art," who could better detect pre-existing influences
underlying a candidate design than an ordinary purchaser who might succumb to the charm of a less original visual effect. 113
Given this test, there were only two logical explanations for the practice of routinely invalidating issued design patents at the appellate level. 114
Either the nonobviousness standard as imported from the domain of utility
patents inherently lay beyond the reach of even the most gifted designers, or
courts had artificially elevated the standard of nonobviousness applicable to
designs to avoid undue restraints on trade. 115 If the former was true, then

llO.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th ·Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1961) [hereinafter Design Protection Hearings 1961]. The eminent Judge Giles S. Rich testified in 1960 that "[p]atents for designs have been difficult to obtain and more difficult to sustain and many
have felt it was not worth the effort and the protection illusory." [d. Despite these
drawbacks, the number of applicants seeking to obtain such patents from the PTO averaged between 4,000 to 6,000 per year in the period 1953 to 1975. The number of
design patents issued by the PTO during the same period ranged from 2,300 to 4,300
annually. See Lindgren, supra note 98, at 204-07; see also Brown, supra note 32, at
356-57 (remarking that "[s]omebody must think they are worth having"). In effect, the
design patent provided a marketable certificate of title that demonstrated proof of
invention and ownership, and it supported claims for priority rights in foreign law
under article 4(c) of the Paris Convention, supra note 1. See G. BoOENHAUSEN, GUIDE
TO THE ApPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION RlR THE PaarEcnON OF INDUSTRIAL
PRoPERTY 43-44 (1968). An issued design patent also enhanced the possibility of
negotiating license agreements that served to avoid the costs of litigation, especially in
industries that respected design patents as a matter of trade custom. At the very least,
such a patent constituted an initial barrier to entry that a competitor would have to overcome. See Lindgren, supra note 98, at 207.
Whether these advantages-despite wholesale judicial invalidation of litigated
patents-satisfied art. 5 quinquies of the Paris Convention, supra note I, remained an
open question. As amended at Lisbon in 1958, this article declared that "Industrial
designs shall be protected in all the countries of the Union." According to
Bodenhausen, "All that was inserted in the [Paris] Convention was the mere obligation
for member states to protect industrial designs." G. BODENHAUSEN, supra, at 86
(emphasis supplied).
Chairman Kastenmeier expressly mentioned this possibility at hearings held in 1975.
See Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 362-63.
See supra text accompanying notes 97-109.
See 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2], at 1-200, § 5.04[1].
See id. § 1.04[2] (citing cases).
See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69, 92; Nimetz, supra note 69, at 127 (stating that courts used the·
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less biased courts could reinterpret the standard so as to implement the original policies behind the Design Patent Act of 1842. 116 If the latter explanation proved correct, then courts could undo much of the mischief they had
caused by a more evenhanded application of the general nonobviousness
standard as conventionally formulated. 117
From a comparative perspective, foreign courts that administered sui
generis design laws built on the patent model had faced similar dilemmas
without elevating the requirements of novelty and qualitative originality to
unattainable heights. liS Italian courts, in particular, working with a rigid
design patent law rather like that of the United States,119 had deliberately
softened the statutory test of intrinsic novelty-akin to nonobviousness-on the theory that the strict standards applicable to both utility
patents and utility models would not serve to promote the decorative arts. 120
No evidence has been found to suggest that these or other foreign practices
influenced judicial application of United States design patent law, in the way
that Italian law had directly influenced the domestic copyright standard of
separability promulgated in 1958 and codified in 1976. 121 Nevertheless,
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), in 1966,
introduced a lower standard of nonobviousness for ornamental designsl22
that paralleled prior developments in Italian law.

116.

117.

118.
119.
120.

121.
122.

invention standard "to choose between those designs deserving a monopoly and those
that should be freely copyable" and stressing economic considerations unfavorable to
design protection).
For the original policy, see supra note 69. and accompanying text; see also Gorham v.
White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall) 511 (1871) (still the leading Supreme Court decision on
design patents, which favorably viewed the statutory policy of stimulating design innovation).
Nothing in the statute "suggests the need for a disproportionately high standard" or
obliges courts "to exaggerate the degree of nonobviousness required of miniscule
design innovations that possess significant commercial value." Reichman, Designs
After 1976, supra note 17, at 362.
See supra notes 79-82, 86-87 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the eligibility
requirements under most foreign design laws remain too high, even if not so high as
those in the United States. See infra text accompanying notes 848-58.
See Italian design law, supra note 4; Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at
1213-14 (citing authorities).
See, e.g., BenussI, supra note 8, at 64-65 (stating that the Italian courts' "ftexible criterion of assessment" looks only for "a particular esthetic quality given to an industrial
product in relation to the usual appearance of products in the same sector," and noting
a recent tendency to lower the requirement in mote crowded fields where "possibilities
for. . . variations are necessarily limited"). As a result, challenges for lack of inventive height seldom appear to succeed under Italy's design law, although its novelty
requirement, which lacks a grace period, destroys proportionately more designs than
the novelty requirement of American law. See, e.g., Fabiani,l Modelli, supra note 85,
at 240-43 (stressing minimum level of "new creative contribution" required of designs);
see also Z.O. ALGARDI, o.SEGNO INDUSTRIALE E ARTE APPUCATA 90-91 (1977).
See infra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
See In re Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1966); see also Michaelson, Design PatenlS
and Obviousness-Obviousness to Whom?, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 620 (1970); Comment,
Design Protection-1ime to Replace the Design Patent, 52 MINN. L. REV. 942 (1967).
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In the case of In re Laverne, 123 the C.C.P'A. -speaking through Judge
Giles Rich-observed that the usual test of nonobviousness would negate
all patent protection for ornamental designs if courts construed the distinction between routine mechanics and true inventors so as to exclude the entire
output of "competent designers." It was the competent designers who, in
Judge Rich's estimation, ultimately brought about any progress in the field
of industrial design. 124 To be sure, Judge Rich did not say that section 103
of the Patent Act required no more than a competent designer might produce. 125 Rather, the object was to enable such designers to protect at least
some of their work. To this end, the C.C.P.A. proposed a new test for obviousness based on the "ordinary intelligent man," who would assess the visual impact of a candidate design with less technical refinement than "the
designer of ordinary skill in the art.,,126 The policy behind this test aimed
to promote innovative industrial design by aligning the standard of eligibility with the pristine goal of the Design Patent Act of 1842.127
If a similar strategy appears to have worked rather well in Italy, where
courts seldom invalidate patented designs for lack of "intrinsic novelty,"12S
it failed in the United States. The other appellate courts, with one exception,129 refused to follow the C.C.P'A. and rejected what they viewed as a
move "to equate obviousness with novellJ' in the case of design patents"
without an express legislative mandate. 13 Because of the split in the circuits after Laverne, the design patent law operated with a lower threshold of

123. 356 F.2d 1003 (C.c.P.A. 1966).
124. Id. at 1006. The court noted that the distinction between "patents for inventions" and
"patents for designs" in 35 U.S.c. § 111 "would seem to indicate a legislative consciousness that 'inventions' and 'designs' are different in kind." Id. at 1005.
125. [d. at 1006.
126. "The test is inherently a visual test. . . . No special skill is required to determine what
things look like, though individuals react differently. It is bound to be an individual
reaction." Id.
127. Id.; see supra note 124. By upholding the validity of a patented American variant on
Saarinen's famous chair, the court arguably increased the availability of design patent
protection by enlarging the range of patentable variations. By the same token, however, the court may have weakened the scope of protection for patented designs because
it did not view the American design as falling within the range of equivalents covered
by Saarinen's own patent. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 96, at 190, 199 (implying
that the scope of a design patent will not extend beyond literal copying).
128. See supra note 120 and accompapying text.
129. See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1970)
(purporting to apply the ordinary observer standard but in so strict a manner as to
defeat its purpose); see also Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1980).
130. Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter Kiddie & Co., 462 F.2d 1263, 1265 (3d Cir. 1972). See
generally I D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 104[21, at 1-203 to 1-204 (citing cases); Fryer,
supra note 77, at 118-19. The congressional decision not to enact a special design law
in 1976 could therefore also be construed as an express mandate to maintain the status
quo and as an implicit disavowal of Laverne. Cf Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989) (stating that the novelty and nonobviousness
Jequirements express a congressional determination of the desired level of competition).
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eligibility in some jurisdictions than in others, a situation that encouraged
forum shopping.
In 1981, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ended the Laverne
experiment and, in In re Nalbandian, 131 closed the split in the circuits it had
opened in 1966. 132 Henceforth the c.c.P.A. agreed to measure obviousness
in terms of a "designer of ordinary capability who designs articles of the
type presented in the application."133 The court, however, would allow
applicants to demonstrate their attainment of this standard more objectively
than in the past 134 through the use of expert testimony by designers working
in the pertinent field. 135
This return to an orthodox doctrinal formulation did not mean that the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had acquiesced in the practice of
exaggerating the degree of nonobviousness required of design innovation.
In a series of opinions posterior to Nalbandian,'36 panels of the C.C.P.A.
attacked the tendency of sister courts to disassemble patented designs into
their component parts and then to subject these parts to piecemeal evaluation against the prior art, usually with twenty-twenty hindsight and without
regard to commercial success. 137 The correct approach, as the c.c.P.A.
now saw it, required a patented design challenged for obviousness to be
tested as a visual whole against existing references pertinent to the ensemble
without piecemeal dissection of its component parts. 138 The court hinted,
moreover, that secondary considerations, especially copying and commercial success, were respectable indicia of nonobviousness in the design environment, 139 a point it had not made in Nalbandian. 140
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals thus ended its days by
bequeathing a more workable set of binding doctrinal tools to its successor-the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit l41 -than had previously
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

138.

139.
140.
141.

661 F.2d 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
Id. at 1216.
Id.
See id. at'1217; Fryer, supra note 77, at 119.
Fryer, supra note 77, at 119. Professor Fryer, however, notes the tendency of skilled
designers to disagree when caIled as experts.
See. e.g., In re Carter, 673 F.2d 1378 (C.c.P.A. 1982); In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388
(C.C.P.A. 1982).
See supra note 136; Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1223-24, 1223
n.414, 1224 n.415 (describing these practices and criticizing courts for "acting upon a
virtually conclusive presumption that combination designs were obvious as a matter of
law," notwithstanding the presumption of validity that nominally attached to the patent
itself).
See, e.g., Rosen, 673 F.2d 388 (stating that "there must be a reference to something in
existence, the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed
design, in order to support a holding of obviousness"); see also Carter, 673 F.2d 1378;
In re Spreter, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 866 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
See, e.g., Rosen, 673 F.2d 388.
See Nalbandian, 611 F.2d at 1218.
The Federal Circuit was formed through a merger of the former Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims. The new court has declared that all decisions
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been available, even though the c.c.P.A. validated very few design patents
in this period. 142 At the same time, other federal courts had begun to conclude that "blind opposition to the design patent was counterproductive.,,143
Between 1974 and 1982, a number of decisions at both the appellate and
district court levels upheld and enforced design patents under a more flexible
reading of the nonobviousness standard than was customary during the preceding half century. 144
2.

Transitional Holding Patterns: 1982-1986

By 1982, when the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit began to
implement the congressional call for a specialized tribunal that would
develop a uniform and more rational patent system, 145 there were many portents heralding "the end of the antipatent era."I46 Not the least of these
were the Supreme Court's ground-breaking decisions concerning microbiology and computer programs,147 which may indirectly have improved the
outlook for industrial designs. Any lasting improvement in the climate for
design patents, however, depended on the willingness of the Federal Circuit
to undertake a searching reevaluation of the nonobviousness requirement in
general, with a view to preventing issued utility patents from succumbing to
facile judicial invalidation. 148

142.

143.
144.

145.

146.

147.

148.

of the predecessor courts rendered before the close of business September 30, 1982,
will be considered binding. See, e.g., South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
Compare, e.g., Rosen, 673 F.2d 388 (reversing the rejection of an application for furniture design for obviousness) with Carter, 673 F.2d 1378 and Spreter, 211 US.P.Q.
(BNA) 866 and Nalbandian, 611 F.2d 1214 (all holding designs invalid for obviousness).
Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 363.
See id. at 334-35, 362-65 (citing cases). Notable in this period were Contico Inn, Inc.
v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc., 665 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1981) (trash can dolly);
Lancaster Colony Corp. v. Aldon Accessories, Inc., 506 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1974) (modem ash tray); see also Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 494 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1974).
See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 28 U.S.c. § 1295 (1988). The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created by this Act, came into existence on October I,
1982. See also Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, 20 U MICH. lL. REF. 979,982 (1987).
See Adelman, supra note 145, at 981-83,982 n.12. According to Professor Adelman,
the year 1982 marked the end of the anti patent era in that the authorities eased the pressure from antitrust law, the Supreme Court enlarged the scope of patentable subject
matter, the Patent and Trademark Office was upgraded, and Congress created the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. [d. at 981.
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 US. 175 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabaty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980); see also Dawson Chern. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 US. 176,201-02 (1980)
(allowing patent law to create monopoly in unpatented product that had no other substantial commercial use).
See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 83 (relating strong judicial hostility to design patents in the 1950s and 1960s to more diffuse judicial bias against utility patents during
the same period). Rendering § 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 more manageable was
essential to a strong patent system, which in tum was allegedly needed to meet the
challenge of foreign competition. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 145, at 982 n.14.
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The steps taken by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to overhaul prior jurisprudence and enhance the value of utility patents in recent
years are largely beyond the scope of this Article. 149 Nevertheless, the
emphasis this court has placed on the role of secondary considerations in the
evaluation of nonobviousness generally ISO is of such overriding importance
for an understanding of current trends in design patent law that some preliminary observations on this topic are in order.
a.

The Emerging Role of Secondary Considerations

As early as 1966, the United States Supreme Court, In Graham v. John
Deere CO.,ISI had included secondary considerations among the various
subtests it allowed lower courts to apply when evaluating utility patents
challenged for obviousness. The federal appellate courts could therefore
assess such nontechnical, objective factors IS2 as commercial success,
fulfillment of a long-felt need in the trade, and copying by an alleged
infringerlS3 at the same time as they subjectively measured the inventive
height of a given innovation in terms of the routine skill of an ordinary engineer familiar with the prior art. IS4

149.
150.

151.
152.

153.

154.

Observers agree that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has fulfilled legislative expectations that it would improve the climate for utility patents in general. See,
e.g., Adelman, supra note 145, at 982-88; Dunner, Introduction, in 13 A.I.P.L.A. Q.1.
185 (1985); see also Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U L. REV. I (1989). However, some believe the court may have overfulfilled
this assignment. See, e.g., Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAUF. L. REV. 803, 859-76 (1988); Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondory Considerations in Applying the Section 103 Nonobviousness
Test for Patentability, 28 B.C.L. REV. 357 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Secondory Considerations].
See supra note 148 (citing authorities).
See generally Adelman, supra note 145, at 987-1007.
383 US. I, 17-18 (1966).
The so-called subjective tests of nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as mandated
by Graham, require courts to ascertain: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2)
the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (3) the differences between the prior art and
the claimed invention. Id. at 17-18. The Supreme Court also authorized the use of
nontechnical, objective factors, called secondary considerations or subtests of nonobviousness, which focus on "the economic and motivational aspects" rather than "technological aspects" of the issue. See, e.g., Note, Secondory Considerations, supra Dote
148, at 357-59; see also Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness":"A Nontechnical Approach
to Patent Validity, 112 U PA. L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1964) [hereinafter Note, Subtests of
Nonobviousness]. How and when such factors were to be applied after Graham
remained controversial.
See, e.g., Merges, supra note 148, at 816; Note, Secondory Considerations, supra note
148, at 358 (citing cases). Other secondary factors include licensing to potential competitors (acquiescence of the trade), progress of the patent application through the PTO,
nearly simultaneous invention by another researcher in the field, professional approval
by experts in the field, and the failure of others to make the same invention.
See Merges, supra note 148, at 815 (stating that the Federal Circuit has made Graham-along with the secondary considerations-"the cornerstones of nonobviousness").
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In the past, however, courts tended to apply the Graham tests of nonobviousness in such a restrictive fashion that appeals to secondary considerations did little to prevent judicial invalidation of a large proportion of the
utility patents litigated in the period 1966 to 1982. 155 In overriding both the
examiners' favorable decisions and the presumptions of validity supposed to
derive from them,156 many judges actually evaluated the teachings disclosed in a patent as of the time its validity was challenged rather than as of
the time the invention was made. 151 Courts in this mood either neglected
the secondary considerations altogether or applied them in a half-hearted
manner that normally served to corroborate their own intuitive findings of
obviousness. 158
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, deploring any
devaluation by hindsight, held that the secondary considerations constituted
one of four basic subtests applicable to all utility fatents challenged for
obviousness under section 103 of the Patent Act. 15 The federal district
courts l60 must accordingly evaluate objective factors, including commercial success, in every relevant case,161 and these so-called secondary con155. See, e.g., Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 US. 273 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 US. 57 (1969); Merges, supra note 148, at 815-16, 815
n.39; Adelman, supra note 145, at 991 n.46 (noting 60-70% rate of invalidation in
period preceding establishment of Federal Circuit).
156. See, e.g., P. RoSENBERG, supra note 77, § 17.05 (presumption of validity); Adelman,
supra note 145, at 991-92.
157. See, e.g., Mintz & Racine, Anticipation and Obviousness in the Federal Circuit, 13
A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 195, 212 (1985) (stating that hindsight inherently diminishes the perceived level of inventive height); see also P. RoSENBERG, supra note 77, "at 9-16 (stressing that the test is "not what would have been obvious to a judge after reading the patent
in suit and hearing the testimony"). For evidence that case law was affected by an antipatent bias rooted in early laissez-faire economic theory, see Nimetz, supra note 69, at
98-102.
158. See supra note 155. The conventional formula for downgrading secondary considerations was to find them relevant only when the outcome of the nonobviousness test was
ambiguous on the basis of the primary, subjective considerations of the prior art. See,
e.g., Walker v. General Motors Corp., 362 F.2d 56,60 (9th Cir. 1966); Note, Secondary
Considerations, supra note 148, at 358.
159. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1099-1100 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 895-96 (Fed. Cir.),
eert. denied, 469 US. 857 (1984); Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 961
(Fed. Cir. 1983), eert. denied, 469 US. 835 (1984); Stratoftex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,
713 F.2d 1530, 1538-40 (Fed. Cir. 1983). These decisions build on prior decisions of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals that stressed the importance of secondary
factors and that had occasionally given them greater weight than the three prior art considerations. The other federal appellate courts did not follow this lead.
160. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals concerning patents from the federal
district courts and from the Patent and Trademark Board of Appeals. 28 US.C.
§ 1295(a) (1988).
161. See, e.g., Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575-76
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that evidence of commercial success required finding of
nonobviousness even though invention would have been obvious on basis of prior art
considerations alone), eeN. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman
Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540. 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that objective factors
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siderations may greatly affect the final outcome of patent litigation. 162 The
Federal Circuit has also insisted that district courts assess nonobviousness
as of the time the invention was made, that they avoid all recourse to hindsight, and that they respect the presumption of validity that the statute confers upon every patentee. 163
Any resolute rehabilitation of secondary considerations in the realm of
utility patents should then logically extend to the judicial evaluation of
design patents as well. Implementing this logic, however, presented certain
practical difficulties l64 and posed a real dilemma for the court. On the one
hand, continued judicial annihilation of design patents would become inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's overall approach.165 On the other hand,
full application of the secondary factors to design patents without some
countervailing doctrinal limitations could produce a still more protective
environment than has so far emerged in the realm of utility patents. 166

162.

163.
164.

165.
166.

are entitled to great weight); StratoJlex. 713 F, 2d at 1538 (stressing burden of proof on
challenger of invalidity).
See, e.g., Alco Standard Corp. v. Thnnessee Valley Auth., 808 F,2d 1490 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (holding patent valid essentially on basis of commercial success); Hodosh v.
Block Drug Co., 786 F, 2d 1136, 1143-44 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (requiring evidence of secondary considerations to be evaluated independently of what any real person knows
about prior art); Simmons Fastner Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F,2d 1573,
1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that evidence of commercial success alone may
require reversal of a finding of invalidity), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985); see also
Mintz & Racine, supra note 157, at 217 (stating that the Federal Circuit has "emphatically endorsed" application of secondary factors in patent infringement litigation and in
ex parte prosecutions of patent applications); Merges, supra note 148 (criticizing this
approach).
.
See, e.g., P. RoSENBERG, supra note 77, at 9-16; Mintz & Racine, supra note 157, at
212.
See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 119. In regard to utility patents, for example, it is
assumed that judges can measure the distance between the prior art and a new technical achievement on the basis of scientific criteria and technical data that are consistent
for all decision-makers faced with a similar evaluation. See Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 US. I, 35 (1966). Moreover, Ihere is implicitly a further judgment about the level
of incentives needed in a given field, in relation to the rules of free competilion that
otherwise apply. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 US.
141, 150 (1989); Nimetz, supra note 69, at 127. In the case of appearance designs,
court!; cannot measure the distance between any given aesthetic contribution and its
predecessors without succumbing to value judgments that are hard to quantify and
unreliable at best. See, e.g., 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2], at 1-199 to 1-200
("[N]ot surprisingly, the courts openly admit that any assessment of the obviousness of
the [design) solution is necessarily subjective."); Nimetz, supra note 69, at 122 (noting
that no socially accepted concept of artistic progress exists to guide the courts). Use of
expert testimony appears to formalize these inherent uncertainties without providing a
firm basis for resolving them. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 119. While value
judgments about art are impermissible under general principles of copyright law, lest
veiled forms of censorship prevail, see Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
US. 239 (1903), the contestability of any judgment about matters of taste renders the
patent examiners' decisions to grant design patents easier to challenge than is true of
inventions generally. See Nimetz, supra note 69, at 113.
See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
Whether the Federal Circuit has become a "plaintiffs" court or not is controversial.
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Consider, for example, that only the commercially successful appearance designs attract imitators, while the market for mass-produced consumer goods moves at a rapid pace that makes close copying the typical
mode of infringement. Yet, both "commercial success" and "copying" constitute secondar;,>.; factors entitled to considerable weight in the evaluation of
utility patents. 1 7 Even if the Federal Circuit were to require design patent
owners to establish a closer nexus between commercial success and the
challenged components of protected designs 168 than it has so far required of
plaintiffs suing to enforce utility patents, 169 routine reliance on commercial
success and copying would significantly narrow the opportunities. to invalidate patented designs. 170
One should therefore expect the rate of invalidation for obviousness to
decrease sharply if the Federal Circuit decided to evaluate design patents in
light of the same objective criteria it has applied to utility patents in the
name of Gralwm. In approaching the case law from 1982 on with this
hypothesis in mind, however, it seems logical to ask whether the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit was prepared to make such a radical break
with the past. If it was, one also needs to ask how the court would seek to
ensure a proper balance between innovation and competition under a revitalized design patent law in which commercial success was likely to figure in
every action for infringement.

h.

Evenhanded Tests of Nonobviousness

During the period 1982 to 1986,171 the evidence suggests that the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit began cautiously to disentangle the

167.

168.

169.

170.
171.

For the view that the patent courts as a whole have been neutral or evenhanded, see
Dunner, supra note 148, at 185-94 (including statistical tables).
See supra note 153 and accompanying text. Few of the myriad designs launched onto
the market in any given year will attain commercial success. See, e.g., Duchemin, La
protection, supra note 8, at 34-37. But once a design captures the public's fancy, slavish imitation gives competitors a price advantage and eliminates the originators' lead
time. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1386-95; Nimetz, supra note 69, at 108-09.
Moreover, a primary purpose of most appearance designs, as distinct from functional
designs, is to induce the public to purchase marginally differentiated products whose
technical yields tend to be standardized. See generally F. PERRET, supra note 8, at
9-21.
See, e.g., Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392-93
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that the commercial response to an invention provides objective evidence of how it is viewed in the marketplace). While plaintiff bore the burden
of proving a nexus between commercial success and the patentable features, a prima
facie showing of this nexus shifted the burden onto the defendants of proving that success was due to extraneous factors. [d.
See. e.g., Merges, supra note 148, at 861 (arguing that a test of commercial success
rewards marketing advantages, such as a superior distribution system or access to capital, and favors monopoly power); id. at 876 (arguing for less use of secondary factors in
regard to utility patents); see also Emery, Patent Law: Obviousness. Secondary Considerations. and the Nexus Requirements, 1986 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 117 (1986).
See infra text accompanying notes 323-30.
In point of fact, the period under review in this subsection extends from 1982 to 1985.
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design patent law from past judicial encumbrances without formulating a
comprehensive policy concerning the proper role of the Design Patent Act in'
the absence of legislative reform. For its opening move, the court insisted
that design patents challenged for obviousness were entitled to a genuine
presumption of validity that saddled the challenger with the twin burdens of
going forward and of overcoming the examiner's findings by clear and convincing proof. 172 The Federal Circuit then proceeded to ratify the same
standard of obviousness that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had
applied to design patents between 1979 and 1982. 173 Both the district
courts and the examiners would accordingly continue to test the inventive
height of an ornamental design by reference to the skill of an ordinary
designer working in the relevant field of endeavor and not by reference to the
impression it made upon an ordinary observer unskilled in the art. 174
At the same time, the Federal Circuit endorsed the C.C.P.A.'s last strictures against piecemeal decomposition of candidate designs either at the
prosecution stage or for purposes of invalidating issued design patents. A
finding of obviousness would thus continue to depend on references to comparable art and not merely to bits and pieces of unrelated design solutions. 175 The court also stressed the need to measure obviousness against
the level of prior art existing at the time a design was created, and it strictly
forbade devaluation through hindsight. 176 The Federal Circuit then broke
new ground by holding that all the subtests currently used to determine the
nonobviousness of utility patents,l77 including the secondary considerations, should apply to design patents as well. 178
The court did not relish the consequences of its own logic, however.
True, it declined to invalidate a number of successful designs on the

172.
173.
174.

175.

176.
177.
178.

with one decision in the first quarter of 1986 assimilated to the discussion of functionality characteristic of this transitional period. That decision was Unette Corp. v. Unit
Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying
text.
See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. AI Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (placing burden on challenger); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d
1423, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
See supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
See, e.g .• Shelcore. Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc .• 745 F.2d 621 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Litton,
728 F.2d at 1443; In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981), rev'g In re Laverne,
356 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1966); see also supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
The Federal Circuit thus declined to soften the standard of eligibility for design patents
by judicial interpretation, as the C.C.P'A. had tried to do in the period 1966 to 1980.
See supra notes 122-35 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Shelcore, 745 F.2d 621; Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740
F.2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Litton, 728 F.2d at 1443; Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984) (LEX IS Genfed library. USApp file)
(unpublished); see also Ex parte Igarashi, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 463 (PTO Bd. Pat. App.
& Interferences 1985); In re Carter, 673 F.2d 1378, 1381 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Rosen.
673 F.2d 388,390 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
See, e.g., Shelcore, 745 F.2d at 628; Litton, 728 F.2d at 1441.
See supra text accompanying notes 159-63.
See, e.g., Litton, 728 F.2d at 1440-41; Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No.
83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984) (unpublished).
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grounds that they represented mere adaptations or modifications of the prior
art,179 a favorite tactic of federal appellate courts hostile to design protection in the past. 180 It even recognized that, of all the objective factors inherited from Graham v. John Deere Co., "copying" deserved particular weight
in the judicial evaluation of patented designs challenged for obviousness. 181
But the Federal Circuit distrusted the results to which uncritical reliance on
commercial success might lead in the design milieu, acknowledging that
such success could depend as much on brand loyalties, advertising, and
functional efficiency as on the superiority of the designer's creative art. 182
The court thus recognized, in the context of industrial designs, some of the
very drawbacks to applying the secondary considerations that critics would
later raise in connection with utility patents. 183
Nevertheless, the treatment that the Federal Circuit afforded ornamental designs challenged for obviousness during the period under review
appears evenhanded and, on the whole benign, especially in light of the
judicial bias against design patents that used to prevail outside the C.C.P.A.
Of eight cases concerning the validity of design patents known to have
reached the Federal Circuit between 1982 and the first quarter of 1986,'84
only one actually resulted in a decision to invalidate for obviousness. 185 Of
179. See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 E2d 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (affirming finding that design of eyeglass display rack was not obvious);
She/core, 745 E2d 621 (holding design for driving simulator toy not invalid for double
patenting).
180. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19,
1984) (unpublished); see also Trans-World, 750 F.2d 1552; Thompson, supra note 96, at
163 (noting that Trans-World was a case of "outright theft"). In Fiberglass in Motion,
the court rejected a defense based on an industry practice of copying and declared that
such "behavior evidences disregard for the property rights . . . in the creative products
of others."
182. See, e.g., Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 E2d 1541, 1549 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Litton, 728 E2d at 1443; Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984) (unpublished). The court also stated that expert testimony
concerning inventive height could influence but not exclusively determine the issue of
obviousness, which remained a question of law, not of fact. See, e.g., Petersen, 740
E2d at 1547-48 .
. 183. See supra note 169 (presenting views of Merges).
184. E.g. Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 E2d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Interpart Corp. v.
Italia, S.p.A., 777 E2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985), disapproved in nonre/evant part in Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Trans-World, 750 E2d
1552; Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Petersen,
740 E2d 1541; Litton, 728 F.2d 1423; Feuling v. Wood, Nos. 84-543, 84-662 (Fed. Cir.
Nov. 30, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (unpublished), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1137 (1985); Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
19, 1984) (unpublished).
185. See Petersen, 740 F.2d 1541 (affirming the finding that design for "locking plier-type
wrenches and other 'hand tools' " was invalid for obviousness); infra text accompanying notes 221-33; see also Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. Coratomis, Inc., 702 E2d 671
(8th Cir. 1983) (affirming the finding that design for surgically implantable heart pacemakers was obvious).
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the remainder, one was found invalid for lack of ornamentality; 186 another
lacked novelty under the "on sale" bar of section 102(b); 187 while five of the
eight patents in question were upheld on aPl:al. 188 This represented an
invalidation rate of some thirty-eight percent, 89 as compared with an invalidation rate of from seventy-five to one hundred percent for the federal
appellate courts only a few years earlier. 190
c.

Uncertain Standard of Functionality

Courts hostile to design patents in the past often suspected manufacturers of trying to use this institution to circumvent the stringent requirements
governing utility patents. 191 On its face, the Design Patent Act protects
only the decorative features or appearance of a useful article l92 and not its
functional aspects. 193 But modem industrial design blurs this legal distinction by programmatically avoiding the separation of form and function. 194
The more perfectly a designer integrates the two in a patented creation, the
more likely it becomes that his legal monopoly of form will yield indirect
control over functional components of the underlying product that have not
met the tests of novelty and nonobviousness. 195
From a worldwide perspective, however, the industrialized countries
seem increasingly disposed to protect even functional designs that fail to

186. See Feuling v. Wood, Nos. 84-543, 84-662 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 1984) (unpublished)
(holding that designs of fan housing on air-cooled engine and of mounting stand for
attaching accessory to engine lacked ornamentality and were primarily functional).
187. See Interpart, 777 F.2d at 686 (holding that a suit on patent despite knowledge of sales
in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) justified award of attorney's fees as an exceptional
case under 35 U.S.c. § 285).
188. These included Unelle, 785 F.2d 1026; Trans-World, 750 F.2d 1552; Shelcore, 745 F.2d
621; Utton, 728 F.2d 1423; Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 19, 1984); see also Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co., 758 F.2d 167 (6th
Cir. 1985) (three designs of see-through rifle sights were held valid and infringed
below; two invalidated for functionality on appeal).
189. The rate of invalidation at the district court level is, of course, different, but of little statistical interest in this period because the Federal Circuit had not yet emitted clear signals about design patents. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 96 (criticizing district
courts' activity in this period).
190. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 115-20, 127.
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988); Warbern Packaging Indus. v. Cut Rate Plastic Hangers,
Inc., 652 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1981); Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294
F.2d 694,696 (2d Cir. 1961). While the design must "appeal to the eye," the requirement is one of industrial aesthetics, not "beauty" in a purely artistic sense. See, e.g.,
Contico Infl, Inc. v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc., 665 F.2d 820, 825 (8th Cir.
1981) ("Perhaps it is too much to expect that a trash-dolly can be beautiful. It is enough
... that it is not ugly, especially when compared to prior designs.").
193. See generally I D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2](d).
194. See, e.g., Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 738-40 (1983).
195. See, e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 8, at ll-16; Fryer, supra note 77, at 119-21; Nimetz,
supra note 69, at 114-16, 120-21.
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meet the standards of patentability, and some exotic legal paraphernalia
have been concocted for this purpose. For example, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, and Japan provide direct protection of functional designs
under utility model laws in addition to sui generis protection of appearance
desi§.ns. l96 Although utility model laws, which are growing in popularity, I 7 operate with a stricter legal discipline than that of the design laws, 198
they weaken the standards nominally supposed to govern a mature patent
system in subtle and indirect ways.l99 Some countries that remain unwilling to protect utility models nonetheless tolerate a rather high degree of
functional content in appearance designs protectable under sui generis
design laws. 2OO Most industrialized countries, following the lead of the
United States, have also begun to protect integrated circuit designs in special laws embodying modified copyright principles. 201 One country, the
196. See, e.g .• 2 S. LADAS. supra note 1. at 949-56; Hausser, Utility Models: The Experience
of the Federal Republic of Gemumy, 26 INDUS. PRoP. 314 (1987); Reichman. Designs
Before 1976, supra note 17. at 1217-21 (case of Italy); The Utility Model Law of Japan.
Law No. 123 of 1959. reprinted in JAPANESE LAWS RELATING To INDUSTRIAL PRoPERTY
61-88 (l.P.D. rev. ed. 1979). The Japanese law. enacted in 1905. was modelled on that
of Germany. but it soon evolved into a petty patent law that favored small. domestic
inventions. See, e.g .• T. Dol. supra note 82. at 68·70.
197. See, e.g .• I. POUt EL MODELO DE UTIUDAD 1·9 (1982) (arguing that utility model laws
are especially appropriate for developing countries); Chen Ruifang. The Utility Model
System and Its Benefitsfor China. 141.I.C. 493 (1983).
198. In the Federal Republic of Germany. for example. the utility model law classically protected three-dimensional forms of tools and implements. articles of everyday use. or
parts thereof for six (now eight) years on condition of "novelty" and "inventiveness."
But the novelty standard is more permissive than (bat of utility patents (and includes a
six-month grace period). while the standard of invention tends to be lower in practice
than that applied to utility patents. despite a certain formal allegiance to the standard
of nonobviousness. See, e.g .• Hausser. supra note 196, at 314-16. Moreover. utility
models are not examined and can be obtained by mere registration. which delivers
immediate protection. Id. at 316-18 (noting that patent and utility model applications
are often filed conjointly for this reason). The utility model law of the Federal Republic
was recently updated. with an extension of subject matter eligibility to include electri·
cal circuits (qua tools or articles of everyday use). which were previously excluded.
The amendment also codified a standard of invention requiring a mere "inventive act"
as distinct from the "inventive activity" of the patent law. See Utility Model Act of January 1, 1968. § 1. as amended Aug. 28. 1986. reprinted in GERMAN LAws, supra note
4. at 12-81 (English test); Hausser. supra note 196, at 315-16.
199. For example. the tendency is to broaden the sweep of utility models beyond the protection of functional configurations to petty patents in general, which some view as a boon
to smaller-and medium·sized firms. See, e.g., Hausser, supra note 196. at 316.318-19.
But critics see the utility model as an illogical and unwarranted derogation from the
general patent system and from the rules of competition it sustains. See, e.g., F.
PERR~ supra note 8. at 188·233; Perot-Morel, L'ambiguite du concept de modele
d'utilite. in ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE R. FRANCESCHELU 425 (1983).
200. See, e.g., Levin. Recent Developments. supra note 87. at 606-08 (stating that "awareness
of the protection of functional designs bas been decisive for the creation of the Nordic
sui generis design protection system and its limits"); see also Levin. Applied Art: On
the Borderline Between Copyright and Design Protection in Nordic Law (hereinafter
Levin, Applied Art), in ALAI 1983. supra note 8, at 275·76.280-81; supra note 86.
201. See, e.g., S.M. STEWART. INTERNATIONAL COPYRlGlIT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 333-42
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United Kingdom, has just enacted a sui generis law conferring copyrightlike protection on both functional and aesthetic designs that are not subject
to either a registration requirement or statutory prerequisites of novelty and
inventive merit. 202
Formally, the United States has never considered adopting a utility
model law like those enacted in Italy, Japan, or the Federal Republic of Germany. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984203 does protect a
single class of functional designs, however, without insisting on either novelty or nonobviousness. 204 For this and other reasons, the Act has been
treated as a "neighboring right," allied to and collocated with the Copyright
Act of 1976,20S and negotiations for an international treaty to deal with
semiconductor chip topographies are still underway.206 Moreover, the sui
generis design bills currently before Congress would seem to provide copyright-like protection of functional designs without regard to their aesthetic
content and without requiring either objective novelty or nonobviousness as
conditions of eligibility. 207
Against this background, the federal judiciary's traditional concern to
limit the functionality of patented designs may be viewed as an unwillingness to countenance the protection of utility models in disguise without an
express congressional mandate to this effect. 208 On the one hand, too

202.

203.
204.

205.

206.
207.
208.

(2d ed. 1989); Geller, supra note 42, § 4[I][c][i); infra notes 203-06, 939-40 and
accompanying text.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 [United Kingdom), ch. 48, §§ 213-264; see,
e.g., R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 297-98; w'R. CORNISH, INTELLECrUAL PRoPERTY:
PATENTS, CoPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGfITS 384-91 (2d ed. 1989);
Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46. The precise level of "originality" to be required
under this law has reportedly been left to the determination of courts. Id. See also
infra notes 846, 947-63 and accompanying text. Before the passage of this Act, British
courts protected three-dimensional functional designs in copyright law if they had
been depicted in two-dimensional technical drawings, a practice overruled by the Act.
See, e.g., R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 283-95, 361.
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.c. §§ 901-914 (1988).
See id. § 902(b) (excluding nonoriginal and commonplace chip designs and nonoriginal
variations of such designs).
See, e.g., R. STERN, SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PRarECTlON 397-99 (l9H6). See generally
Kastenmeier & Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp
or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. (1985); McManis, International Protection for
Semiconductor Chip Designs and the Standard of Judicial Review of Presidential Proclamations Issued Pursuant to the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 22 Gro.
WASH. J. INT'LL. 331 (1988).
.
See, e.g., Oman, The "Chips" Treaty: A U.S. Post-Mortem, 1989 NIR 422-25 (1989).
See infra note 771 (listing and discussing current design bills); Brown, supra note 32,
at 1399-1400 (criticizing this proposed extension of design protection to functional
designs).
For evidence that resistance to utility models in disguise may have influenced the development of the nonobviousness standard even with regard to utility patents, see M.
Farell, The Supreme Court and the Utility Model Thst of Patentability (Apr. 10, 1990)
(unpublished paper on file at the Vanderbilt Law School).
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indulgent a standard of functionality might mean that competitors could not
make use of a patented design component they needed in order to match or
improve upon an originator's performance. efficiency. or manufacturing
costS. 209 On the other hand. too stringent a standard would defeat the very
purpose of a law enacted to protect ornamental designs of useful articles. 210
The problem. as Nimetz framed it in 1965. was that "the
configurations of most goods are guided both by mechanical necessity and
by artistic considerations...211 Moreover, configurations eligible for protection under the design patent law tend to exhibit a much higher degree of
functionality than courts normally expect to encounter in cases dealing with
copyrightable "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.,,212 Were the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to adopt a purist attitude concerning aesthetic features worthy of protection in design patent law, its functionality standard would logically have to invalidate the bulk of the very designs
that its evenhanded standard of nonobviousness had just rehabilitated. 213
Wholesale invalidation on grounds of functionality, in turn, would only
intensify the pressures that industrial design had begun to exert on federal
unfair competition law in the 1980s,214 a development the court was well
aware of. 21~
During the transitional period under review, the Federal Circuit struggled with this problem without elaborating a fully coherent doctrinal framework for resolving it. On the positive side, the court declared that utility
and design patents constituted two different species, serving different but
equally valid statutory goals, that were quite capable of peaceful co-existence when the occasion so required. 216 That the Federal Circuit was prepared to tolerate a denser admixture of functional features in patentable
designs than the federal appellate courts had condoned in the past217 then
appeared from decisions upholding _the designs of an eyeglass display

209. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 120; supra note 191 and accompanying text.
210. The term "ornamental" as a requirement was added to the design patent statute in 1902
in order to guide and restrict previous practice. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at
119-20.
211. Nimetz, supra note 69, at 117; see also Denicola, supra note 194, at 738-40.
212. See, e.g., 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988) (defining pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works to
exclude "their mechanical or utilitarian aspects"); id. § 102(b) (listing nonprotectible
matter, especially ideas); id. § 113(b) (excluding protection of three-dimensional useful articles depicted in two-dimensional form). See generally I P. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 28, at 98-112.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 177-90.
214. See infra text accompanying notes 530-71,608-701.
215. See, e.g., Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1549 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
216. See, e.g., Shelcore, Inc. v. Dwham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also P. RosENBERG, supra note 77, § 6.01[5], at 6-28.
217. See generally Nimetz, supra note 69, at 113-21.

1989]

Design Protection and the New Thchnologies

41

rack,218 of fiberglass camper shells,219 and, early in 1986, of a container for
dispensing liquids. 220
On the negative side, the Federal Circuit skirted the issue of functionality in one difficult case by tacitly linking it with the general tests of
nonobviousness. In Petersen Manufacturing Co. v. Central Purchasing,
Inc.,221 the court hinted at one point that the design of a handtool was functionally dictated,222 while at another point it stressed plaintiff's failure to
prove that commercial success stemmed from ornamental features of the
patented design rather than from its unpatented functional features. 223 In
the end, the court invalidated the design for obviousness224 under the
"skilled designer" test of In re Nalbandian, 225 and it cast a wanton glance in
passing at design bills that seek to protect functional designs without requiring either ornamentality or a creative contribution. 226
The Petersen decision was regressive in spirit and inconsistent with the
court's overall approach. It failed to rationalize a doctrine of functionality
.that would enable the practicing bar to operate efficiently within a regime
willing to tolerate a high degree of functionality in other designs upheld in
the same period: 227 It also opened the door to sub rosa invalidation for
218. See Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. AI Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 E2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(affirming validity of design for eyeglass display rack).
219. See Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (unpublished) (affirming validity of design of
camper shells made of fiberglass); see also Ex parte Igarashi, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 463
(PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 1985) (finding tire design not obvious without discussing functionality).
220. See Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 E2d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (valid below; issue of
validity not raised on appeal).
221. 740 E2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
222. Petersen, 740 E2d at 1549. Handtools are pristine subjects of foreign utility model
laws. See supra note 198.
223. Petersen, 740 E2d at 1547-49.
224. Id.
225. 661 E2d. 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981), cited in Petersen, 740 E2d at 1547; see supra text
accompanying notes 132-40.
226. See Petersen, 740 E2d at 1549 n.7 (referring to Judge Rich's concurring opinion in
Nalbandian); infra note 771 and accompanying text. The Petersen court's reference to
the then pending design bill thus disclosed that some of the Federal Circuit's most
respected judges welcomed the prospects of sui generis protection for functional
designs meeting no particular standard of creativity. See also The Industrial Innovation
and Technology Act: Hearings on S. 791 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights,
and Trade"..arks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, l00th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-31
(1987) [hereinafter Design Protection Hearings 1987) (testimony and statement of
Judge Giles S. Rich in favor of such a law). For criticism of these or similar proposals
to protect functional designs on soft conditions, see, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at
1395-1404; Cornish, Protecting the Appearance of Products: A British Experiment, in
ALAI 1983, supra note 8, at 297-311; infra text accompanying notes 769-80.
227. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. The confusion surrounding functionality at this time can be surmised from Feuling v. Wood, Appeal Nos. 84-543,84-662
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (unpublished), cerr.
denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985). Since the Feuling designs were in effect engine parts
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obviousness by district courts concerned about functionality, a favorite tac:tic of the past,228 and this in turn might be construed as a signal of hostility
or indifference to design patents in general.
In retrospect, the methodological inelegance of Petersen was a temporary
aberration 229 that did not prevent the Federal Circuit from maintaining a fairly
tolerant approach to functionality throughout the transitional period under
review. 23o Of eight cases concerning the validity of design patents known to
have reached the court between 1982 and the first quarter of 1986, only one
was actually invalidated for functionality,231 while the only design invalidated
for obviousness in the same period-i.e., the Petersen design of a handtoolwas, by the court's own admission, too functional to pass muster. 232 If, in
short, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remained perturbed by
functionality (an issue it would soon address more comprehensively),233 it was
not disposed to encourage wholesale invalidation of design patents on this or
any other ground during the period under review.

d. Infringement-The New Outcard
The Federal Circuit's ambivalent view of design patents surfaced most
clearly in cases that reached the issue of infringement. The usual test for
infringement, handed down from Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. White,234
required the accused design to bear such similarities to the protected design
as to deceive an ordinary observer into purchasing the former supposing it
to be the latter. 235 This emphasis on elements of confusion or deception,
which distorts some foreign design laws, too,236 does prevent second comers
from blatantly trading on the goodwill associated with a protected design.
But it blunts judicial sensitivity to potential violations of a property right, it

228.
229.
230.
231.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

and "irredeemably functional," see Thompson, supra note 96, at 191, invalidation by
the Federal Circuit was logical; the mystery is why the PTO had issued a design patent
in the first place. Id.
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 269-302. But see Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawkeye Distilled
Prods. Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished) (arguably
reverting to this same tactic).
See supra text accompanying notes 216-20.
Feuling v. Wood, Appeal Nos. 84-543,84-662 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 1984) (unpublished).
For the more traditional attitude of some federal appellate courts still handling patent
cases in this period, see, e.g., Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co., 758 F.2d 167,
172, 173-77 (6th Cir. 1985) (see-through mounts for rifle sights found valid and
infringed below; two of three designs reversed for functionality on appeal); Cardiac
Pacemakers, Inc. v. Coratomis, Inc., 702 F. 2d 671, 672 (8th Cir. 1983)"(affirming the
finding that design for surgically implantable heart pacemakers was invalid for obviousness and functionality).
Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
See infra text accompanying notes 269-302.
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871).
Jd. at 526-28; see also I D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[4].
See, e.g., Gaubiac, Autres Problemes de Fron/jeres, in LEoS DEsSINS ET MOOELES EN
QuESTION, supra note 8, at 57, 87-94 (noting influence of French unfair competition
law on tests for infringement under French design protection law).
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undermines the protection of design concepts as such, and it encourages the
courts to disregard market interests despite the high transaction costs that
creators must defray.237 In effect, this infusion of principles drawn from
unfair competition law 238 benefits competitors who appropriate the commercially valuable features of patented designs while artfully varying them to
avoid slavish imitation. 239
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which applied the
Gorham test unswervingly in this period, did not hesitate to exploit its ambiguities by allowing modest dissimilarities to avoid liability when the judges
felt little inclined to enforce the patent at hand. 24O Nor was a showing of
commercial success certain to neutralize this predilection for dissimilarities,241 although proof of copying could attenuate it.242 Conceding only
that Gorham did not impose a "likelihood of confusion" standard243 like that
used in the proliferation of cases in which commercial designs were protected as "appearance trade dress, ,,244 the Federal Circuit in this period left
more design patents stamped "valid but not infringed" than were found
"valid and infringed. ,,245
At the same time, the court took pains to develop and refine a second
prong of its infringement doctrine, known as the "point of novelty" test,
237. See. e.g., Thompson, supra note 96, at 162. Thompson believes that the "issue of customer or observer deception is inherently a narrow test precluding the idea that there is
a protectable design concept in a manner analogous to a functional concept that might
be protectable in a utility patent." [d.
238. See infra notes 530-35 and accompanying text.
239. Cf Levin, Applied Art, supra note 200, at 276-77 (referring to situation in the Nordic
countries). Professor Levin finds it "unsatisfactory if a competitor can come fairly
close to a protected design and still avoid liability for infringement" once a proprietor
has borne the burdens and costs of registration under a design protection law; see also
supra note 237 (view of Thompson).
240. See. e.g., Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 185 F.2d 1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 145 F.2d 621, 629 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that
accused design was substantially different), criticized by Thompson, supra note 96, at
162; Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding
significant differences in crowded field); see also Fryer, supra note 77, at 121 (criticizing extent to which "small differences . . . seem . . . to avoid design patent infringement").
241. See, e.g., Unette, 185 F.2d 1026; Utton, 728 F.2d at 1427.
242. See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. AI Nyman & Sons. Inc.• 150 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1984). noted by Thompson. supra note 96. at 163; Fiberglass in Motion. Inc. v. Hindelang; No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19. 1984) (LEXIS. Genfed library. USApp file)
(unpublished). Whether a design patent could be found valid and infringed without
evidence of copying in this period has been questioned. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 17.
at 121 (citing authority).
243. See Unette, 785 F.2d at 1029.
244. See infra notes 530-35 and accompanying text.
245. Of five relevant cases between 1982 and the first quarter of 1986 in which the design
patents were not invalidated for any reason, three were found "valid but not infringed."
See Unette, 185 F.2d 1026; Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc .• 145 F.2d 621 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); Litton. 728 F.2d 1423. Two were found "valid and infringed." See 1i'ansWorld. 150 F.2d 1552; Fiberglass in Motion. Inc. v. Hindelang. No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 19. 1984).
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which focused on the nature of the matter that a defendant had appropriated
as distinct from the issue of similarity. 246 Under the "point of novelty" test,
a plaintiff must show that any actionable similarities pertain to the novel
matter claimed to distinguish the patented design from the prior art. 247
When the sole point of similarity is not a novel feature that bore on the
threshold claims to eligibility in the first instance, no basis exists for a
finding of infringement. 248
The point of novelty test enabled the Federal Circuit to probe two
issues that lie on opposite sides of the same coin. One concerns the protectability of the matter allegedly taken from the plaintiff's design; the other
asks whether the similarities shown to exist actually amount to illicit similarities at all. 249 Combining these inquiries permits defendants to excuse
even a showing of strong similarities by demonstrating the extent to which
they borrowed only common~lace or generic ideas, functional features, or
other nonprotectable malte~ 0 while adding sufficient dissimilarities and
variations of their own within the range of otherwise protectable matter. 2S1
These tests provided, in short, a functional equivalent in design patent law
of the bifurcated test of copyright infringement2S2 that the Second, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits had been forging during much of the same period. 2s3
The elaboration of this two-pronged test of infringement plays a critical
role in the new approach to design protection law that the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has begun to develop. If the series of "valid but not
infringed" decisions prominent in this period reflected nothing more than
the old bias against design patents,254 for example, it would fail to explain
why the court took such pains to develop the "point of novelty" doctrine
246. See, e.g., Unette, 785 F.2d at 1028-29; Litton, 728 F.2d at 1444.
247. See, e.g., Litton, 728 F.2d at 1444; see also I D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[4) (noting
that "the similarity to the ordinary observer must be attributable to the novel elements
of the patented design").
248. See, e.g., 1 P. ROSENBERG, supra note 77, § 6.01[51, at 6-36.
249. See, e.g., Unette, 785 F.2d at 1028-29; Litton, 728 F.2d at 1440.
250. See, e.g., Litton, 728 F.2d at 1440. For more recent cases, see infra notes 303-18 and
accompanying text.
251. Compare, e.g., Unette, 785 F.2d at 1028 and Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., hic., 745
F.2d 621,623,628-29 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and Litton, 728 F.2d at 1444, with Fiberglass in
Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984) (LEX IS, Genfed
library, USApp file) (unpublished) (holding that defendant's slight modifications did not
justify overturning lower court's finding of infringement given copying and commercial
success).
252. See, e.g., Thompson, supra nole 96, at 195 (noting affinities to copyright infringement
in Fiberglass in Motion).
253. See, e.g., Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 771 F.2d 485,491-93
(9th Cir. 1985); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607
(7th Cir.), cerro denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Warner Bros. V. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir. 1983). See generally 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 3-45. It must be remembered, however, that copyright law gives no protection against independent creation,
whereas independent creation is not a recognized defense to an action for infringement
of a design patent, and copying as such need not be shown. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note
71, at12t.
254. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 96, at 162, 174, 190 (suggesting this explanation).

1989]

Design Protection and the New Thchnologies

4S

when the presence of relatively minor differences could justify a finding of
noninfringement under the Gorham test without more. And why bother to
fashion such an elaborate doctrinal outcard at all while avoiding the older
and better established outcards of invalidation for obviousness or functionality or both?255
A more promising line of inquiry is to ascertain why a court that had
taken pains to treat industrial designs in a more neutral and evenhanded
manner considered the "point of novelty" test to be of such ancillary importance. A review of the cases in which this test figured prominently then suggests that the Federal Circuit found it especially helpful when the patented
design combined decorative and very functional features in an integrated
whole that enjoyed considerable commercial success. 256 An hypothesis
worth examining, in short, is that the ambivalence and uncertainty characterizing the infringement doctrine during this transitional period is directly
related to the court's larger, unresolved quandary about functionality. That
quandary,257 in turn, stemmed from the court's growing realization that
greater latitude in admitting functionally influenced designs to patent protection was needed under modern economic conditions notwithstanding the
federal judiciary's traditional reluctance to allow design patent law to protect utility models in disguise. 258
If the above-mentioned hypothesis proved accurate, then the elaboration of a more refined functionality doctrine-noticeably lacking in this
period-could itself allow decisions for or against infringement to assume a
more neutral and predictable configuration than was true between 1982 and
the first quarter of 1986. The cases decided from mid-1986 to the time of
writing appear to verify both of these hypotheses.
3. The New Synthesis: Functionality, Point of Novelty, Illicit
Appropriation
The later cases suggest that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has shed its initial reserve and is systematically fashioning a more
workable design protection law on the foundations of the preexisting legislation. Notable in this regard is a more resolute determination to apply all the
255. This -does not exclude the possibility that old fashioned antiprotectionist bias was present in such cases as Unette, 785 F.2d 1026, and Shelcore, 745 F.2d 621, in which the
qualitative nature of the similarities at issue may have been unduly discounted. The
point is that the search for a workable doctrinal structure to accommodate industrial
design fulfilled policy objectives that cannot be explained by the appeal to bias alone.
256. See, e.g., Unette, 785 F.2d 1026 (finding design of dispensing container for liquids valid
but not infringed); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(finding design of microwave oven doors valid but not infringed); see infra notes
303-31 and accompanying text (discussing more recent cases).
257. For recognition that the Federal Circuit at this period was in a quandary about functionality, see Fryer, supra note 77, at 120-21.
258. See, e.g., Petersen Mfg. Co., v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1548-49, 1549
n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding design of needle-nosed locking plier-type wrench invalid
for obviousness, but hinting that the underlying functionality problem might be cured if
proposed design legislation were enacted); supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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Graham criteria of nonobviousness to industrial designs and the elaboration
of an overarching doctrine of functionality that affects every phase of the
infringement action. The evidence further suggests that the clearer signals
emitted by the Federal Circuit in this period have begun to influence the way
federal district courts approach design patent cases, too, even though a statistical analysis to detect trends at the district court level remains premature. 259
a. Unreserved Application of Secondary Factors

On the surface, the Federal Circuit's recent pronouncements concerning the statutory presumption of validity and the weight to be given the Graham criteria-including secondary considerations-appear to carry forward the doctrinal framework established during the transit~onal phase. 260
In reality, the court has added a new dimension to its earlier work by stressing the extent to which the ~atenting of aesthetic achievements promotes
progress in industrial design. 61 The Federal Circuit has thus jettisoned the
antimonopolistic cant employed against design patents for the past twenty
years or more,262 and it seems keenly aware of the role that industrial design
plays in stimulating competition under modern economic conditions. 263
259. Because leading cases that perfect the Federal Circuit's own doctrinal re-elaboration
were handed down only in 1988-1990, there is an inevitable time lag during which the
lower courts have to register and digest a more refined message. See infra text accompanying notes 270-314.
260. See, e.g., Avia Group Int'l v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 E2d 1557, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (discussing obviousness); Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp.,
800 E 2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1986). But see Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of
Ohio, Inc., 908 E2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction
against copying of patented fender design despite presumption of validity).
261. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563-64 (stressing need to promote the decorative arts as
policy of the design statute); Pacific Furniture, 800 F.2d 1111 (cited in Avia as an
instance of promoting the decorative arts); cf Gorham Co. v. White, 81 u.s. (14 Wall.)
511 (1871) (stating that purpose of the statute is "to give encouragement to the decorative arts").
262. See generally Nimetz, supra note 69, at 97-113 (rehearsing the antipatent bias of the
Machlup tradition in the design patent milieu).
263. See, e.g., Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 E2d 1186, 1188 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting testimony of Judge Rich deploring that there is "no Federal statute today suited to
the needs of designers and design owners"); see also American Antenna Corp. v. Wilson Antenna, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 924,928 (D. Nev. 1988) (stating that "sleek, high tech
appearance" contributed to company's "unique position in the industry" since introducing the patented design); Physio-Control Corp. v. Medical Research Laboratories, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497. 1498 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting that "a poor design appearance
may create doubts about the level of technical skill and attention devoted to the engineering ... of the device itself'). For the view that "[d]esign is the lifeline of modern
commercially progressive industries and its role in international competitiveness is
growing significantly," see D. UGHANWA & M. BAKER, THE RoLE OF DEsiGN IN INTER·
NAnoNAL COMPETITIVENESS 243, 243-343 (1989); C. LoRENZ, THE DEsiGN DIMEN.
SION-PRoDUCT STRATEGY AND mE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL MARKETING 40-47 (1986);
see also Gregory, supra note 88, in LES DEsSINS ET MODELES EN QuESTiON, supra note
8, at 231-271 (stating that in "a society based on consumption, the primacy of desire
over need has given to fonn a preeminence that it never previously attained outside of
the most socially privileged groups"). For the view that intellectual property rights
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With these policies in mind, the court has allowed the secondary considerations, including commercial success and copying, their full weight in
the assessment of validity throughout the period under review. 264 Although
it insists on proof of a nexus between commercial success and the claimed
design innovation,265 the Federal Circuit has applied these objective tests in
a manner consistent with its treatment of utility patents 266 and without the
guarded restraint that characterized the transitional period. 267 At the same
time, the court has shaped the motion for summary judgment into a tool that
lower courts can be expected to use more liberally when determining issues
of either validity or infringement in design patent cases. 268
b. Nonfunctionality as a "Multiplicity of Forms"
In more recent decisions, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has managed to combine its flexible treatment of nonobviousness with a
mature doctrine of functionality premised on the net separation of the two
issues. As a result, the court will normally not allow considerations of
functionality to influence the test of nonobviousness,269 a practice that had
sometimes clouded its elaboration of both doctrines during the transitional
phase. 270

264.
265.

266.

267.
268.
269.

270.

generally stimulate competition under modern economic conditions, see, e.g., Lehmann, Property and Intellectual Property-Property Rights as Restrictions on Competition in Furtherance of Competition, 20 1.I.c. 1, 11-15 (1989); Ullrich, The Importance of
Industrial Property Law and Other Legal Measures in the Promotion of Technological
Innovation, 28 INDus. PRoP. 102 (1989).
See, e.g., Avia, 853 E2d at 1564; Pacific Furniture, 800 E2d at 1114 (commercial success and copying stressed in lower court's finding of validity; Federal Circuit affirmed,
allowing treble damages and praising the lower court's reasoning).
See, e.g., Avia, 853 E2d at 1564 (holding that proof of nexus in regard to commercial
success was demonstrated); Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawkeye Distilled Prods. Co., 12
US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished) (finding that commercial success of patented liquid dispenser derived from novel use, not from protectible design
features, and rejecting first to promote theory); see also Benchcraft, Inc. v. Broyhill
Furniture Indus., Inc., 681 E Supp. 1190, 1203-07 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (holding that
nexus between "overall design, standing alone" and commercial success was not demonstrated, but copying of design by at least eighteen other furniture manufacturers was
"quite persuasive" of nonobviousness), rev'd on other grounds, 10 US.P.Q.2d (BNA)
2036 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished).
See, e.g., Avia, 853 E2d at 1563-65 (applying texts of commercial success and copying,
stating that "[d)esign patents must meet a nonobvious requirement identical to that
applicable to utility patents"); see also American Antenna Corp. v. Wilson Antenna,
Inc., 690 E Supp. 924, 928 (D. Nev. 1988) (holding that acquiescence of the trade
helped to show that "high tech" design was not obvious).
Compare, e.g., Avia, 853 E2d 1557 and Pacific Furniture, 800 E2d 1111 with Litton
Sys. Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 E2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
See Avia, 853 E2d at 1560-61 (discussing summary judgment).
See, e.g., Avia, 853 E2d at 1563; Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 E2d 1186 (Fed. Cir.
1988); In re Cho, 813 E2d 378, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Power Controls Corp. v.
Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234,239 (Fed. Cir. 1986). But see Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawkeye Distilled Prods. Co., 12 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished)
(invalidating the design of a liquid dispenser because its overall appearance was "suggested by the combination of references considered by the [lower) court").
See supra notes 221-30 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps to ensure that lower courts and the examiners respect the Federal Circuit's resolve in this regard, a majority in In re Cho 27l reversed the
PTO's decision that the design of a bottlecap was obvious because the Board
had erroneously anal~zed the cap as if it were the subject of an application
for a utility patent. 27 Although "it may have been obvious from a utility
standpoint to place cylindrical depressions in crown-type caps and to
include flaps in the depressions," the majority declared, it did not follow
that the claimed design was obvious because "the combined teachings suggest onlr components of the claimed design . . . not its overall appearance...27 A dissenting opinion would have affirmed the examiner's rejection on grounds of functionality;274 but the majority pointedll, refused to
consider the functionality bar as "not an issue in this appeal." 75 That the
court would henceforth treat nonobviousness and functionality as separate
and independent issues was thus a message it carried up to and perhaps
beyond the breaking point in this opinion. 276
This gambit served to flush the problem of functionality out into the
open where the Federal Circuit now proceeded to deal with it on its own
terms. At one extreme, the court showed it would not hesitate to exclude all
designs that are dictated by function, in keeping with the older case law. 277
At the opposite extreme, the court foresaw that purely decorative designs,
altogether separable from the functional features of the products that
embodied them, would pose no problem. 278 It recognized nonetheless that
most cases fell between these extremes because functional considerations
significantly affect the bulk of the designs that figured in litigation today. 279
If the commercially most valuable designs that are both efficient and attractive 280 were to be denied eligibility merely because of their functional com271. 813 F.2d 378 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
272. [d. at 382; see also Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188 (separating tests of functionality and ornamentality).
273. Cho, 813 F.2d at 382.
274. [d. at 382-84 (Newman, J., dissenting).
275. [d. at 382.
276. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 120-21 (criticizing the detachment of ornamentality
from functionality in the majority's analysis). The dissent preferred that the analysis of
ornamentality and obviousness should be guided by the same criterion. See Cho, 813
F.2d at 382; see also Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawkeye Distilled Prods. Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished) (apparently adopting this approach and, to
that extent, is regressive in method and spirit). The whole point of the cases from
mid-1986 on was to enable more functionality to enter design patent law at the eligibility stage while establishing some means of filtering out functional features at the
infringement stage. See infra text accompanying notes 303-31.
277. See, e.g., Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(finding that packaging for electrical component was functional).
278. See, e.g., Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stressing
that design patents are limited to ornamentation); Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 239
(finding that design for plastic "clam shell" casing for electrical rotary dimmer switch
was not primarily ornamental).
279. See, e.g., Avia Group Infl v. L.A. Gear Cal.,lnc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
280. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 120.
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ponents, the old doctrinal formula barring functionally dictated designs 281
could become an instrument for depriving the design patent law of any stimulatory effect in the drive for domestic economic growth. 282
In a formative opinion handed down in Avia Group International v. L.A.
Gear California, Inc.,283 the Federal Circuit demonstrated the liberality with
which it would aJlow designs that combined functional and aesthetic features to survive the threshold tests of eligibility.284 In so doing, the court
turned away from rigid tests of separability that seek to distinguish form and
function, with their built-in bias towards nineteenth century kitsch,285 in
favor of a "multiplicity of forms" approach 286 familiar from foreign design
law. 287 Under this approach, a given design feature, though functionally
significant, need not be excluded if competitors can obtain comparable technical yields by using an aesthetically different shape.288 Only' a design feature that failed this test would automaticaUy be barred at the threshold of eligibility, lest design patent law allow a manufacturer to control important
mechanical functions 289 or perhaps to monopolize features determined by
market expectations. 290
This left a gray area in which the "multiplicity of forms" test would not
of itself invalidate a functional design that also embodied strong aesthetic
281. See, e.g., 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2), at 1-192 to 1-194.1 (citing authorities).
282. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563 (stressing distinction between functionality of article
and "functionality of the particular design of such article or features thereof that perform a function").
283. 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
284. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; see also Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186,
1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that patentable design may embody functional features);
Phlaphongphanich v. Fabjancic, No. 88-1128 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, USApp file) (unpublished) (stating that "design patents may in some cases
embody functional features").
285. See, e.g., Nimetl, supra note 69, at 120 (criticizing "gingerbread conception of
design").
286. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; see also Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188.
287. See, e.g., Gaubiac, supra note 236, at 66-71 (noting increasing use of "multiplicity of
forms" test in regard to functionality under French design protection law); infra note
288 (discussing U.K. law).
288. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; see also Fryer, supra note 77, at 120; Nirnetl, supra
note 69, at 120 (arguing, in 1965, that "such a test would make good c:cunumic sense").
Strictly applied, however, a "multiplicity of forms" test can become overprotective on
the premise that there is no useful article whose "demands ... are such that only one
design will suffice to meet them." See R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 292 (discussing
decision by United Kingdom's House of Lords in AMP v. Utilux, [1972] RPC 103
(H.L.).
289. See. e.g., Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234,240 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(concerning plastic packaging container devised to close like a clam shell around electrical components). According to Professor Fryer, there was no evidence that this
design improved appearance or that "the package could be built using the same functional arrangement without creating essentially the same appearance." Fryer. supra
note 77, at 120.
290. See, e.g., Litton Sys.• Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1984)"
(holding that microwave oven door shared features in common with all prior oven
doors).
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components. Methodologically, the Federal Circuit believed it could isolate
the pertinent aesthetic features in such cases by piecemeal decomposition of
the design as a whole, a technique the court expressly authorized the lower
courts to use for purposes of its refined functionality analysis,291 but not for
purposes of testing either obviousness 292 or infringement. 293 When this
analysis persuades the district courts that a given design as a whole amounts
to a utility model in disguise,294 they should invoke the "primarily functional" rule to invalidate it,295 in part because such designs "do not promote
the decorative arts. ,,296 But the Federal Circuit will not allow the rule
against primarily functional designs to exclude a priori all the heavily
functional designs falling within this gray area as might have occurred in
the past. 297 On the contrary, when functional features are combined with
strongly marked aesthetic features, as often occurs, and the design as a
whole does not fail the "multiplicity of forms" criterion , 298 the Federal Circuit may allow it to survive the functionality hurdle in order to evaluate the
nature of the taking under the two-pronged test for infringement it has carefully elaborated. 299
It follows that "design patents may in some cases embody functional
features,,,3oo precisely because-as one federal district court recently
deduced-"we are concerned not with ornamentation in the conventional
sense, but with industrial design. ,,301 In this environment, the Federal Cir291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

296.
297.
298.

299.

300.
301.

See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 239-40.
See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; In re Cho, 813 F.2d 378, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
See, e.g., Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 240.
See supra text accompanying notes 196-200,208.
See, e.g., Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 240 (holding plastic "clam shell" package to
encase electrical rotary dimmer switch invalid for functionality); see also Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming validity of design for
massage device, "but a design patent is not a substitute for a utility patent"); supra note
185.
See Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 238 (citing In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020, 1022 (C.C.P.A.
1964».
See.supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, §
1.04[2], at 1-194.1 to 1-195.
See, e.g., Avia Group Infl v. L.A. Gear Cal., hic., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(finding that overall aesthetic design of an athletic shoe was not functional, although
parts of the design were functional, because each component could have been accomplished in other ways).
See, e.g., id. at 1563 (affirming the summary judgment finding that design for upper
part and outer sole of athletic shoe was valid and infringed); Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188
(affirming the finding that design for massage device was valid); see also FMC Corp. v.
Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 528 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (affirming the finding that
design of full-power, single-power-source changer for tubeless tires was valid). For the
most recent decision, see Winner Infl Corp. v. Wolo Mfg. Corp., 905 F.2d 375 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (finding design of steering wheel lock was not inf~inged under point of novelty test, and vacating finding of invalidity). The Lee and FMC decisions portend the
excesses to which the "multiplicity of forms" test can be carried unless checked by
other doctrines. See supra note 288; infra note 321 and accompanying text.
Phlaphongphanich v. Fajancic, No. 88-1128 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 1988) (LEX IS, Genfed
library, USApp file) (unpublished) (citing Lee, 838 F.2d at 1563).
Physio-Control Corp. v. Medical Research Laboratories, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497,
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cuit warned, courts must either learn to distinguish the functionality of an
article from the functionality of a particular design or it will "not be gossible to obtain a design patent on a utilitarian article .of manufacture. ,,30
c. Relation Between Functionality and Infringement

The price exacted for this liberality at the threshold to eligibility, however, is a stricter scrutiny at the infringement stage than the Federal Circuit
would otherwise require if the design were less significantly influenced by
functional features. This heightened scrutiny occurs along both edges of
the two-pronged approach to infringement formulated during the transitional period. 303
From one angle, the Federal Circuit applies the "point of novelty" test,
rather like the idea-expression test of copyright law, to exclude nonpatentable features, including the prior art,304 and to focus the ordinary purchaser's attention on protectable aesthetic components of a patented design. 305 .

302.

303.
304.

305.

1498 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Noting the "clean and crisp" appearance given by the design of a
defibrillator used in cardiac arrest emergencies, the district court observed that while
"very little of it is dictated solely by function. . . the design options are clearly inhibited by function" in an effort to "enhance ... effectiveness ... and at the same time
present a pleasing appearance." [d. at 1498; see also American Antenna Corp. v. Wilson Antenna, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 924 (D. Nev. 1988) (holding that unlike alleged prior
art, patented device had "sleek, high tech appearance" and that claim of validity was
likely to succeed on the merits).
Avia, 853 F.2d at 156 (citing Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 800
F.2d lllt (Fed. Cir. 1986); Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932,939 (Fed. Cir.
1983»; see supra note 282. The end result in these cases approximates that of recent
decisions in the United Kingdom. There the notion that a design is to be excluded if
dictated by function has come to mean that it was "prompted by a given purpose" without an attempt to add some embellishment to the article beyond those features
prompted by the purely functional demands of the article. See R. MERKIN, supra note
3, at 292-94 (discussing Interlego AG v. l)'co Indus., [1988] 3 All E.R. 949; AMP v.
Utilux, [1972] RPC 103 (H.L.».
See supra notes 246-58 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 249-53. "A device that copies the utilitarian or
functional features of a patented design is not an infringement unless the ornamental
aspects are also copied . . . ." Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1189 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); see also Winner Int'! Corp. v. Wolo Mfg. Corp., 905 F.2d 375 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
See, e.g., Winner, 905 F.2d at 376; Avia, 853 F.2d at 1565; Lee, 838 F.2d 1186; FMC
Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 527 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Unette
Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (cited with approval in this connection by FMC). In Lee, a panel of the court suggested that the "point of novelty" test
applied only if the Gorham test of similarity as a whole was met. Lee, 838 F.2d at
1189. This seems unnecessarily rigid, given that patent law, unlike copyright law,
requires prior specificity of claims. See, e.g., Winner, 905 F.2d at 376 (stating that purpose of point of novelty test is "to focus on those aspects . . . which render the design
different from prior art designs"); cf Adelman & Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673,
705-06 (1989). While commentators have criticized the Federal Circuit's recent tendency to import the copyright principle of substantial similarity into the doctrine of
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This ensures that the broadened mix of decorative and utilitarian features
allowed to escape invalidation under the court's more relaxed tests of functionality and nonobviousness will not indiscriminately obtain protection
through the back door in the infringement calculus. 306
From a second angle, the Federal Circuit seems likely to circumscribe
the range of actionable similarities when applying the ordinary purchaser
test of Gorham Co. v. White 307 to highly functional designs that have not
been copied point for point. In such cases, the court will first satisfy itself
that the similarities claimed to infringe constitute illicit similarities-that
is, an appropriation of the patented novelty308-because a competitor does
not infringe by copying unprotectable functional features. 309 The presence
of very functional features can then affect the degree of similarity that may
be required to trigger infringement in either quantitative or qualitative
terms. By demanding closer imitation within a narrower range of equivalents than would be necessary absent these functional influences, the Federal Circuit further ensures that only imitators who appropriate more than
the unprotectable features will fall into the net of infringement. 3\0
In sum, when the patented design partakes of highly functional elements and a second comer invests the time and expense to vary it, the court
may weigh his variations more favorably than if the patentee had claimed
markedly aesthetic or decorative effects. 311 The more a given design elicits
strict scrutiny on account of its functionality, the less its actionable similarities are likely to "deceive" the ordinary purchaser in the court's view. 312

306.

307.
308.
309.

310.
311.

312.

equivalents applicable to utility patents, see Adelman & Francione, supra note 305, at
698-706, echoes of such a test in the design patent environment would seem less inappropriate because design patent applications can only claim the disclosed features. Use
of the "point of novelty" test then permits the court to exclude unpatentable subject
matter from the infringement calculus, and it also permits a more focused directive to
the ordinary purchaser in order to preserve the greater range of equivalents recognized
in Avia.
See, e.g., Winner, 905 F.2d at 376 (stating that the point of novelty test cannot include
the overall configuration and appearance of a patented design "without regard to the
prior art"); Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188 (holding that design patents protect only ornamental
features, not structural or functional aspects).
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871).
See, e.g., Winner, 905 F.2d at 376; FMC, 836 F.2d at 527.
See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1565; Lee, 838 F.2d at 1190; FMC, 836 F.2d at 527. In short,
there must be an illicit appropriation of the patentable novelty, not just an appropriation
of the patented design. For an analogous approach in copyright law, see supra note
253.
See, e.g., Lee, 838 F.2d at 1190; FMC, 836 F.2d at 527-28.
See Winner, 905 F.2d 375 (holding that no reasonable jury could find design of steering
wheel lock infringed because of dissimilarities and defendant's use of unpatented prior
art); see also Lee, 838 F.2d at 1190 (acknowledging that doctrine of equivalents applies
to design patents, lest minor differences camouflage piracy; but noting that the doctrine
can only apply where the designs are "equivalent in their ornamental, not functional
aspects," and holding design for a massage device valid but not infringed); FMC, 836
F.2d at 527-28 (assessing both differences and similarities, but finding that the former
prevailed, despite defendant's intention to market "look-alike" product design for tubeless tire changer; design patent held valid but not infringed).
See, e.g., FMC, 836 F.2d at 527-28; see also Physio-Control Corp. v. Medical Research
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But when a second corner is too lazy or in too much of a hurry to make any
. appreciable variations, his copy wiJI infringe notwithstanding the presence
of strong functional features in the overall design. 313 In this event, even
though the imitator intended to exploit a different market segment and did
not engage in direct competition with the originator, he will nonetheless
infringe upon the protected design concept.~14
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has thus responded to
criticism concernin~ the failure of design patent law to recognize the doctrine of equivalents 15 by indicating that the scope of protection may extend
beyond literal infringement in appropriate cases,316 even though the range
of protectable equivalents will shrink as the incidence of functionality
increases. 317 Should this Willingness to protect the patented design concept
carryover to future decisions, it could eventually limit the deception rationale of Gorham 318 and further enhance the overall effectiveness of the existing design protection law.

4. Positive Evaluation of Current Law
The foregoing survey of major cases handed down between the second
quarter of 1986 and the second quarter of 1990 has confirmed that a broad
range of highly functional designs may now qualify for patent protection,
even if the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rightly continues to
stress that "[t)he great bulk of industrial design is simply not protectable by
design patents.,,319 As regards the substantive prerequisite of nonobviousness, the cases show that eligible designers usually benefit from the

313.

314.
315.

316.

317.
318.
319.

Laboratories, 7 U.s.p.Q.2d (DNA) 1497, 1498-1500 (N.D. III. 1988) (stating that the
"ordinary purchaser of these devices is a sophisticated purchaser" who "views the
design only with respect to the points of novelty"; adding that when "making judgments about appearance in a somewhat crowded field, the dissimilarities take on added
importance").
See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1565 (finding that design of parts of an athletic shoe was
valid and infringed); see also Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp.,
800 F.2d 1111,1114 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that design for upholstered armchairs
was valid and willfully infringed).
See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1565.
See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 96, at 162. For the unsettled state of the doctrine of
equivalents in regard to utility patents after Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,
833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), see generally Adelman & Francione, supra
note 305.
See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1565 (''To find infringement, the accused shoes need only
appropriate a patentee's protected design, not a patentee's market as well."); Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1189-90 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that "principles of
equivalency are applicable under Gorlulm").
See supra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text.
Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188 n.3. The reasons for this general condition of nonprotectability
are twofold: (I) most industrial designs are primarily functional and therefore not
within the purview of a statute that covers "ornamental designs of useful articles"; and
(2) most industrial designs are legally obvious by definition. In evaluating the state of
design protection law both here and abroad, it is important to keep these two issues
separate. See infra text accompanying notes 947-69.
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presumption of validity once their patents have issued and from the application of secondary or objective factors if validity is later challenged. Because
the protection of markedly aesthetic designs better promotes the policies
underlying the statute than the protection of very functional appearance
designs, the former tend to receive more favorable treatment at the infringement stage when courts evaluate the nature of the taking. Alleged infringers of highly functional designs must still approach slavish imitation before
incurring liability, lest the design patent law cover a range of equivalents
that would unduly encroach upon the delicate frontier with utility patents. 320
Despite these limitations, the cases emanating from the Federal Circuit
reveal an impressive effort to reshape the United States Design Patent Act in
conformity with its original goals. To be sure, a number of issues require
further elaboration, especially the "multiplicity of forms" test of functionality, whose innate permissiveness has been judicially curtailed in both the
United Kingdom and France. 321 Much also depends on the court's continued willingness to emit the clearer signals it has been sending since 1986
and on the continuation of a favorable climate for utility patents as well. 322
But none of these reservations detracts from the remarkable finding that, of
thirteen cases concerning ornamental designs of useful articles known to
have reached the Federal Circuit during the period under review,323 there
320. See supra text accompanying notes 303-18; see also Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto
Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction on theory that presumption of validity had been sufficiently rebutted,
especially in regard to functionality; issue on merits "not prejudge[d)").
321. See, e.g., supra notes 299, 302. Even under the United Kingdom's Registered Designs
Act of 1949 as amended in 1988, supra note 3, features prompted by functional
demands of an article without added embellishment remain ineligible. The pure multiplicity of forms test was rejected as too permissive. R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at
292-94; see also Perot-Morel, Protection of Designs and How It Is Related to the Law on
Patents In French Law, in DEsiGN PROTECTION, supra note 8, at 67, 70-74 [hereinafter
Perot-Morel, Protection of Designs) (stating that multiplicity of forms test leads to
excessive protection under French Design Law of 1909, and that modified separability
or "contours" test, adopted by some courts, excludes elements of form that contribute
to a practical result); cf Chrysler Motors, 908 F.2d 951.
322. Cf Nimetz, supra note 69, at 83. One recent unpublished opinion evokes the old bias
against combination designs and sends a methodological signal not in keeping with the
Federal Circuit's other decisions. See Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawkeye Distilled Prods. Co.,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (invalidating design of container for obviousness because it was "suggested by the combination of references").
323. Published cases include Winner Int'l Corp. v. Wolo Mfg. Corp., 905 F.2d 375 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Avia Group Int') v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lee,
838 F.2d 1186; FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 501 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re
Cho, 813 F.2d 378 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d
234 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 800 F.2d
I1II (Fed. Cir. 1986). Unpublished cases include In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (affirming examiner's rejection on "public use" grounds under 35 US.C. §
102(b»; Neo-Art, 12 US.P.Q.2d (DNA) 572 (finding design of combined stand and container for storing liquids invalid for obviousness); Benchcraft, Inc. v. Droyhill Furniture
Indus., Inc., 10 US.P.Q.2d (DNA) 2036 (Fed. Cir. 1989), vacating and remanding 681 F.
Supp. 1190 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (finding nonobvious design for sofa and loveseat invalid
for inequitable conduct); John Thomas Batts, Inc. v. S.O. Thxtiles Co., No. 88-1134
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 17, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (affirming unpUblished
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are only two decisions invalidating patented designs for obviousness, both
unpublished,324 and there is only one clear instance of invalidation for functionality.325 Moreover, in two of the five cases in which the Federal Circuit
applied the refined infringement analysis described above, the patented
designs were found both valid and infringed. 326
Even when cases from both the transitional and the more mature
phases are examined together, the results are hardly less astonishing. Of
some twenty-two relevant cases known to have reached the Federal Circuit
between 1982 and the first half of 1990, there were only two instances of
invalidation for functionality.327 Of some eighteen cases in which the inventive height was directly or indirectly challenged, there were only three
instances of invalidation for obviousness. 328 Of some ten relevant cases
known to have reached the decisive phas~ of an infringement action during
the entire period under review, four concerned patented designs that were
ultimately found valid and infringed. 329

324.

325.
326.

327.

328.
329.

decision of the Southern District of Aorida to invalidate under 35 U.S.c. § 103);
Phlaphongphanich v. Fabjancic, No. 88-1128 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, USApp file) (affirming award of priority by PTO Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences); In re Blaisdell, No. 87-1524 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, USApp file) (affirming examiner's final rejection of claimed design under 35
U.S.c. § 103).
Neo-Art, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 572; Batts, No. 88-1134 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 17, 1988); see
supra note 323. Rule 18 opinions designated as unpublished "shall not be employed as
precedent" by the Federal Circuit, except in regard to a claim of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or law of the case.
See Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 238-40. Not included in these statistics is Chrysler
Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 95t (Fed. Cir. 1990). See
supra note 320.
Compare Avia, 853 F.2d 1557 (holding designs for shoe sole and upper part valid and
infringed) and Pacific Furniture, 800 F. 2d lilt (holding design of upholstered armchair
valid and infringed) with FMC, 836 F.2d 501 (affirming lower court finding that design
of single-power-source tire changer was valid but not infringed in action for declaratory
judgment by alleged infringer) and Lee, 838 F.2d 1186 (holding design for massage
implement valid but not infringed) and Winner, 905 F.2d 375 (vacating finding of invalidity and holding design of antitheft bar-type steering wheel lock not infringed under
point of novelty test).
These cases include Power Controls, 806 F.2d 234; Feuling v. Wood, Nos. 84-543,
84-662 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (unpublished)
(finding designs for engine fan housings and mountings to be primarily functional); see
supra notes 227, 289; see also supra text accompanying notes 221-28, 276 (discussing
Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Neo-An,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 572 (holding highly functional designs invalid for obviOUsness».
Not included in these statistics is Chrysler Motors, 908 F.2d 951.
These cases include Petersen, 740 F.2d 1541; Neo-An, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 572; Bans,
No. 88-1134 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 17,1988). See supra notes 221-28,323 and accompanying
text. Nothing is known about the last case at either level.
Compare Avia, 853 F.2d 1557 and Pacific Furniture, 800 F.2d IIII and Trans-World
Mfg. Corp. v. AI Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and Fiberglass in
Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984) (LEX IS, Genfed
library, USApp file) (all holding design patents valid and infringed) with Winner, 905
F.2d 375 and Lee, 838 F.2d 1186 and FMC, 836 F.2d 501 and Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack
Co., 785 F.2d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1986) and Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d
1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (all holding design patents valid but not infringed).
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To anyone familiar with the dismal record of the past, these findings
proclaim an altogether different message. They do not, of course, add up to
a modern design protection law along the lines that reformers both here and
abroad have sought to develop from the 1950s on. 330 They do signify a
major change of direction in United States design patent law, one that is
more consonant with the spirit of the Supreme Court's early decision in
Gorham Co. v. White. By providing some exceptionally creative designs
with a strong and effective form of protection, albeit on strict conditions,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has brought the domestic
design protection law closer to the models operating abroad. In so doing, it
has at long last enabled the United States to fulfill the obligation "to protect
industrial designs" that article 5 quinquies of the Paris Convention imposed
on all Member States. 331
B. Copyright Protection of Applied Art: The RetreatJrom Partial
Cumulation

1. Forty Years After Mazer v. Stein: 1954-1983
Because the federal appellate courts had virtually stopped enforcing
issued design patents by the 1950s,332 the modern period of design protection in the United States really opened with the landmark case of Mazer v.
Stein 333 in 1954, in which the Supreme Court first upheld copyright protection for works of applied art. 334 Judicial recognition of applied art as statutory subject matter brought domestic law into line with the minimum standards prevailing under the international copyright conventions. 335 But the
Supreme Court neglected to provide any legal criterion for distinguishing
commercial designs now eligible for protection as "works of applied art"
See infra text accompanying notes 918-37.
See supra notes 33, 109 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 72, 108-09 and accompanying text.
347 U.S. 201 (1954)..
See generally Latman, supra note 51. In Mazer, the copyright authorities persuaded the
Supreme Court to hold that statuettes of male and female dancing figures were copyrightable despite their commercial use as lamp bases and notwithstanding the availability of statutory protection for ornamental designs under the Design Patent Act of
1842. Mazer, 347 U.S. 201, affg 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1953). Prior to 1948, the
Copyright Office had generally refused to register three-dimensional designs of useful
articles for copyright protection despite enabling language in the statute itself. See,
e.g., Derenberg, supra note 72, at 627, 646-48; Note, Protecting the Artistic Aspects of
Articles o/Utility: Copyright or Design Patents, 66 HARV. L. REV. 877,879 n.16 (1953).
335. In 1948, the Berne Union countries agreed to require some recognition of applied art in
the domestic copyright laws of member states without setting minimum standards. See
S. RICKETSON, supra note I, at 276-79; 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 828-37; supra note
42. That same year, the United States Copyright Office cautiously allowed certain
works of artistic craftsmanship to register for protection if they qualified as "works of
art in the historical and ordinary sense." The decision in Mazer, by upholding this
qualified recognition of applied art, facilitated future copyright relations between the
Berne Union countries and the United States, which adhered to the Universal Copyright
Convention in 1952. See generally Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at
1149-53,115000.26-27,1174-81.

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
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from those that would qualify only as "ornamental designs of useful art ic1es,,336 under either the existing design patent law or any sui generis design
law that might later be enacted. 337 On this most crucial issue of demarcation, moreover, the international conventions offered little guidance, given
that at least three orthodox national viewpoints had survived all efforts to
reach some unifying consensus at the Brussels Conference to Revise the
Berne Convention in 1948. 338
The United States Copyright Office had traditionally opposed the
"unity of art" doctrine championed by France and the frinciple of broad
copyright protection for industrial design to which it led. 39 After an abortive experiment with a regime of partial cumulation like that in the Federal
Republic of Germany,34O the Register interpreted Mazer as authority for
establishing a neo-Italian regime of noncumulation, built around the criterion
of separability, in regulations promulgated in 1958. 341 These regulations
336. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1171-73.
337. Although the United States had actively opposed copyright protection of commercial
designs and supported the revision of the Paris Convention, supra note I, art. 5
quinquies, see supra notes 16-18,33, 109 and accompanying text, its domestic design
law arguably remains inconsistent with the spirit of the Brussels compromise of 1948,
see supra'note 335, owing to the lack of a sui generis design law. See, e.g., Final
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, at
609-12, reprinted in 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 97-100 (1986) (discussing tension between
current United States law and the Berne provisions concerning applied art). Whether
United States law is or was inconsistent with the letter of the Paris Convention presents
a different and closer question. See supra note 109; text accompanying note 331.
338. See supra notes 43-46, 335 and accompanying text (discussing the French regime of
total cumulation between copyright protection of applied art and that country's special
design law; the Italian regime of noncumulation between copyright law and a special
design law; and the various regimes of partial cumulation typified by that of the Federal Republic of Germany).
339. See supra notes 16,335-37. For a discussion of the "unity of art" doctrine in relation
to United States law, see Reichman, Designs Before 1976. supra note 17, at 1153-74.
340. In 1956, the Copyright Office issued regulations that interpreted Mazer as allowing
copyright protection only for an object that was "clearly a work of art in itself." See,
e.g., Bailie v. Fisher, 258 E2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1958). This test resembled the one used
by courts in the Federal Republic of Germany to distinguish a few exceptionally creative designs eligible for copyright protection from the bulk of commercial designs
confined to a sui generis law. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. It also resembled the criterion later incorporated into article 21 of the Uniform Benelux Designs
Law, supra note 4. But the 1956 regulation antagonized the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, which questioned the Register'S authority to implement a regime of partial cumulation along these lines and hinted at tension with the principle of nondiscrimination expressed in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239
(1903). See Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260
E2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958), modifying 155 E Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The Copyright
Office withdrew this regulation in 1958. See generally Reichman, Designs Before
1976, supra note 17, at 1174-82. The United States experience in the period 1956 to
1'958 thus anticipated later judicial resistance in the Netherlands to the "clearly marked
artistic character" criterion adopted by article 21 of the Uniform Benelux Designs Law,
supra note 4. See. e.g., Cohen Jehoram, Netherlands. supra note 46, § 2[c); infra notes
407-08 and accompanying text.
341. See Reichman. Designs Before 1976, supra note 17. at 1181-82. The authorities took
pains to identify Italian law as the fount of their own expedient, a inove that made it
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served to exclude virtually all modern, three-dimensional designs from protection as works of applied art under the Copyright Act of 1909. 342
When, in 1976, Congress finally codified the criterion of separability
in section 101 of the new Copyright Act,343 it seemed to preclude further
consideration of full copyright protection for industrial art in the name of
Mazer. 344 But the congressional decision not to enact a sui generis design
bill, pending since the 1950s,345 also meant that the commercially most valuable appearance designs were relegated once again to the very design patent law whose ineffectiveness had initially triggered the movement for
reform. 346 Only when the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit later
took steps to revitalize the design patent law347 would this codified criterion
of separability actually begin to discharge its systemic function of shunting
some noncopyrightable industrial designs into an operative design protection law. As the domestic design patent law began to revive after 1982, the
corresponding provisions in copyright law became less incoherent than they
had appeared in 1976. 348
a. Separability Is Sometimes Conceptual

The treatment afforded works of applied art in domestic law nonetheless manifests numerous incongruities that defy systematic rationalization.
This occurs in part because of ambiguities inherent in the doctrine of sepaeminently acceptable at the international level. See iLl. at 1182 n.201 (citing authorities). Sources close to the Copyright Office arranged for the publication of at least two
articles discussing the theory of dissociation, which justified the Italian position. See
Note, Present Design Protection in the United States, 5 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 139
(1958); Note, Toward a More Systematic Approach to the Protection of Applied Art to
Industry, 6 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 287 (1959) [hereinafter Note, Systematic
Approach) (translating Italian Supreme Court decision on separability).
342. See. e.g., Note, Systematic Approach, supra note 341; Reichman, Designs Before 1976,
supra note 17, at 1182-86 ("An Interim Theory of Dissociation"); iLl. at 1213-23 ("Separability Italian Style"); cf. Fabiani, I Modelli. supra note 85, at 231-36, 251-53;
Auteri, Industrial Design, in OIzIONARI DEL OIRITIO PRIVATO 565, 577-82, 585-90 (N.
Irti ed. 1981); see also infra text accompanying notes 369-98.
343. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text; infra notes 369-74.
345. See supra notes 13-22, 72-75, 109 and accompanying text. The United States had
played an active role in the movement to strengthen the international protection of
industrial designs within the framework of the Hague and Paris Conventions that got
underway in the 1950s. See. e.g., Fisher Address. supra note 16, at 207; see also M.A.
PEROT-MOREL, LES PRINCIPES, supra note 8, at 18-19. The Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs of 1925 permits a single international deposit of protected designs. Act of The Hague, Nov. 6, 1925,47 Stat. 1789,
T.S. No. 941, 74 L.N.T.S. 341, revised at London, June 2, 1934,205 L.N.T.S. 179,
reprinted in WIPO & BIRPI, MANUAL OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CoNVENTIONS, items
A-I, B-1. See generally Maugue, The International Protection of Industrial Designs
under the International Conventions, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 393 (1989).
346. See H.R. RER No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1976); supra notes 72-77 and
accompanying text.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 171-331.
348. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1220-23.
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rability itself349 and in part because certain traditional categories of applied
art retained their privileged status under the 1976 Act, notwithstanding the
restrictive definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works" set out in
section 10 I .3S0
(l) Established Categories of Applied Art

For example, most two-dimensional designs, including fabric and textile designs, remain copyrightable even when subsequently embodied in
useful articles,3s1 according to the official interpretation of separability
derived from Mazer. 3s2 A troublesome subcategory comprises "maps,
globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings," which are
expressly treated as pictorial, graphic and sculptural works within the broad
definition codified by section 101. 3S3 Maps must sometimes satisfy a
higher standard of creativity,354 while architectural works were in effect
assimilated to designs of useful articles and subjected to a variant of the
separability criterion. 3ss
Fortunately, copyright protection of blueprints or of other technical
drawings as pictorial or graphic works 3s6 cannot normally extend to the useful articles they portray, owing to the codification, in 1976, of a line of prec349. See infra text accompanying notes 374-98.
350. See supra notes 20-21.
351. See, e.g., Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 E2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1917);
Dolori Fabrics, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 662 E Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). See generally I P. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 151-53.
352. 347 U.S. 201 (1954); see supra notes 340-44 and accompanying text. The reasoning is
that a two-dimensional painting does not forfeit eligibility when embodied in a useful
article. See, e.g., Dleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Baker
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (discussing works that appeal to aesthetic taste in dicta).
Most two-dimensional designs are then assimilated to paintings, including technical
drawings and architectural plans. But see Deverly Hills Design Studio (N.Y.), Inc. v.
Morris, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1889 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (upholding the denial of copyright
registration to two-dimensional paper patterns used to cut fabric for garments). The
Beverly Hills decision in the United States would be consistent with the dominant line of
cases in Italian law, which regards two-dimensional fabric and textile designs as inseparable from the useful articles that embody them. See, e.g., G. SENA, I DIRITn SULLE
INVENZ!oNE E SUI MODELU INDUSTRIAU 537-38 (1984). But see Auteri, supra note
342, at 590-91 (contending that two-dimensional designs, including fabric designs,
should be deemed separable as a matter of law).
353. See supra note 21 (quoting 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988».
354. See generally I P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 176-79 (criticizing direct observation
rule and assimilating maps to the treatment of factual works in general).
355. See generally id. at 98-102,202-04 (noting that a copyright in architectural plans gave
only the exclusive right to reproduce the plans in copies) (citing authorities). In effect,
only monumental or ornamental buildings could secure copyright protection.
However, bills were recently introduced to bring the protection of architectural works
more into line with the minimum standards under the Berne Convention, and Congress
adopted one of these bills late in 1990. See The Judicial Improvement Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-650 (H.R. 5316), Title VII, "Architectural Works," reprinted in 41 Patent, lrademark & Copyright J. (DNA) 133, 134-35 (Dec. 6, 1990). Works of architecture as such are beyond the scope of this Article.
356. See supra note 21.
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edents descending from the Supreme Court's 1879 decision in Baker v. SeIden. 357 These precedents subordinate the exclusive reproduction right of
copyright law to the traditional right of third parties to reverse engineer the
ideas embodied in unpatented products of mechanical and technical skills.
For this reason, a third party may freely imitate a dress or unpatented automobile parts so long as he does not copy the two-dimensional plans from
which these objects were initially made,358 in contrast with the situation
prevailing in the United Kingdom prior to the Copyright Designs and Patents Act of 1988. 359
Some three-dimensional works of applied art have also survived
codification of the separability test in 1976. For example, the creators of
dolls, costume jewelry, figurines, some toys, and certain other three-dimensional objects still obtain copyright protection 360 either because courts
deem such items not to be useful articles at a1l 361 or more typically because
they qualify as separable works of sculpture even if embodied in useful artic1es. 362 These subject matter categories thus fall within the shadow tradi357. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 113(b) (1988) (codifying Baker v. Selden, 101 US. 99 (1879)
and its progeny); supra note 23 (citing authorities). See generally Reichman, Designs
Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1229-32 (explaining evolution of § 113(b».
358. See. e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 105 (1976), reprinted in 1976
US. CoDE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659-801; Combustion Eng'g, Inc. V. Murray Thbe
Works, Inc., 222 US.P.Q. (BNA) 239, 244 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (holding that a copyrighted blueprint of a boiler did not bar construction of a similar boiler by reverse engineering the finished article); supra notes 401-03. See generally Reichman, Programs as
Know-How, supra note 23, at 693 n.288 (clarifying historical implications of Baker v.
Selden in relation to § 113(b) and the practice of reverse engineering). However, architectural works may now receive greater protection. See supra note 355.
359. See supra notes 46,202 and accompanying text; infra note 846 and accompanying text.
See generally R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 283-95.
360. See. e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982);
Kamar Infl, Inc. v. Russ Berrie and Co., 657 E2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1981); Gund, Inc. v.
Swank, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding stuffed toy lion was infringed).
See generally 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 156-58.
361. See, e.g., Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 E2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984)(declining to hold
abstract design of a swimsuit a useful article as a matter of law); Gay Toys, Inc. v.
Buddy L. Corp., 703 E2d 970,974 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that toys lack any intrinsic
utilitarian function "other than the portrayal of the real item"); see also Masquerade
Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 E2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that animal
nose masks were not designs of useful articles). A work that is not the "design of a useful article" is not subject to the test of separability, as these terms are defined in 17
US.c. § 10 1. See supra note 21 .
362. See. e.g., Denicola, supra note 194, at 497-98. However, such designs often consist of
commonplace ideas or generic versions of natural objects that lack personal expression,
which adversely affects both eligibility and the scope of protection. See 17 US.c.
§ 102(b) (1988); I P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 156-57. Sculptural embodiments
of artistic works first expressed in two-dimensional form, such as a doll that embodies a
cartoon character, are protectible under a line of precedents codified in § 113(b) of the
1976 Act, which freezes two lines of cases derived from Baker v. Selden, WI US. 99
(1879). The other line of cases denies protection to utilitarian articles portrayed in
two-dimensional graphic representations. See supra notes 357-58 and accompanying
text.
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tionally cast by Mazer, and they often figure in litigation. 363
Most three-dimensional designs of useful articles remain unprotectable, of course, owing to the separability criterion in coplsright law 364 and
to the nonobviousness requirement in design patent law. 5 Between these
two doctrinal barriers, however, lies an uncharted territory inhabited by
exceptionally creative designs that might have qualified for design patent
protection had their originators not neglected to file timely applications
within the one year novelty grace period that United States patent law generously provides. 366 The question that sooner or later bedevils the highest tribunals in every country that has ever enacted a design protection law 367 is
how to deal with palpably superior designs of this kind when their penitent
creators supplicate at the door to copyright law after having failed to comply
with the burdensome prerequisites of any design law that happens to be in
force. 368
(2) Partial Cumulation in the Second Circuit
Shortly after Congress codified separability as the criterion for distinguishing copyri~htable works of applied art from noncopyrightable "industrial designs, ,,36 the federal appellate courts denied copyright protection to
the attractive, modern forms of an outdoor parking lamp and of a set of
363. 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 156.
364. See supra notes 19-21, 343-44 and accompanying text; infra notes 369-74 and accompanying text. The definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works expressly
denies protection to the "mechanical or utilitarian aspects" of "works of artistic craftsmanship." See supra note 21 (quoting 17 U.s.c. § 101 (1988»; Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201 (I 954).
365. See supra notes 175-90,260-68,319-31 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. Such designs have destroyed their own
novelty.
367. For the most recent tensions of this kind in foreign law, see, e.g., Cohen Jehoram,
Cumulative Design Protection-A System for the EC? [hereinafter Cohen Jehoram,
Cumulative Protection], in DISEGNO INDUSTRIALE E PROTEZIONE EUROPEA 55, 60-64
(1989); infra notes 406-08 and accompanying text.
368. To the extent that courts view certain exceptional designs as copyrightable works of
applied art, they exempt originators from the very formalities of registration and
deposit that design protection laws normally require. See. e.g., Berne Convention,
supra note I, art. 5(2) (providing that the "enjoyment and the exercise of these rights
shall not be subject to any formality"); WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATlON, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION RJR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) 33-34 (1978) [hereinafter WIPO GUIDE]. This in turn
undermines the policies that prompt legislatures to enact special design laws in the first
place. See. e.g., Fabiani, La protezione dell'arte applicata. supra note 18, at 415. To
the extent that courts deny copyright protection to these same designs in deference to a
design law, they risk violating the principle of nondiscrimination present in all developed copyright laws. From a comparative standpoint, the recurrence of this dilemma
under even the most up-to-date design protection laws explains why the legal history of
industrial art in the twentieth century may be viewed as a continuing effort to establish
special regimes of design protection without unduly derogating from the general principles of copyright law.
369. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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wire-spOked hubcaps. None of these designs could stand alone as a work of
art when separated materially from the utilitarian articles they embelIished. 37o As to an "isolated reference" to conceptual separability in the
legislative history,371 these courts stressed that Congress did not intend by
this notion to tolerate long-term copyright protection for the very designs to
which it had just denied even short-term relief in a sui generis law. Rather,
the legislative intent was to exclude copyright protection for the overall
shape or configuration of a utilitarian article no matter how "aesthetically
satisfying and valuable" it might be. 372 On this interpretation, enactment of
the separability criterion traded the ineligibility of modern designs as a
class for the difficulties inherent in making judgments about art in specific
cases. 373
These early decisions under the United States Copyright Act of 1976
reflected the same strategy that Italian courts used to "avoid the ambiguities
inherent in the theory of dissociation by holding three-dimensional designs
of useful articles to be inseparable as a matter of law in nearly all cases.,,374
The theory of dissociation as elaborated in Italy, however, does recognize an
exception to the general rule of separability for conceptually separable
designs that can stand alone as works of art. 375 Strictly interpreted, the
design of a useful article meets this conceptual separability test only if it
can be reproduced and applied to other material supports without
sacrificing either its individuality or its existence as an artistic work independent of the object with which it is associated. 376 For example, the form
370. See Norris Indus., Inc. v. lIT Corp., 696 E2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding designs of
wire-spoked automobile wheel covers not copyrightable because functional and artistic
components were inseparable); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 E2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (holding the modern design of an outdoor lamp not copyrightable under the criterion of separability codified in the 1976 Act), cert. denied, 440 US. 908 (1979); see
also Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 E2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding typeface designs were
not works of art under § 5(g) of the 1909 Act).
371. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 US.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659-801 (stating that an ornamental design of a useful
article can qualify as a copyrightable work of applied art only if it "contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian
aspects of that article"); Esquire, 591 E2d at 800-01, 803-04 (discussing and interpreting this reference).
372. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 US.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659-801; Esquire, 591 E2d at 800; accord Norris, 696
E2d at 924; see also Fabrica, Inc. v. EI Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890,892-94 (9th Cir.
1983); infra text accompanying notes 553-70.
373. See Esquire, 591 F.2d at 805 (stating that the decision of Congress to discriminate
against modern, "high-tech" designs as a class was a legitimate, if regrettable, consequence of the legislative policy against copyright protection for industrial designs).
374. Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 352. For the theory of dissociation,
which underlies the criterion of separability in foreign law, see generally Reichman,
Designs Before 1976. supra note 17. at 1182-86, 1213-23 (citing authorities).
375. See generally G. SENA, supra note 352. at 535-39; Fabiani, I Modelli. supra note 85, at
231-36.
376. See, e.g .• Auteri, supra note 342, at 580,588. Professor Auteri contends that the economic value of the formal element must not depend on the utility of the material support. See also E PERR~, supra note 8, at 262-63.
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of Cellini's saltcellar would qualify as a conteptually separable work of
applied art on this approach, not because of its artistic intensity, but because
one could apply the same shape to other material supports, such as an inkpot or a candy container, without diminishing its artistic integrity.377 Conversely, the tendency of today's most gifted designers to integrate form and
function would inherently disqualify the bulk of their production. 378
This strict reading of the conceptual separability doctrine satisfies
those commentators who believe that ornamental designs of useful articles
are properly confined to industrial property law because copyright protection would unduly distort competition on the general products market. 379
That Italian courts agree appears from recent decisions denying copyright
protection to designers whose works are renown for their artistry.380 Other
writers contend, however, that conceptual separability should turn on the
artistic intensity of the design in question, which sometimes transcends its
material support and renders the useful article an object of contemplation in
its. own right. 381 Exponents of this view urge courts to assess the artistic
impact of particular designs with a view to enabling Italy's most talented
designers to qualify for copyright protection under the conceptual separability exception to the general rule of separability.382 In effect, this school prefers the case-by-case approach of regimes that allow partial cumulation
371. See, e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 262-63; Auteri, supra note 342, at 58!), 588. The
same would not be true for the shape of a shoe or an automobile, since in these cases the
shape is not superimposed upon the objects but constitutes the object itself. F. PERRET,
supra note 8, at 262-63.
378. See, e.g., Auteri, supra note 342, at 580-82, 589-90.
379. See, e.g., id. at 570-74,592; Fabiani, 1 Modelli, supra note 85, at 235-36. Professor
Fabiani warns that "were copyright law to absorb all the products of industrial design
(including automobile spare parts, for example), it would risk weakening the very concept of a law to protect authors." Fabiani, La protezione dell' arte applicata, supra note
18, at 415. (trans.).
380. See, e.g., Fabiani,l Modelli, supra note 85, at 581-82 (noting denial of copyright protection to the design of a mUlti-purpose container by Enzo Mari and to certain designs
of tables and chairs by Rietweld, a leader of the Der Stijl movement); see also
Estabilimento Miliardi-Zanova S.r.I. v. Cassina (Court of App., Florence, Italy, Feb. 4,
1989), reprinted in 60 h. DIRn-ro DI AtITORE 444, 449-53 (1989). This decision denied
copyright protection to three LeCorbusier designs of chairs despite their singular style,
elegance of line, balance, and novel shapes, because the forms could never be dissociated from the industrial products and reproduced in the ideal sense as independent
sculptural works. The decision also denied protection in unfair competition law
because qualified consumers would not be confused by the similarities of design and
because competitors could not further vary the unpatented, noncopyrightable designs
without compromising their aesthetic integrity. See also Stanghellini, Opera d'arte
applicata e disegni e modelli industriali, 60 h. DIRllTO DI AtITORE 453-67 (1989) (discussing EstabilimenlO Miliardi-Zanova).
381. See, e.g., G. SENA, supra note 352, at 538-39 (citing Auletta, Greco and Vercellone,
Bonasi Benucci, among others); Benussi, supra note 8, at 63-64. See generally
Magelli, La tutela del design nell'interpretazione della dottrina giuridica e della
giurisprudenza, 38 RIv. DIRn-ro INDUSTRIALE 205,208-11 (1989).
382. See, e.g., G. SENA, supra note 352, at 529-30 (contending that the patent approach hinders designers who make an enormous contribution to the Italian way of life and economy); Benussi, supra note 8, at 64 ("the object must altain at least a certain artistic
level").
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between cop~right and design laws, such as occurs in the Federal Republic
of Germany, 83 to the total exclusion of modern designs from copyright law
under a strict regime of noncumulation as implemented in current Italian
law. 384
The latter school of thought won an eminent convert to its cause when,
in 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
copyright protection for two prize-winning belt buckle designs 38S that demonstrated "substantial originality" and that "rose to the level of creative
art.,,386 On the authority of Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 387
exceptionally creative designers could sometimes invoke the "conceptual
separability" doctrine 388 to prevent competitors from appropriating designs
that might have met the nonobviousness standard of patent law if a timely
application had been filed. 389 Rejecting the District of Columbia Circuit's
thesis that such an exception to the general rule of separability contravened
the overall congressional policy against copyright protection of industrial
designs,39O the Second Circuit declared that, "so long as the statute remains
in its present form," it will "always be necessary to determine whether in a
given case there is a physically or conceptually separable artistic sculpture
or carving capable of existing independently as a work of art.,,391
Wittingly or unwittingly, this inftuential American court had sided
with those Italian writers who viewed conceptual separability as a test of
artistic intensity or degree. 392 In so doing, its unorthodox methodology
closely tracked that of the Supreme Court in the Federal Republic of Germany, which affords copyright protection to a few highly creative designs
whose "esthetic content . . . is greater than that asked of objects that are
mere designs and models... 393 Courts in numerous other countries have
383. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; Dietz, Germany, Federal Republic, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAw, supra note 42, §§ I[b), 2[c).
384. See, e.g., G. SENA, supra note 352, at 539 (citing authorities); see also Franzosi, Arte e
dirilto, 26 RJVISTA DI DIRITrO INDUSTRIALE 285, 295 (1977) (criticizing the separability test and endorsing a test based on the prevalence of artistic over utilitarian values).
385. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 E2d 989,990-91 (2d Cir. 1980).
386. Id. at 992-94; see also L. Batlin & Sons, Inc., v. Snyder, 536 E2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en
banc) ("substantial originality"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
387. 632 E2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
388. The court conceded that the designs in question would not satisfy the strict test of material separability, which it had applied in other circumstances. See, e.g., Durham
Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 E2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
389. See supra text accompanying notes 366-68.
390. See supra notes 371-73 and accompanying text.
391. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 E2d at 994.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 381-84.
393. Reimer, supra note 45, at 40-42. The key operative phrase added by the German Higb
Court was: ''The line of demarcation between copyright protection and that of designs
and models must not be too low." Id.; accord E. ULMER, URHEBER-UND
VERLAOSRECHT 147 (3d ed. 1980). In effect, the German High Court (BGH) borrowed
the evaluative criteria of patent law to distinguish the few copyrightable designs of useful articles that make "an artistic contribution" from the great mass of designs whose
fate depends on eligibility under a sui generis design law. See generally Kunz-
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adopted similar techniques at various times to fashion what commentators
term a regime of "partial cumulation... 394
The Kieselstein-Cord decision thus opened a second front with respect
to the separability criterion codified in the Copyright Act of 1976. 395 Ironically, when the Copyright Office had first expressed its preference for partial cumulation in 1956, it was the Second Circuit-in the well-known
Vacheron case-that had balked at any digression from the Bleistein principle of nondiscrimination. 396 Wiser by some twenty-five years of experience
with the works of applied art that Mazer had ushered in,397 the successors to
this same court discovered-in Kieselstein-Cord-why so many of their foreign counterparts had ultimately derogated from general principles of copyright law when adjudicating legal monopolies in borderline utilitarian works
that appeal to both the copyright and the patent paradigms. 398
b. Conceptual Separability Reconsidered

To keep Kieselstein-Cord in perspective one must realize that the majority opinion actually upheld the Copyright Office's own decision to register
the belt buckle designs in question. 399 The action of the Copyright Office,
in turn, can be reconciled with its long-standing preference for a regime of
partial cumulation. 400 Comparative legal history teaches, however, that
regimes of partial cumulation remain fully functional only so long as courts
require objective evidence of exceptional achievement as a precondition of

394.
395.

396.

397.
398.
399.
400.

Hallstein, Design Protection in Ger11Ulny, in DIsEONO INDUSTRIALE E PRCJrEZIONE
EUROPEA 67, 76-77 (1989) (stressing the relevance of expert testimony, especially of art
specialists, and of recognition by museums); Kruger, Designs Between Copyright and
Industrial Property Protection, 151.I.C. 168, 177-81 (1984).
See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Japanese law reportedly adopts a similar
regime. See T. Dol, supra note 82, at 100-01.
See generally Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 271-350 ("Partial
Cumulation in the Second Circuit"). But see infra text accompanying notes 458-75
(citing evidence that the Second Circuit began to retreat from partial cumulation in
1987). .
See supra note 340 and accompanying text; Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
188 U.S. 239 (1903); Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch
Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958) (criticizing Copyright Office regulation of 1956 based
on the "clearly a work of art in itself' criterion).
See supra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
See generally Reichman, Designs Befort! 1976, supra note 17, at 1167-70.
See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 991 (2d Cir. 1980)
(noting that the designs had been registered as "jewelry" or, in the alternative, as "original sculpture and design"). The latest registration was dated 1980. Id.
By treating exceptionally creative designs of belt buckles as "conceptually separable"
works of applied art, the copyright authorities had carried forward, albeit by different
stratagems, the policy of allowing copyright protection for an object that was "clearly a
work of art in itself." See supra note 340 and accompanying text. For evidence that the
Copyright Office's practice manual at this time was more consistent with partial cumulation than with a strict view of separability, see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CoMPENDIUM
OF CoPYRIGffT OFFtcE PRAC11CES (I) 2-274 (1973) (describing in effect a "prevalence"
or "artistic surplus" test like that used in Germany before the Second World War).
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copyrightability while confining ordinary commercial designs to whatever
design protection laws happen to be in place. 401 The admonition of the
Supreme Court in the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, that the
"line of demarcation between copyright protection and that of designs and
models must not be [set] too low"402 explains why partial cumulation in that
country has stood the test of time. 403
When, in contrast, appellate tribunals balk at derogating repeatedly
from the copyright law's general principle of nondiscrimination, their very
hesitation soon frustrates the goal of drawing principled distinctions
between eligible and ineligible designs. 404 As inconsistent decisions multiply over time,405 downward pressures on the criterion in force pull towards
ever more expansive copyright protection of industrial art. 406 In the most
recent example, "nostalgics of the copyright approach" have persuaded the
Benelux Court of Justice to soften the "markedly artistic character" test of
applied art adopted in a regional harmonization treaty,407 with the result that
industrial designs in the Netherlands may yet obtain long-term copyright
protection in a judge-made regime of total cumulation under the "unity of
art" banner. 408
.
The Bleistein principle of nondiscrimination is deeply ingrained in the
American copyright tradition,409 as the dissenting opinion in Kieselstein401. See, e.g., Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 333-40,367-70.
402. Reimer, supra note 45, at 40-42 (quoting authority); see supra note 393 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 4S, 393 and accompanying text; see also Dreier, Le systeme de cumul
partiel de protection par les lois specifiques et par Ie droit d'outeur, in OsJECTIF 1992,
supra note 46, at 107-IS. Dreier observes that, in recent years, the Supreme Court in
the Federal Republic may have become slightly more permissive than a decade ago,
when Reimer wrote. See Reimer, supra note 4S. Even today, however, apart from certain dolls, animal figures and the like, only a few designs that demonstrate "a level of
originality . . . palpably higher than the bulk of creations in this domain" can hope to
qualify as copyrightable works of applied art in the Federal Republic of Germany. See,
e.g., Dreier, supra, at 110-14; Dietz, Germany, Federal Republic, supra note 383, § 21c]
(citing authorities).
404. See generally Desbois, supra note 7.
4OS. See, e.g., id. at 74 (criticizing inconsistent decisions "discouraging for their subtlety"
that plague foreign regimes of partial cumulation and noncumulation alike).
406. rd.; see also Gaubiac, supra note 7, at 62-63,66-70.
407 .. See the Benelux Designs Convention (adopting the Uniform Benelux Designs Law),
supra note 17; Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 4, at 293-97 ..
408. See supra notes 46, 367 and accompanying text; Braun, suPra note 46, at 97-106;
Cohen Jehoram, Cumulative Protection, supra note 367, at 6O-6S (discussing the
Screenoprints decision by the Benelux Court of Justice on May 22, 1987, and the decision by the Netherlands Supreme Court concerning the same case on January IS,
1988). The Screenoprints decisions appear to permit btoad cumulation between the
Benelux copyright laws and the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, notwithstanding the
anticumulationist language in article 21- of that design law, which limits copyright protection to designs possessing a "markedly artistic character." See Uniform Benelux
Designs Law, supra note 4, art. 21; infra note 861.
409. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (establishing universally recognized principle of nondiscrimination in United States copyright law).
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Cord made plain. 4lo This worried the United States copyright authorities,
who soon had reason to fear that judicial loyalty to Bleistein might deter
courts following Kieselstein-Cord from limiting the conceptual separability

doctrine to a few exceptionally creative designs. 411 Rather than run this
risk, the Copyright Office has recently repudiated its previous decision to
register the belt buckle designs in Kieselstein-Cord as a misinterpretation of
the separability criterion itself.412
.
As the copyright authorities now see it, conceptual separability has
nothing to do with aesthetic value, or with the functionality of a design, or
with the amount of effort that went into creating it. 413 Nor does it matter
that a particular useful object might be worn as jewelry, or that it was the
product of a famous designer, or that it had earned prizes and other forms of
recognition for artistic excellence. 414 What matters officially is that the
form or shape in question can be reproduced in a drawing or on other objects
without sacrificing its integrity as an autonomous work of art. In other
words, given a design that is "physically inseparable by ordinary means
from the utilitarian item," the Copyright Office has determined that conceptual separability could only arise if its aesthetic features were "nevertheless
clearly recognizable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work which can be
visualized on paper . . . or as free standing sculpture . . . independent of
the shape of the useful article" with which it was associated. 415
410. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1980) (Wein. stein, J., dissenting).
411. See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. AI Nyman & Sons, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 208
(D. Del. 1982) (holding sculptural features of certain plastic display racks to be conceptually separable works of applied art); see also infra note 518 and accompanying text
(citing recent district court cases on separability).
412. See Schrader, Copyright Office Registration of Industrial Designs, 19 U. BALT. L. REV.
445 (1989). According to Ms. Schrader, the examiner in Kieselstein-Cord did not apply
the correct test of conceptual separability, and his approach to the problem was further
skewed by treating tbe belt buckles as a form of jewelry. Id. But the examiner's "erroneous" approach to conceptual separability was in fact consistent with the CoMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFiCE PRACTICES (I) as it stood at the time. See supra note 400
(citing authorities); Reicbman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 328 0.341.
413. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFiCE, CoMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGm' OFFIcE PRACTICES (II)
§ 505.05 (1984) [bereinafter COMPENDIUM II); Schrader, supra note 412.
414. See Schrader, supra note 412; CoMPENDIUM II, supra note 413, § 505.05. Hut see
Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 992-93 (stressing these very factors); if. Kunz-Hallstein,
supra note 393, at 77 (noting that Supreme Court in Federal Republic of Germany prefers evidence that design seeking to enter copyright law is recognized by artistic circles
and museums).
415. COMPENDIUM II, supra note 413, § 505.03; if. Estabilimento Miliardi-Zanova S.r.I. v.
Cassina (Court of App., Florence, Italy, Feb. 4, 1989), reprinted in 60 IL DIRrrro DI
AuToRE (taking exactly the same line in regard to conceptual separability under Italian
law). The CoMPENDIUM OF CoPvRIGm' OFFiCE PRActICES II adds that the artistic features must be of a kind that "can be imagined separately and independently from the
useful article without destroying the basic shape of the useful article. The artistic features and the useful article could both exist side by side and be perceived as fully realized, separate works-one an artistic work and the other a useful article." But "the
test. . . is not met by merely analogizing the general shape of a useful article to works
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Under this reformulation of the criterion set out in section 101 of the
1976 Act, the designs of the belt buckles in Kieselstein-Cord were never separable either physically or conceptually from the shapes of the buckles
themselves. The Copyright Office today, according to its General Counsel,
if faced with a similar application for registration, would therefore invoke
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer and Norris Industries, Inc. v. lIT Corp. to deny copyright protection as applied art416 and would not follow the majority opinion
in Kieselstein-Cord for which it was directly responsible!417 Indeed, the
Office now views the belt-buckle designs exactly as the dissenting judge in
Kieselstein-Cord argued they ought to have been viewed when he wrote that
the "works sued on are, while admirable aesthetically pleasing examples of
modern design, indubitably belt buckles and nothing else.,,418
Remarkable as this may seem, it will not escape the attentive reader
that the language now used by the United States copyright authorities to
implement the conceptual separability doctrine parallels the approach to
that same doctrine recommended by the strict constructionists in Italy, who
have so far persuaded the Italian tribunals to heed their advice. 419 It is, in
short, the language of noncumulation preferred by Professors Auteri and
Fabiani,420 rather than that of partial cumulation preferred by Professors
Benussi, Franzosi, and Sena. 421 In this manner, the United States Copyright Office has written off its historical predilection for regimes of partial
cumulation as a lost cause, at least in the absence of a congressional decision
to enact a sui generis design law. It has sided with those at home and abroad
who would never allow a modern "high tech" design into copyright law no
matter how "aesthetically satisfying and valuable" it might be. 422

416.

417.
418.

419.
420.
421.
422.

of modern sculpture," because the "alleged 'artistic features' ... cannot be perceived
as having [a] separate, independent existence." CoMPENDIUM II, supra note 413,
§ 505.05. Schrader also stresses that the key to the tests as currently administered is
that a copyrightable design must be both separable and capable of independent existence as a work of art. Schrader, supra note 412. The latter requirement is often overlooked by practitioners.
Norris Indus., Inc. v. lIT Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer,
591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cerro denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); see supra notes 370,
372; Schrader, supra note 412 (stating that the Copyright Office took an active part in
obtaining the decision in No"is).
Schrader, supra note 412.
Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 994 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). Judge Weinstein added
that it was "the originator's success in completely ·integrating the artistic designs and
the functional aspects of the buckles that precludes copyright." [d. at 995; cf
Schrader, supra note 412 (observing that virtually no modern functional design can
pass the test of separability as currently applied).
See supra notes 374-80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 376-80. Professor Perret of Switzerland, a leading exponent of the dissociation theory, also takes this position. See F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 262-63.
See supra notes 381-84.
See supra note 372; supra notes 369-74 and accompanying text. "Thus, the mere fact
that a famous designer produces a uniquely shaped food processor does not render the
design of the food processor copyrightable." CoMPENDIUM II, supra note 413, §
503.05.
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These developments pose two rather intriguing questions. First, one
may justifiably wonder how long the Copyright Office will adhere to its own
official line, given its past record and the fact that the bulk of the designs
qualified to enter copyright law under this doctrine may be less worthy of
protection from either an artistic or a commercial standpoint than those
likely to be excluded. 423 Assuming the Office sticks to its revisionist line,
the second question concerns the judicial response likely to ensue. Will the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in particular, fall
meekly into line with this administrative conversion to a strict noncumulationist regime? Or will its more protectionist members cling to the
majority opinion in Kieselstein-Cord and maintain the regime of partial
cumulation that the copyright authorities had themselves convinced the
court to establish in 1980r24
2. Demise of the Neo-German Model?
a. Judicial Aversion to Noncumulation
The first major decision to probe these issues was Carol Barnhart, Inc.
v. Economy Cover Corp.,425 which concerned two sets of life-sized human
torsos used to display wearing apparel in retail clothing stores. One maleand-female set of torsos wore sculpted shirts; the other was left unclad. All
exhibited life-like and anatomically correct features, except that they lacked
necks and arms and were hollowed out at the back to hold excess fabric
when displaying garments. 426 Since the defendant admitted copying both
sets of mannequins, the case turned on the validity of the copyrights that the
originator thought he had perfected when the Copyright Office agreed to
register the forms as sculptural works. 427
The lower court disregarded the plaintiff's certificate of registration
and denied copyrightability on the ground that the mannequins possessed
no aesthetic features capable of independent existence when separatedphysically or conceptually from the utilitarian aspects of the forms. 42 On
appeal, a panel of the Second Circuit disregarded the presumption of validity to which a certificate of copyright registration was nominally entitled,429
unlike the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which had strengthened
the presumption of validity afforded to issued design patents. 430 This con423. See supra notes 360-65 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 385-400 and accompanying text.
425. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
426. Id. at 412-13.
427.ld.at413.
428. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 594 F. Supp. 364 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd,
773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
429. See 17 U.S.c. § 41O(c) (1988), which states that a timely certificate of registration
"shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts
stated in the certificate." The provision adds, however, that the "evidentiary weight to
be accorded the certificate . . . shall be within the discretion of the court." Id.
430. See supra notes 163, 172 and accompanying text.
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elusion followed, according to the majority, because the Copyright Office
did not examine the prior art, nor did its officials need special expertise to
decide whether to register a work or not. Hence, judges were as qualified as
the Register to view the forms and determine their eligibility under the
law,431 a point the Second Circuit had already stressed in KieselsteinCord. 432
When it came to implementing this task, however, the Second Circuit
and the Copyright Office turned out to be speaking two different languages.
The Copyright Office had accepted the torso forms for registration because
a string of precedents, derived from Mazer, protected dolls, figurines, and
other representational shapes applied to useful articles. The Office therefore regarded the human torso in any form as copyrightable subject matter. 433 Viewed from the front, moreover, these particular torsos could stand
alone, as sculptured human figures, which brought them within the strict
interpretation of separability set out in the 1984 revision of the Compendium of Copyright Office Practices. 434 The Copyright Office thus feared to
deny eligibility lest it appear to have rejected the torso designs merely
because they served a useful purpose, contrary to the United States Supreme'
Court's explicit holding in Mazer v. Stein. 43s To the extent that Mazer
rejected a "destination" or "purpose" test, in short, the authorities felt
unable to exclude these mannequins without straying from that precedent
and from the long-standing administrative practices built around it. 436
In contrast, the majority opinion in Carol Barnlwrt perceived the
Copyright Office's decision to register these mannequins as illogical largely
because the panel seemed unaware that the Office had repudiated its previous action in Kieselstein-Cord. 437 In Kieselstein-Cord, the Office implicitly
asked the court to validate belt buckle designs whose exceptional aesthetic
qualities made them a museum piece. 438 The mannequins used to display
retail clothing were hardly creative achievements. Faithful to KieselsteinCord, the majority in Carol Barnlwrt rejected the proposition that the design
'of a useful article was entitled to a "lower level of scrutiny" in determinin~
its eligibility "merely because ... [it] falls within a traditional art form.'t43
431. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 414. The court held that the presumption of validity in
copyright law merely ordered the burdens of proof. Id.
432. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989,994 (2d Cir. 1980).
433. See supra notes 360-63 and accompanying text; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
434. See CoMPENDIUM II, supra note 413, §§ 505.03 to 505.05 (quoted in supra note 415).
This interpretation did not require a separable work of applied art to retain its economic
value when reproduced on different material supports, only its overall artistic integrity.
For the contrary view in regard to the proper implementation of dissociation theory in
Italian law, see supra note 376 (citing the view of Auteri).
435. 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, II3(a) (1988».
436. See supra notes 360-63 and accompanying text.
437. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
438. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985) (stressing this
aspect of Kieselstein-Cord).
439. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418.
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Admitting the torso designs to copyright -law thus appeared inconsistent
with both the legislative history, which denied protection to most aesthetically satisfying commercial designs,440 and with the court's prior decision
in Kieselstein-Cord, which had declared that "the vast majority of belt buckles" would not "rise to the level of creative art" under the tests of creativity
and conceptual separability the Second Circuit had laid down. 441
To complicate matters further, Judge Newman, the dissenting member
of the Carol Barnhart panel, flatly rejected any criterion of aesthetic
achievement that derogated from the Bleistein principle of nondiscrimination. 442 He thus indirectly attacked the majority opinion in
Kieselstein-Cord at its most vulnerable point,443 much as Judge Clark, dissenting in Vacheron, had attacked Register Fisher's "clearly a work of art in
itself" test some twenty years earlier. 444 The Carol Barnhart dissent then
proposed a new test, to be known as the "temporal displacement" test, that
would characterize aesthetic features as conceptually separable if "the article stimulate[s] in the mind of the beholder a concept that is separate from
the concept evoked by its utilitarian function" or "that can displace at least
temporarily the utilitarian concept.'t44S Asked to apply his proposed test to
the facts at hand, Judge Newman declared that one set of torsos indubitably
satisfied the criterion of conceptual separability as thus defined, while his
decision concerning the second set would require more evidence than the
record contained!446
A majority of the panel, led by Judge Oakes, dismissed this improvised
~est of conceptual separability as administratively unsound and as an "illusory standard" that led to the "bottomless pit" of copyright protection for
industrial art of every kind. 447 In other words, the proposed "temporal displacement" test appeared to be a thinly disguised formula for converting the
440_ See id. at 418 (noting. however, the contradiction between this policy and the trend
toward increased copyright protection for other articles having a utilitarian dimension.
such as computer programs); cf. supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
441. See Kieselstein-Cord. 632 F.2d at 994 (stating that the expert witnesses testified and "the
Copyright Office's action implied ... [that] the buckles rise to the level of creative
art").
442. See Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419, 422-23 (Newman, 1., dissenting).
443. See. c.g., Reichman, Designs After 1976. supra note 17, at 369, 3Rt.
444. See Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d
637, 643-45 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting); supra note 340 and accompanying text.
445. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422,423 (Newman, 1., dissenting). This proposed criterion would allow expert testimony to show that the appearance of an article "would
engender in the observer's mind a separate nonutilitarian concept that can displace at
least temporarily the utilitarian concept." [d. at 423.
446. [d. at 424-26. Under this test, one of the designs in Carol Barnhart was conceptually
separable because it could be entertained in the mind without simultaneously perceiving the forms as mannequins at all. [d. at 425. For the difficulties of administering
such a criterion and the consequences likely to ensue, see infra text accompanying notes
502-06.
447. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419 n.5 (criticizing the temporal displacement-test as "so
ethereal as to amount to a 'non-test' "). But see. e.g., W. PATRY, LA~N'S THE CopyRIGHT LAw 44-45 (6th ed. 1986) (approving the "temporal displacement" test).
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exclusionary criterion of separability into an inclusionary formula inspired
by the late Professor Melville Nimmer's "unity of art" leanings. 448 The
majority then ended the debate by denying copyright protection on the
grounds that "the features claimed to be aesthetic or artistic, e.g., the lifesize configuration of the breasts and the width of the shoulders, are inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian features, the display of clothes. "449
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit emerged from this fracas on a collision course with the Copyright Office for the first time since the Vacheron
decision in 1958. 450 Ironically, the two sides were now on opposite sides of
the fence, with the Second Circuit rooting for partial cumulation and the
Copyright Office penitently adhering to a strict noncumulationist line.
Meanwhile, the scarecrow of nondiscrimination, raised by the dissent in
Carol Barnhart, was about to paralyze the court's ability to administer its
own fledgling regime of partial cumulation.
b. Healing a Split in the Circuits

These tensions came to a head in 1987, when Brandir International,
Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber CO. 451 reached the Second Circuit on appeal.
This case concerned the modern design of a bicycle rack, made of bent tubing, which the designer had derived from an original wire sculpture that
lacked any utilitarian purpose at the time he first created it. On the one
hand, the case resembled Kieselstein-Cord in that considerable objective evidence established the superior artistic character of the design. 452 On the
other hand, the evidence also showed that the designer had subsequently
modified his original wire sculpture in order to make the design functionally more efficient for use as a bicycle rack, a use discovered after he created the form. 453
This time the Copyright Office had refused to register the design of the
bicycle rack because it contained no element "capable of independent existence as a copyrightable pictorial, graphic or sculptural work apart from the
shape of the useful article. ,,454 The Office thus closed the very door to con448. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. The dissenting opinion dwells at length on

449.

450.
451.
452.

453.
454.

Professor Nimmer's own interpretation of conceptual separability. See Carol Barnhart,
773 F.2d at 420-22 (Newman, J., dissenting); I M. & D. NIMMER, supra note 28,
§ 2.08[B)[3].
Carol Barnlwrt, 773 F.2d at 419; see also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d
905 (2d Cir. 1980).
See supra notes 340, 399-400 and accompanying text.
834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
"The RIBBON Rack has been featured in Popular Science. Art and Architecture, and
Design 384 magazines, and it won an Industrial Designers Society of America design
award in the spring of 1980." Id. at 1146. In 1984, the rack was selected for an exhibition entitled "The Product of Design: An Exploration of the Industrial Design Process," which was written up in the New York TImes. Id.
Id. at 1143, 1146-47.
Id. at 1146. The Register of Copyrights was named as a third-party defendant under
17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988), but the Copyright Office chose not to appear after denying eligibility. Id. at 1143.
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ceptual separability it had opened in Kieselstein-Cord and contemporaneously implemented the strict interpretation of separability to which it had
converted in the revised Compendium of 1984. 455 The authorities also
refused registration on the dubious alternative ground that .the design consisted of standard, public-domain shapes lacking the requisite degree of
originality and creativity, an assessment belied by the laurels this design
later won for its creator. 456
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in contrast,
disregarded any question of originality457 and formally declined to acquiesce in the Copyright Office's own retreat from partial cumulation. "'Conceptual separability' is ... alive and well, at least in this circuit," declared
Judge Oakes, writing for the majority, "[t]he fsroblem ... is determining
exactly what it is and how it is to be applied."4 8 Unable to resolve the controversy over the proper line of demarcation that Carol Barnhart had rendered so acute,459 this panel, like its predecessors, then divided once again
on the meaning of conceptual separability. 460
A majority ultimately agreed with the conclusion reached by the copyright authorities that the design of the bicycle rack could not qualify as
applied art due to the designer's perfect integration of form and function. 461
In evaluating the conceptual separability exception to the general rule of
455. See supra notes 411-18 and accompanying text; see also Animal Fair, Inc. v. Amfesco
Indus., Inc.• 620 E Supp. 175, 186-88 (D. Minn. 1985). affd without opinion, 794 E2d
678 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding the design of a slipper resembling a bear's paw that the
Copyright Office had accepted for registration).
456. See Brandir, 834 E2d at 1146.
457. [d. Use of a quantitative creativity requirement, couched in terms of "substantial originality" or of a "substantial variation" from pre-existing designs. was not anomalous in
itself after 1976, particularly in the Second Circuit. This doctrine could also exclude
variations attributable to physical or manufacturing skills, rather than to true artistic
skills. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 E2d 905, 910-11 (1980); L.
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder. 536 E2d 486 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cerr. denied, 429 U.S.
857 (1976). The Copyright Office has properly begun to make more aggressive use of
this doctrine to exclude borderline utilitarian works that reveal only miniscule variations from matter still in copyright or already in the public domain. See, e.g .• I P.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 68-71 (noting recent cases requiring nontrivial variations). But see Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 E2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (questioning
authority of Register to deny copyrightability of a videogame for lack of creativity and
because the design was not an original work of authorship within 17 U.S.c. § 102(a».
vacating and remanding 695 E Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. (988). In applying the Batlin standard of substantial creativity to both industrial art and industrial literature. the Copyright Office examiners need to avoid piecemeal decomposition. a lesson that the patent
examiners had to absorb from 1980 on. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying
text; Reichman. Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 683-89 (" 'Originality' and
the Burden of Overlapping Claims").
458. Brandir, 834 E2d at 1144. Judge Oakes was the author of all the majority opinions
under review. viz, those in Brandir, 834 E2d 1142; Carol Barnhart. Inc. v. Economy
Cover Corp., 773 E2d 411 (2d Cir. (985); and Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl.
Inc., 632 E2d 989 (2d Cir. (980).
459. See supra notes 438-50 and accompanying text.
460. Compare Brandir, 834 E2d at 1142-50 (majority opinion by Oakes. J.) with id. at
1150-52 (Winters, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
461. See id. at 1147-48; infra text accompanying notes 470-75.
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separability, however, the majority pointedly declined to enquire whether
the design in question displayed "substantial originality" and "rose to the
level of creative art," as the majority in Kieselstein-Cord had done. 462 Given
the merger of form and function in this highly artistic design of a bicycle
rack, that was the logical issue to pursue under the neo~German regime of
partial cumulation the Second Circuit had appeared to favor in 1980. 463
Such an analysis would have broken too openly with the principle of
nondiscrimination that had surfaced in Carol Barnhart, however. Instead, a
chastened majority, speaking through Judge Oakes, now joined with the
Copyright Office in officially disavowing further attempts to measure conceptual separability in terms of artistic achievement because they had been
"reminded . . . by numerous . . . opinions . . . that we judges should not
let our own views of styles of art interfere with the decisionmaking process
in this area.,,464 In the Second Circuit as in the Copyright Office, in short,
the Bleistein principle of nondiscrimination would formally restrict the legal
criteria used to draw the line of demarcation between applied art and industrial designs once again.
The matter did not rest there, however, because the Brandir majority
then declined to take the easy way out by simply endorsing the C0l2'right
Office's own revisionist interpretation of the separability criterion. 5 On
the contrary, the majority now professed to discover a new test of conceptual
separability, launched by Professor Denicola in 1983,466 which distinguished between copyrightable works of applied art "whose origins lie out~
side the design process, despite the utilitarian environment in which they
appear," and ordinary industrial designs that inhibit "the unconstrained perspective of the artist.'>467 On this approach, which might be termed the
"design process and nature of the work" test,468 conceptual separability
would depend on "the extent to which the work requires artistic expression
uninhibited by functional considerations.'>469
Armed with this new key to the two-hundred year old mystery of how
to collocate industrial designs within the framework of the world's intellectual property system, the Brandir majority inspected the design of the bicycle rack for elements that could "be identified as reflecting the designer's
artistic judgment exercised independently of functional considerations.'047o
In so doing, it affirmed the belief that the shape of a telephone influenced by
Arp, Brancusi, or Moore would surely satisfy this new test of conceptual
462. See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145; supra notes 385-98 and accompanying text.
463. See supra note 45; supra notes 392-95 and accompanying text.
464. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 n.3; see supra notes 412-15 and accompanying text (noting
that Copyright Office disavows artistic value as factor in assessing conceptual separability).
465. See supra notes 412-15 and accompanying text.
466. See Denicola, supra note 194, at 741-48.
467. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Denicola, supra note 194, at 741).
468. [d.
469. [d. (quoting Denicola, supra note 194, at 741).
470. [d.
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separability.471 To the dismay of the dissent,472 however, the bicycle rack in
Brandir failed even this test because its form, as finally adopted, was
significantly influenced by utilitarian concerns. 473 Any plea that the design
might qualify as minimalist art was therefore unavailing, as were the
numerous awards it had garnered. 474 Indeed, these very awards only
served to establish that the designer of the bicycle rack had "achieved . . .
the highest goal of modern industrial design, that is, the harmonious fusion
of function and aesthetics," which now made it uncopyrightable by
definition!47s

3. Critical Evaluation of Current Law
The Brandir decision is the least persuasive of the cases applying the
conceptual. separability test after 1976. For example, the majority's exaggerated concern about violating the rule in Mazer476 would have been
justified under the regulations issued prior to 1976 because nothing in Mazer
or the 1909 Act expressly supported the separability criterion that the Copyright Office had engrafted upon the Supreme Court's opinion.477 After the
codification of 1976,478 however, section 101 authorized courts to rule that
even modern shapes analogous to abstract works of sculpture might forfeit
eligibility as works of applied art if their forms were inse~arably joined with
a functional application in the design of a useful ariicle. 4 9 Doctrinally, this
follows from the strict interpretation of separability, which denies protection
to shapes that cannot be reproduced on other material supports without loss
of artistic integrity.48O In policy terms, this result serves to prevent the
exclusive reproduction rights of copyright law from disrupting the application of design patent law to "high tech" designs that are sold on the products
market rather than on the market for artistic works as SUCh.481
The Brandir majority complained that, under the Copyright Office's
current interpretation of separability, a superior modern design of a bicycle
rack could not enter copyright law while a telephone shaped like Mickey
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.

476.
477.
478.
479.

480.
481.

[d. at 1145 n.3.
[d. at 1150-52 (Winter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[d. at 1147.
[d.
[d. at 1147-48 (stating that "there remains no artistic element of the RIBBON Rack that
can be identified as separate and 'capable of existing independently, of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article' ").
See id. at 1144.
See supra notes 339-42 and accompanying text. Indeed, there was language in Mazer
that could be read to support the "unity of art" approach, as the late Professor Nimmer
was fond of pointing out. See supra note 51 (quoting Nimmer).
See supra notes 19-21,343-44 and accompanying text.
See supra note 21 (quoting definitions of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" and
"useful article" in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988»; H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
54, 55 (1976), reprinted in U.S. CoDE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659-801; see also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Thmy Corp., 630 F,2d 905,910-15 (2d Cir. 1980).
See supra notes 374-80 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 832-47 (,The Two-Market Conundrum").
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Mouse would pass muster. 482 This unpalatable result might understandably
have prompted the Second Circuit to stress the transcendental qualities of
the bicycle rack qua art, as it had done for the belt buckles in KieselsteinCord. 483 But the majority could neither bring itself to confirm that Erecedent, in deference to Bleistein and the principle of nondiscrimination, 84 nor
to affirm the strict version of separability now in favor at the Copyright
Office. Rather, the majority tried to weasel out of its dilemma by stressing
that the designer had not applied his sculpture to a useful object in the pure
and unadulterated form with which it had come into being. 485
In other words, the majority refused to protect a sculptural form
because the creator had subsequently altered its dimensions in order to
increase its efficiency as a bicycle rack.486 By emphasizing the purpose of
these posterior design modifications, however, the opinion allowed eligibility to turn fortuitously on the process or sequence of decisions taken by the
designer, and it raised the spectre of a de facto destination test that did
conflict with Mazer as codified in 1976. 487 Dissenting Judge Winter chided
his brethren for this aberration,488 which he and Judge Newman had brought
about by over-emphasizing the role of Bleistein in an industrial milieu,489
and the Copyright Office has distanced itself from the reasoning-but not
the end result-in Brandir. 490 At least one district court has also rejected
this aspect of Brandir while latching onto the protectionist opportunities
latent in the majority's dicta concerning the continued vitality of conceptual
separability in the Second Circuit. 491
The Brandir majority's ruminations on aesthetic philosophy were even
more disconcerting than its propensity to tinker with the venerable theory of
dissociation. The opinion suggests that the pioneers of modern design
would have sympathized with the "design process" test because the streamlined shape of a telephone "may be equally divorced from utilitarian influences as a telephone shaped like Disney's Mickey Mouse. ,,492 In reality, Arp,
Brancusi, and Moore would have been appalled to learn that the modern
design of a telephone they inspired might become copyrightable in the
United States because courts deemed it "sufficiently divorced from utilitarian influences." They would insist that, in their telephones, art and utility
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.

See Brandir, 834 E2d at 1145 n.3; see also Denicola, supra note 194, at 746.
See supra notes 385-91 and accompanying text.
See Brandir, 834 E2d at 1145 n.3.
See id. at 1147.
Id. (stressing that "the designer has clearly adapted the original aesthetic elements to
accommodate and further a utilitarian purpose").
See, e.g., 17 U.S.c. §§ 202, 113(a) (1988); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
See Brandir, 834 E2d at 1152 (Winter, J., concurring in pan and dissenting in part).
See supra notes 442-44 and accompanying text.
See Schrader, supra note 412.
See National Theme Prods., Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 E Supp. 1348, 1353 (S.D.
Cal. 1988).
See supra notes 471, 482. That only the telephone shaped like a mouse was protectible
under precedents recognized by the copyright authorities looked like an anomaly in the
doctrine of separability, as the majority chose to view it.
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had merged, that no "divorce" whatsoever was possible or desirable, and
that the object had to be protected as a superior creative achievement for that
very reason. 493
Whatever its merits, the Supreme Court in the Federal Republic of Germany could accommodate such an argument under that country's prototypical regime of partial cumulation, especially if expert testimony objectified
the level of artistic achievement,494 and this had been the Second Circuit's
approach in Kieselstein-Cord. 49s In contrast, the Supreme Court of Italy,
while capable of accommodating this argument without any theoretical difficulties' would decline to implement it in practice lest lower courts undermine the primacy of the sui generis design law through the vagaries of a
case-by-case analysis of conceptual segarability.496 In other words, both
the Italian Supreme Court after 19574 7 and the United Stales Copyright
Office after 1984 would apply the strict doctrine of separability to cases like
Brandir on the grounds that their respective legislators had established
design patent laws to promote the decorative arts without unduly burdening
free competition.
Between these extremes, the Brandir majority implied that Professor
Denicola's "design process" test enabled the Second Circuit to establish a
new and more flexible approach to conceptual separability that would avoid
the supposed anomalies of dissociation theory without derogating from the
principle of nondiscrimination. 498 Those familiar with the long history of
foreign design law, however, will have reason to doubt that the "design process" test discovered in Brandir was very new at all. On the contrary,
Denicola's test, like its Italian counterpart launched by Professor Franzosi in
1977 ,499 bears marked affinities to similar tests that were used and discarded in France and other countries during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. S()() It also evokes the "aesthetic surplus" or "prevalence" test,
493. See, e.g.,1. HESKETT, INDUSTRIAL DEsiGN 85-104 (1980).
494. See supra notes 401-03 and accompanying text; Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 393, at
76-77.
495. See supra notes 386-89 and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 374-80 and accompanying text.
497. See Note, Systematic Approach, supra note 341, at 288.- This anonymous "note" on
Italian law, condensed and translated from IL DiRITIO D~ORE 27-32 (1957), was
mysteriously published in its United States version about the time that the Copyright
Office was introducing the criterion of separability into its 1958 Regulation.
498. See supra notes 465-69 and accompanying text. The Copyright Office assimilates
Denicola's test to the "primary purpose" test it had sometimes used in the past. See
supra note 400 and accompanying text; Schrader, supra note 412 (stressing that the
Office does not apply the Denicola test).
499. See Franzosi, supra note 384, at 295 (proposing that a design should be deemed separable and protectible if the observer "appreciates the work more for its aesthetic value
than for its utilitarian value. If the observer finds its artistic value more significant_
than its utilitarian value, or if indeed the artistic value should make one almost forget
the utilitarian value," the separability test would be met) (trans.). Compare Franzosi,
supra note 384, at 295 with supra text accompanying notes 466-69 (discussing
Denicola's "design process" test) and supra text accompanying notes 442-46 (discussing Judge Newman's "temporal displacement" test).
500. See, e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 242; Gaubiac, supra note 7, at 46-47 (attributing
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used for a time by the High Court of Germany after the First World War,
which recognized a protectable work of applied art "when the extra esthetic
element added to the functionalism of the forms, whatever the artistic value,
attains to such a degree that one can speak of art, taking into account generally accepted opinion."sol
If one bothers to ask why these and innumerable other tests that appear
plausible on their face are always discarded sooner or later in this peculiar
corner of the law, the answer is always the same: Such tests inherently defy
consistent administration on a case-by-case basis. S02 Over time, courts
applying any of these tests will either succumb to protectionist pressures
thrusting downwards towards the "unity of art" position-as seems to be
occurring in the Benelux countries todayS°3-or they will tilt upwards
towards an overt test of aesthetic accomplishment, as occurred in the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second World War. S04 In effect, the
Supreme Court in the Federal Republic allows copyright law to shelter ornamental designs of useful articles from competition on the products market
only if they meet a de facto nonobviousness standard of aesthetic achievement borrowed from industrial property law for the specific purpose of

501.

502.

503.
504.

the criterion based on the secondary or accessory character of the aesthetic features to
PmLIPPON, TRAITE THEORlQUE E PRATIQUE DE LA PRoPRIETE DES DEssINS ET DEs
MOOELES INDUSTRIELS (1880), who emphasized the gratuitous nature of art "applied" to
industrial objects as distinct from designs determined by the utilitarian object itself).
In all, French courts and commentators struggled with at least five different criteria in
seeking to determine the line of demarcation between industrial designs and applied
an during the nineteenth century. See generally Reichman, Designs Before 1976,
supra note 17, at 1154-55. The unity of art doctrine was adopted in exasperation with
them all. See F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 246 (denigrating this result as a makeshift
solution).
Reimer, supra note 45, at 40-41. The Copyright Office reads Denicola's test this way.
See supra note 498.
See, e.g., Gaubiac, supra note 7, at 46-47; Desbois supra note 7, at 74. The judges who
must administer such tests are alternately appalled now by acts of design piracy, now
by the modest creative content of the bulk of the designs clamoring for protection. If
they set a low standard of eligibility for copyright protection in order to repress imitation, it becomes impossible to exclude the bulk of designs chronically lacking in creativity. If they set a high standard for copyright protection, they must borrow evaluative
criteria from patent law despite the nondiscrimination principle of copyright law, and
they must be willing to tolerate slavish imitation in the name of free competition. See
generally Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 366-73. Use of such criteria
inevitably produces a zig-zag line of cases that furnishes the "unity of art" school with
its most potent ammunition. See, e.g., E. POUILLET, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DEs DESSINS ET MODELES 51 n.l (5th ed. 1911) (deploring that, under such tests, "the
result is the worst inconsistencies and the most unexpected contradictions"); Desb9is,
supra note 7, at 74 (stating that the unity of art thesis "avoids controversies discouraging for their subtlety and inconsistent decisions on the merits") (trans.). This dilemma
pushes courts and legislators into one of the three competing options still available
today-total cumulation in copyright law; total noncumulation outside copyright law;
or partial cumulation "baSed on de facto criteria of anistic achievement. See supra
notes 42-46, 368 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46, 367-68,407-08 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 401-03 and accompanying text. Under this test, the anistic aspect
need not exceed the functional aspect at all. See, e.g., Reimer, supra note 45, at 42-43.
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defending the integrity of the design protection law in force. sos
That the "design process" test endorsed in Brandir suffers from these
defects was later conceded by its originator, Professor Denicola, and by Professor Brown, who believes that it will "leave too much room for self-serving
declarations of aesthetic aims...S06 Perhaps the most ironic ~nd instructive
aspect of the Brandir opinion is that the majority, having discovered this
test, may not actually have· applied it in the end. Pressed by the dissent to
follow Kieselstein~Cord to its logical conclusion,s07 the majority was forced
to acknowledge that the bicycle rack in question was just a "product of
industrial design" whose "[f]orm and function [were] inextricably intertwined . . . being as much the result of utilitarian pressures as aesthetic
choices. "S08 Like the outdoor lamp in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, S09 the artistic
elements of the bicycle rack, though "worthy of admiration," were inseparable from the functional elements in which they merged, even if the form of
the rack existed independently as a work of art in the minds of the
experts. S 10 The Brandir majority thus ended by denying protection for
much the same reason that the Register of Copyrights had refused to register
the d'esign in the first place,sll and a collision between the court and the
Copyright Office was narrowly averted at the last moment.
That the Second Circuit has tired of its experiment with partial cumulation can hardly be doubted after this decision, as Judge Winter's dissent
gleefully pointed out. S 12 If Brandir's award-winning design of a bicycle
rack, derived from an original wire sculpture, was not conceptually separable, despite the majority's dicta about "design process," then the operative
test of separability in the Second Circuit resembled the test used in those
other federal appellate courts that had excluded the designs of an outdoor
lamp, of wire-spoked hubcaps, and of carpet display folders on grounds of
inseparability.sl3 Weary of more bloody struggles in the name of nondiscrimination, Judge Oakes in particular may henceforth tend to view con:505. See, e.g., E. ULMER, supra note 393, at 147-50; Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 393, at 77
(relating the high threshold of eligibility to the German judges' traditional reluctance
"to grant the rather long lasting copyright protection to those creations for which the
special protection under the ... [design law) is available"); see also Katzenberger,
Protection of Industrial Designs in Germany, reprinted in DEsIGN PRoTEcnON, supra
note 8, at 100-02. However, some recent decisions appear slightly more liberal in
regard to copyright protection than in the past. See Dietz, ·supra note 383, § 2[4)[c).
506. See Brown, supra note 32, at 1351, 1352 n.51 (reporting the later views of Denicola).
Both Brown and Denicola reject broad copyright protection of industrial designs under
any theory. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1349; Denicola, supra note 194, at
726-27.
507. See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1150-52 (Winter, J., concurring in:part and dissenting in part).
508. Id. at 1147. The majority added that "Brandir has achieved the highest goal of modem
industrial design, that is, the harmonious fusion of function and aesthetics." Id.
509. 591 F.2d 796, 800-01 (D.C. eir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978); see supra
notes 370-73 and accompanying text.
510. See supra note 452.
511. See supra notes 454-55 and accompanying text.
512. See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1151.
513. See supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text; see alSo Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's
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ceptual separability as a theoretical construct that, in practice, is seldom
allowed to temper the policy of whatever design protection law happens to
be in force.
If so, the Second Circuit's approach to copyrightable applied art in the
future will draw nearer to the neo-Italian construction of Esquire, and the
split in the circuits, opened in 1980, could largely heal of its own accord. 514
Meanwhile, one should not forget that both the majority and the dissent in
Brandir quietly agreed to remand the design of the bicycle rack to the lower
court with instructions to consider its eligibility for protection as "appearance trade dress" under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 515 Mindful of the
growing opportunities to expand the protection of industrial designs under
federal unfair competition law, which both the Second and Ninth Circuits
had pioneered,5t6 the majority in Brandir may well have concluded that the
struggle to install a measured regime of partial cumulation between the patent and copyright laws was no longer worth either the effort or the risks it
entailed.
Nevertheless, the Brandir majority had gone on record as favoring a
"design process" test of conceptual separability, while the dissenting judge
in Brandir had sided with the Carol Barnhart dissent in advocating a "temporal displacement" test of conceptual separability. 517 Either test couldbecome highly protectionist over time if endorsed by the Second Circuit as a
whole or by other circuits that have not yet pronounced upon these matters.
Although the copyright authorities oppose both tests and have intensified
their defense of the noncumulationist fortress, district courts in different
jurisdictions seem increasingly inclined to cite the protectionist dissents in
Brandir and Carol Barnhart' 18 rather than the orthodox formulation of Compendium (II) of Copyright Office Practices. 519
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the experimental regime of
partial cumulation operating since 1980 in one United States federal appel-

514.
515.
516.
517.
518.

519.

Costumes Co., 721 F. Supp. 1566 (E.D.N.Y.) (finding masquerade costumes not conceptually separable), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir.
1989).
For the split in the circuits opened in 1980, see generally supra text accompanying
notes 47-50, 369-95.
Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1148-49, 1152.
For opening moves in this strategy, see infra notes 540-52 and accompanying text; for
later and more decisive moves by the same courts, see infra notes 553-70, 620-33 and
accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 466-75.
See, e.g., National Theme Prods., Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348, 1354
(S.D. Cal. 1988) (holding costume artwork, including overall shape of at least one costume, copyrightable under "design process" test of Brandir because "the artists' communication of their aesthetic judgments (was] exercised independently of functional
considerations"); W. PATRY, supra note 447. at 45 (contending that the "temporal displacement test is ... the most persuasive approach to ... a perplexing issue"). But
see Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costumes Co., 721 F. Supp. 1566 (E.D.N.Y.) (costume
designs were not conceptually separable), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 891
F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989).
See supra notes 412-18 and accompanying text.
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late jurisdiction has really ended or is just temporarily suspended. If the
laUer, then-absent prompt and carefully contrived sui generis design legislation-there is still reason to fear that "nostalgics of the copyright
approach" may yet overpower the partisans of noncumulation in this country as they appear to have done in the Netherlands only a short while ago. S20
C. Concu"ent Protection o/Trade Dress: The Judge-Made Design Law

1. "Appearance Trade Dress" Without Aesthetic Functionality:

1975-1985

.

Comparative intellectual property law demonstrates that, unless
restrained by the enactment of sui generis design laws or by the periodic
strictures of higher authority, foreign judges are reluctant to condone systematic design piracy in blind obedience to liberal economic theory. Given
room to maneuver, there is a nearly universal tendency521 to strain trademark and unfair competition laws s!Junding in the confusion and deception
rationales to the point where they at least occasionally deter slavish imitation on' a case-by-case basis. 522 Moreover, courts in some industrialized
countries still view slavish imitation as a tort in its own right, S23 a tendency
that has been reactivated by the advent of new technologies that fit imperfectly within the established framework of world intellectual property
law. 524
520. See supra notes 46, 367, 406-08 and accompanying text; Braun & Evrard, La /oi
uniforme Benelux surles dessins et modeles, 52 R.I.D.A. lOt, 118-20 (1975) (criticizing
"nostalgics of the copyright approach" for attempting to undermine the Uniform Benelux Designs Law of 1975).
521. See supra note 502, infra note 522; Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 50, at
794-95 (citing authorities).
522. In the Netherlands, for example, heavy-handed judicial recourse to the misappropriation branch of unfair competition law, coupled with pressures from abroad, finally convinced the authorities to enact the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, supra note 4, which
took effect in 1975. See, e.g., Braun & Evrard, supra note 520, at" 101-22; von
Nieuwenhoven Helbach, Design Protection and Parent Law, Trade11Ulrk Law, and the
Law of Article 1401 Civil Code, in Benelux and DUlCh Law, in DEsIGN PRcm:cnON,
supra note 8, at 5-7, 12-18. The Benelux design law attempts to limit concurrent protection in trademark and unfair competition law. See, e.g., ill. at 15 (discussing Uniform Benelux Designs Law, supra note 4, art. 14(5». Whether this effort has succeeded is doubtful. See, e.g., Rose, Passing Off, Unfair Competition and Community
Law, 12 E.I.P.R. 123, 126 (1990). In contrast, Italy, which takes its design law seriously, has been little inclined to recognize slavish imitation of unprotected designs as
unfair competition. See, e.g., Franzosi, The Legal Protection of Industrial Design:
Unfair Competition as a Basis of Protection, 12 E.I.P.R. 154, 156-57 (1990) [hereinafter
Franzosi, Unfair Competition]. In Italy as elsewhere, however, there are strong countervailing pressures. See, e.g., Cuonzo, I limiti al principio di libera imitabilitd dei
prodotti altrui al di fuori della privative industriali: verso la fine di un dog11Ul?, 38
RlvlSTA DI DIRI'ITO INDuSTRIALE 190 (1989); Mangini, II morehio e gli auri segni
distintivi in 5 TRATTATO DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE E DI DIRITTO PuBBLlCO
DELL'EcoNOMIA 168-82 (F. Galgano ed. 1982).
523. See, e.g., P.l. KAuFMANN, supra note 50, at 83-85, 89.
524. See, e.g., Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 50, at 792-93 (discussing problems
of protecting applied scientific know-how). Although the Federal Republic of Germany
is said to resist this approach, see P.l. KAuFMANN, supra note 50, at 92-96, courts in
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That similar pressures were mounting in the United States soon
appeared from a number of federal appellate decisions in the 1970s. 525
These cases held that nonfunctional design features left unprotected by the
Copyright Act of 1976 might qualify for protection under section 43(a) of
the United States trademark law, known as the Lanham Act, which prohibited "a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation"
of goods or of "containers for goods. ,,526
Only a decade or so earlier, the extension of section 43(a) to product
simulation appeared illegal owing to constitutional limitations on the protection of unpatented, noncopyrightable product configurations set out in
the Supreme Court's Sears-Compco decisions of 1964. 521 Language in
these opinions could be construed to prevent both state and federal courts
from inhibiting the free imitation of any products not covered by statutory
intellectual property laws,528 except in true cases of passing off: 529 By the
that country have been using unfair competition law to protect computer programs.
See, e.g., Lowenheim, Legal Protection for Computer Programs in West Germany, 4
HIGH TECH. L.J. 187, 195, 198-200 (1989) (stating that "most cases to date have protected computer programs on the basis of unfair competition law rather than copyright
law"). Moreover, article 5(c) of the new Swiss Unfair Competition Law may be viewed
as a codified misappropriation law aimed at high technology. See, e.g., Probst, Protection of Integrated Circuits in Switzerland, 4 E.I.P.R. 108, 109-10 (1988); Reichman,
Programs as Krww-How, supra note 23, at 666-67. For an endorsement of this general
approach, see Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine:
Cornman Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 55 (1987).
525. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 E2d 200
(2d Cir. 1979); Truck Equip. Servs. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 E2d 1210 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 US. 861 (1976); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cen. denied, 423 US. 99 (1975); see aLro
Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 456 US. 844 (1982). See generally 1 IT.
McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:25D (2d ed. 1984).
526. Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427,441 (1946) (codified as amended at 15
US.c. § 1125(a) (1988». Section 132 of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988
amended § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which now extends civil liability to:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person. . . .
15 US.C. § 11.25(a) (1988). The amended text attempts "to codify the interpretation
. . . [§ 43(a)) has been given by the courts" because it "fills an important gap in federal
unfair competition iaw." S. REP. No. 515, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1988).
527. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 US. 225 (1964).
528. See, e.g., Compco, 376 US. at 237 ("To forbid copying would interfere with the federal
policy, found in . . . the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of
allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the
public domain."); Sears, 376 US. at 231 ("An unpatentable article ... is in the public
domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so."). Following these
decisions, courts "were reluctant. . . to grant relief under state or federal law for product imitation or trade dress infringement; many interpreted Sears and Compco as dis-
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1970s, however, some federal courts had begun to challenge this interpretation. S30 In their view, if a competitor seemed likely to confuse consumers
about the source of a product by imitating nonfunctional design features S31
that had acquired secondary meaning through use,532 the aggrieved producer could invoke section 43(a)533 to combat one kind of "false designation
of origin"S34 or simply to protect his unregistered trademark. S3S On either

529.

530.
531.
532.

533.

534.

535.

couraging any protection in this area." Note, The Problem of Functional Features:
Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COWM. L. REV.
77,82-83 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Trade Dress Infringement]; see also Brown, supra
note 32, at 1349, 1384-86; Meyer, Misapplication of the Misappropriation Doctrine to
Merchandising: A Reply to Professor Bauer, 35 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 69, 105
& n.174 (1988) (arguing that use of § 43(a) to repress copying is inconsistent with 17
US.c. § 301(a»; Nimetz, supra note 69, at 93-94 (giving a broad interpretation of
Sears-Compco).
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1359-60, 1383-86. Narrowly construed, the "passing off' doctrine protects the buying public against deception in regard to the source of
offered products. See generally R.S. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON CoPYRIGHT,
UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER ToPICS BEARING ON THE PRarECTIoN OF LITERARY,
MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS 513-47 (5th ed. 1989) (distinguishing the business tort
of passing off from that of misappropriation).
See supra note 525.
For the evolution of the nonfunctionality requirement, see infra text accompanying
notes 572-633.
''The prime element of secondary meaning is a mental association in buyers' minds
between the alleged mark and a single source of the product." 1 IT. McCARTHY, supra
note 525, at 659; see also Pegram, The Scope of Industrial Design Protection Under
Trademark and Unfair Competition Laws, 19 U BALT. L. REV. 333 (1989) (stressing that
trademark law requires symbolization of the source, not the product as such).
As thus interpreted, §§ 43(a) and 44 oUhe Lanham Act, whIch were further refined in
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, see supra note 526, implemented international obligations that the United States had assumed at different times, including articles 10 and 10 bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, and
these measures became available to both nationals and foreigners on equal footing. See
15 US.c. § 1125(a) (1988); Paris Convention, supra note I, arts. 10, 10 bis; G.
BODENHAUSEN, supra note 109, at 138-48; 3 S. LADAS, supra note 1, at 1701-03 (noting
that the vast body of federal case law "representing an effective set of rules against
unfair business practice" was cut off by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 US. 64 (1938»;
see also Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of
the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U L. REY. 1029, 1029-32 (1957).
On its face, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as codified in 1946, prohibited only false labelling and false ciesignations of origin in the geographical sense. See Lanham Act, ch.
540, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946). By the 1970s, however, the federal appellate
courts had converted § 43(a) into a nationally applicable federal law of unfair competition by interpreting "false designation of origin" to mean "false designation of manufacturer." See, e.g., Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 43IND. L. REV. 84, 1l0-11 (1973). This made ittechnically possible to bring
confusingly similar product designs and dress within its ambit. See, e.g., S. REP. No.
515, IOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 40,49 (1988); Pegram, supra note 532, at 338. See generally Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Shauld Be the Reach of Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1984).
See, e.g., Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541,1549 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (claim that use of a patented design that had acquired secondary meaning
through use constituted "a false designation of origin" was "inartfully pleaded," but
court interpreted complaint as stating a claim that "the shape had become, in effect, its
trademark," protectable against confusingly similar use under § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 15 US.C. § 1125(a) (1988».
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rationale, these courts avoided the preemptive sweep of Sears-Compco by
stressing that federal policies concerning trademarks and unfair competition
were rooted in the Commerce Clause and thus operated on a par with other
federal policies implemented by the patent and copyright laws. s36 As resistance to Sears-Compco mounted generally and the Supreme Court appeared
to relax its strict antiprotectionist stance,S37 this view gained the ascendancy.538
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, had relied
on section 43(a) in the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders decision of 1979, which
protected decorative features of a football uniform against imitators who
caused a likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of competing goods. 539 In 1981, the Second Circuit returned to this theme on at least
536. See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) ("If the
design is not entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory protection, then it can
be copied at will.") (emphasis supplied); cf. 17 U.S.c. § 301(d) (1988) (stating that
other federal laws are not preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976); see also Pegram,
supra note 532, at 337-38, 343-46; Bauer, supra note 534, at 685-90. On this view of
the matter, if Congress disagreed with judicial perceptions of the interplay between
these policies, it could directly regulate federal torts arising under § 43(a). See, e.g., I
J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 525, § 7:26; supra note 526 (quoting Lanham Act § 43(a)
as amended in 1988); see also Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to
Lear, 59 CAUF. L. REV. 873-904 (197 I).
537. That the tide was running against Sears-Compeo in this period is undisputed. See, e.g.,
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (holding contract to pay royalties enforceable despite invalidation of corresponding patent); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (finding state trade secret laws not preempted);
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (holding that state law giving copyright
protection to sound recordings left unprotected by federal copyright law was not preempted). See generally Wiley, Bonito Boats: Uninformed But Mandatory Innovation
Policy, 1989 SUP. CT. REv. 283, 287-88 (1989).
538. See, e.g., In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring) (stating that "this court has adopted the position that each [federal] statute must
be interpreted independently of the other ... and that no one of these [copyright, patent, and trademark] statutes affording protection to a design, preempts the other");
Bauer, supra note 534, at 685-91, 725 n.219, 728. See generally J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PRarF.cnON AND PRACTICE §§ 2.13(1), 2.13[5] (1988) (stating that "almost
every judicial circuit in the United States has come to apply Section 43(a) in trade dress
cases, and the trend shows no sign of abating. Sears and Compeo are almost never
mentioned by the courts. They are, in fact, moribund."). But see Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); infra text accompanying notes 713-16.
The extent to which state trademark and unfair competition laws can still prevent imitation of the overall shape or configuration of a product, despite the Supreme Court's
Sears-Compeo decisions in 1964, remained controversial. See, e.g., Gemveto Jewelry
Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 800 F.2d 256 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stressing the power of SearsCompeo to preclude state claims grounded in product simulation, except where the
injunction was narrowly drawn to address "palming off' only); Brown, supra note 32,
at 1374-83. But see H20 Swimwear, Ltd. v. Lomas, Nos. 40498, 40499, 40500 (N.Y.
App. Div. Aug. 16, 1990) (finding noncopyrightable designs of swimwear not preempted under state unfair competition law).
539. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, lnc_ v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d
Cir. 1979) (affirming preliminary injunction and finding that combination of colors and
collocation of decorations had become an unregistered trademark within § 43(a».
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two occasions,540 notably in Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.,541
which dealt with the design of a toy automobile made famous in a national
television series. 542 Once again the court used section 43(a) to enjoin a
competitor from marketing an unauthorized, look-alike version of the original product, in part because it fostered a "likelihood of confusion as to the
source or sponsorship" of the toy automobile543 and in part because the
competitor should not be allowed to "reap where [it] had not sown."544
Viewed strictly in the context of other federal unfair competition cases
that emphasized a confusion or a deception rationale, the Warner Brothers
decision of 1981 545 constituted a remarkable example of judicial indiscretion. By blurring the distinction between a design that identified a producer
and a design that identified a product,546 for example, this opinion ignored
any limitations that Sears-Compco might have placed on the protection of
product configurations as such. 547 It also appealed boldly to the very misappro~riation rationale, drawn from International News Service v. Associated
Press, 48 that the Supreme Court had tried to suppress in 1964. 549
540. Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981); Harlequin Enters. Ltd. v.
Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding cover design for series of
novels protected by § 43(a».
541. 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Warner Bros. I).
542. Id. at 77-78. The court enjoined the use of certain nonfunctional distinctive symbols in
the manufacture and sale of defendant's toy car, the "Dixie Racer." These included the
bright orange color, the Confederate flag decal, door numerals, and the symbol "General Lee," placed upon a toy replica of a 1969 Dodge Charger as used in "The Dukes of
Hazzard," a successful television show.ld.
543. Id. at 79.
544. Id. at 80.
545. For a second decision in this case, see Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327 (2d
Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Warner Bros. II] (discussing issue of functionality).
546. The court cited several cases that it claimed had allowed § 43(a) "to encompass a broad
spectrum of marks, symbols, design elements and characters" that the public associates
with a "product" or a producer. Warner Bros. I, 658 F.2d at 76, 78. But the mental
association necessary for secondary meaning must occur between a mark and a producer. See supra note 532. The opinion also downplayed the power of proper labelling
to dispel·any source confusion that might otherwise have arisen. See Warner Bros. I,
658 F.2d at 78, 79.
547. While the ability to protect nonfunctional design features that had acquired secondary
meaning under Lanham Act § 43(a) was not seriously in doubt at this period, see supra
notes 530-38 and accompanying text, the ability to protect the overall shape of a product under § 43(a), even when it had acquired secondary meaning, remained controversial owing to the express application of the Sears-Compeo decisions to product
configurations. See, e.g., Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541,
1549-50 & n.1O (Fed. Cir. 1984) (recognizing the uncertain status of overall product
shapes as trademarks under § 43(a) and looking to the law of the regional circuits in
particular cases).
548. 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918) (only Supreme Court decision to suggest that slavish imitation in itself might constitute the tort of "misappropriation").
549. This panel's open appeal to International News Service and its misappropriation rationale was manifestly too forthright to exert any lasting influence. See, e.g., Compeo,
376 U.S. 234; Sears, 376 U.S. 225 (confirming thesis of Kellogg and rejecting quasiproperty interest in products of skilled efforts as such); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit
Co., 305 U.S. III (1938) (rejecting broad misappropriation rationale of International

86

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 19

Apart from these unsettled constitutional issues, the first Warner Brothers decision ignored a long-standing technical doctrine, known as aesthetic
functionality, that might have compelled a different result. sso
This doctrine, borrowed from the Ninth Circuit, had traditionally
disqualified a distinctive or fanciful design from protection as a mark if its
aesthetic qua~ities made that design "an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product" itself. SSI When the Ninth Circuit appeared
to retreat from its own doctrine of aesthetic functionality that very same
year, S52 it became clear that two of the country's foremost intellectual property tribunals had singled out the legality of product simulation under section 43(a) as a means of relieving some of the pressure generated by the failure of Congress to enact a special design law in 1976.

a. Product Configurations as Pseudo Trade Dress
These portents were confirmed in 1983 when the Court of Appeals for
News Service). See generally Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy
of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 428-29
(1983); Note, Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888,
932-37 (1964) [hereinafter Note, Competitive Torts) (casting misappropriation as a
residual doctrine of unfair competition law devised to protect intangibles in the absence
of statutory relieO. Since both Sears-Compco and § 30 I of the Copyright Act of 1916
had narrowed the misappropriation doctrine as an unwarranted interference with free
competition, see supra notes 528-29, infra note 565 and accompanying text, it followed
that "[t)o imitate and copy another's goods is not a legal wrong unless the victim of
copying has a legal right that has been invaded." Brown, supra note 32, at 1357-58;
see also P.l. KAuFMANN, supra note 50, at 73, 100-09, 113-17; Abrams, Copyright,
Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law
Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509, 509-15, 537-50, 575-81 (1983); Baird, supra note
549, at 428-29.
550. The aesthetic functionality doctrine created a presumption that ornamental designs of
useful articles served to enhance the sales appeal of products and not to identify their
producer at all. If so, they remained legally "functional" and thereby unprotectable in
trademark and unfair competition law even though they lacked the attributes of utilitarian functionality and had acquired secondary meaning. See, e.g., Pagliero v. Wallace
China Co" 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952); Brown, supra note 32, at 1367-68. See
generally Duft, "Aesthetic" Functionality, 73 TRADEMARK REP., 151, 151-53, 167-203
(1983); Oddi, The Functions of "Functionality" in Trademark Law, 22 Hous. L. REV.
925, 931-33, 951-63 (1985). The doctrine of aesthetic functionality thus reinforces the
competitive balance entrusted to the design patent and copyright laws, whose terms of
duration are constitutionally limited in time. See, e.g., Duft, supra note 550, at 151
(citing cases). A parallel 'exists between the exclusion of industrial designs from trademark and unfair competition law by dint of their aesthetic functionality and the exclusion of similar designs from copyright law due to the separability doctrine after 1958.
551. See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917
(9th Cir. 1980), cerro denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343 (holding
floral designs on tableware functional because they "satisf[y) a demand for the aesthetic as well as for the utilitarian," and stating that public interest requires free competition in regard to unpatentable design features that are "an important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product" (citing RESTATEMENT OF ToKJ'S § 742 (1938»; see
also supra note 550.
552. See Vuitton et Fils S.A. V. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981) (narrowing Pagliero); see also Fabrica, Inc. V. EI Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983);
infra notes 553-71.
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the Ninth Circuit handed down Fabrica. Inc. v. El Dorado Corp.553
Initially, this decision held that the design of a folder used to display samples
of carpeting fabrics was inseparable from the utilitarian article embodying
it and therefore ineligible for copyright protection. 554 In this respect, the
Ninth Circuit belatedly endorsed the restrictive interpretation of separability
that both the District of Columbia Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit had
approved. 555 With this task accomplished, however, the panel proceeded to
find that the noncopyrightable design of the folder amounted to protectable
trade dress within. section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 5S6
That section 43(a) covered unregistered trade dress was, by 1983,
unexceptionable in itself. 557 In the past, however, the Ninth Circuit had
taken pains to distinguish between an article of commerce, which could be
freely imitated, and the package in which the article was marketed, which
could not. 558 The design of the folder at issue in Fabrica served both as a
package, in that it displayed the plaintiff's carpet samples to the public, and
as a product, in that any other carpet company could use a similar folder to
display its own .carpet samples to its own customers. Because the defendant
had imitated the folder in conjunction with its own carpet samples, the litigation arguably concerned the configuration of a product rather than a package in the conventional sense of the term. SS9
The panel nonetheless decided that the overall design of the folder constituted a form of trade dress, which a competitor could not copy without
confusing consumers about the source of the carpet itself.560 This and similar decisions thus began to stretch the notion of trade dress to the point
where prior distinctions between "package" or "container" and "product
configuration" became blurred and hardly worth defending. 561
553. 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983).
554. [d. at 892·94 (denying copyright protection to the three-dimensional design of a display
folder because it contained no features that could "be separated out" or that could "exist
independently oftheir utilitarian features").
555. [d. at 892·94; see supra notes 369-74 and accompanying text.
556. Fabrica, 697 F.2d at 892.
557. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1358.
558. See, e.g., Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 557 (9th
Cir. 1960) (quoting Tas-T-Nut Co. v. Variety Nut & Date Co., 245 F.2d 3, 6-7 (6th Cir.
1957», cited in Fabrica, 697 F.2d at 895.
559. The defendant tried valiantly to make this point, arguing that "the carpet sample folders are not really trade dress, but constitute products in and of themselves." Fabrica,
697 F.2d at 895. But the court confused the issue by talking about the effect of the
folder design on consumers of carpets rather than on carpet manufacturers who comprised the market for carpet display folders as such. [d.
560. [d. at 895 (stating that the display folders are advertising materials that "aid consumers
in selecting the actual product-the carpeting"); see supra note 559. Query, how consumers would be confused about the source of the carpeting if another firm displayed
its own carpet samples, clearly marked with its own brand name and symbols, in a
comparable display folder whose secondary meaning was never mentioned in the opinion?
561. See, e.g., J. GILSON, supra note 538, § 7.02[3](a] (stating that the distinction is no
longer material); Brown, supra note 32, at 1358 (criticizing such a move).
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Assimilatin~ product configurations to trade dress,562 although analytically strained,56 yielded two technical advantages. First, it reduced tensions with positive intellectual. property law because section 43(a) applied
expressly to "containers for goods." Indeed, most courts and commentators
now believed that the protection of trade dress under section 43(a) would not
conflict with either Sears-Compco 564 or section 301(a) of the Copyright Act
of 1976. 565
562. "Most trade dress infringement actions involve the packaging or labeling of goods.
Recently, however, courts have recognized that the design of a product itself may constitute protectable trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act." John H. Harland Co.
v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966,980 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted) (holding
noncopyrightable design of bank checks to be protectable trade dress under § 43(a».
The first case to adopt this tactic for this purpose was reportedly Truck Equip. Servo Co.
v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding exterior design of semi-trailer
truck to be trade dress protectable against copying under Lanham Act § 43(a», een.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); see also 1 J. GILSON, supra note 538, § 7.02[2)[a); id.
§ 2.13[1) (noting that federal unfair competition law under § 43(a) has "supplanted"
the protection of product configurations and of "overall trade dress" in state common
law); Note, Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528, at 77,79,82-83.
563. If the product comes in a package or container and its configuration is also viewed as
trade dress, then every product has at least two trade dresses as a result of this
approach. More to the point, the tactic undermines any statutory design protection
scheme in force. See infra notes 72545 and accompanying text.
564. See supra note 562. The Sears opinion had declared that state unfair competition law
could continue to protect "distinctive dress in the packaging of goods." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 US. 225, 232 (1964). States could also require adequate
labeling to prevent source confusion. Id. The Compeo opinion had recognized that
"other federal statutory protection" remained concurrently applicable. Compeo Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 US. 234,238 (1964). If state laws could still regulate
trade dress and if other federal statutory havens were not precluded, then protecting
commercial designs as trade dress was arguably not inconsistent with Sears-Compeo.
See, e.g., SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055,
1065-66 (3d Cir. 1980); Truck Equip., 536 F.2d 1210; Note, Trade Dress Infringement,
supra note 528, at 82-85. See generally Dratler, Trademark Protection for Industrial
Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 887,916-37 (1988); Schuman, Trademark Protection of
Container and Package Conjigurations-A Primer, 59 CHI. [-)KENT L. REV. 779, 790-92
(1983). But see Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32 (apparently limiting the confusion rationale
as a basis for "an injunction against ... copying that which the federal patent laws permit to be copied," and stressing that "[s]haring in the goodwill of an article unpr<>tected by patent or trademark is the exercise of a right protected by all"); Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co., 305 US. 111, 122 (1938) (a major precedent in pre-Erie, federal
unfair competition law). For the view that the trademark and unfair competition laws,
state or federal, are not to disrupt the federal intellectual property scheme by affording
protection against copying to subject matter that Congress has declined to protect, see,
e.g., Meyer, supra note 528, at 105; ef. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141 (1989).
565. In principle, the separability test of copyright law, see supra notes 20-21 and accompa- .
nying text, was perfected in § 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act, which codified basic
premises of the Sears-Compeo decisions. See 17 US.C. § 301 (1988). Section 301
arguably preempted the protection of noncopyrightable industrial designs under state
unfair competition laws sounding in misappropriation as such. See, e.g., Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 800 F.2d 256 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Durham Indus., Inc. v.
Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (preempting state unfair competition claim
where copyright claim on same design was invalidated for lack of originality); ef. John
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Second, not even ardent judicial partisans of aesthetic functionality,
such as the Ninth Circuit,566 had ever applied this doctrine to packaging or
true trade dress,567 because consumers did not buy packages for their own
sake. 568 By insisting that the display folder at issue in Fabrica was trade
dress and not a product configuration, the panel hinted that it did not need to
invoke aesthetic functionality at all. 569 Lest critics object that it had
wrongly distinguished trade dress from trademarks on the facts of this case,
moreover, the panel stated its belief that the Ninth Circuit was unlikely to
apply aesthetic functionality even to product configurations in the future
because this doctrine no longer served any useful purpose. 570
By treating a product configuration as pseudo trade dress, in other
words, this and other federal appellate courts" I had quite deliberately
begun to transform the very three-dimensional designs of useful articles
that the Copyright Act of 1976 had banished to the public domain into
unregistered trademarks protectable in perpetuity under an evolving federal
law of unfair competition.

566.

561.

568.
569.
510.

511.

H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.• 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that
state laws of unfair competition were not preempted by § 301 where they required
proof of nonequivalent rights ~ounding in the confusion or deception rationales). aff'd
on other grounds. 111 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1983). See generally 2 P. GOLDSTEIN. supra
note 28. at 411-502, 553-62. 513-85; Abrams. supra note 549. at 531-66. However.
§ 301(d) of the 1916 Act expressly exempted "any rights or remedies under any other
Federal statute" from the preemptive sweep of § 301(a). Federal rights legitimately
arising under Lanham Act § 43(a) are therefore not preempted by § 301 (a) of the copyright law or by the residual impact of Sears-Compco unless there is some inherent
conflict between the two equally valid federal statutes that requires reconciliation. See.
e.g .• Meyer. supra note 528. at 105 & n.114 (arguing that "[i]mporting the misappropriation doctrine into § 43(a) frustrates the stated purpose of the preemption statute. . .
by threatening to create a parallel system of rights equivalent to copyright").
See. e.g .• International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912.911
(9th Cir. 1980); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.• 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952); supra note
550. But see Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters.• Inc.• 644 F.2d 169.113 (9th Cir.
1981) (declining to apply aesthetic functionality bar to distinctive and decorative
designs of luggage and handbags).
"[T]his court has specifically limited application of the Pagliero functionality test to
product features and has refused to apply tbe test to cases involving trade dress and
packaging." Fabrica. 691 F.2d at 895 (citing Audio Fidelity. Inc. v. High Fidelity
Recordings, Inc.• 283 F.2d 551 (1960».
See. e.g., Duft. supra notc 550. at 191-92 (stressing that "in the case of product design,
the potential exists for an absolute prohibition against copying and manufacturing . . .
a particular good formed in a particular way").
Fabrica. 691 F.2d at 895-96.
''This court ... bas specifically rejected the notion that a design feature is functional
by definition if it increased appeal and sales of the product." [d. at 896 (citing Vuitton
et Fils. 644 F.2d 169). That aesthetic functionality had ceased to interest the Ninth Circuit was confirmed expressly in a subsequent decision. See First Brand Corp. v. Fred
Meyer. Inc .• 809 F.2d 1318. 1382 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (dictum); see also infra text
accompanying notes 608-33. It followed that only the utilitarian functionality test
could henceforth disqualify design features that otherwise met the requirements of
§ 43(a) regardless of whether these features pertained to a product or to the trade dress
of a product. See Fabrica. 691 F.2d at 896.
See supra notes 540-50. 562.

90

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 19

b. A Revisionist View of Utilitarian Functionality

Meanwhile, in a series of decisions that continued up to its demise in
1982,572 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) had been making it harder for the Patent and Trademark Office to invoke utilitarian functionality as grounds for refusing to register three-dimensional product and
container designs as trademarks573 on the Principal and Supplementary
Registers. 574 Nonfunctionality became the chief obstacle to actual registration 575 once product and container designs had qualified as eligible subject
matter in the period 1958 to 1964. 576
Historically, the nonfunctionality requirement excluded candidate
marks that served a mechanical purpose577 or that otherwise contributed to
the efficiency, utility, or aesthetic commercialization of a product,578
regardless of any secondary meaning such marks may have acquired or of
their inherent distinctiveness. 579 Nonfunctionality thus prevented trade572. See supra note 141 (noting that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit replaced
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals after September 30,1982).
573. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re World's Finest Chocolate,
Inc., 474 F.2d 1012, 1014 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d
925,933 (C.c.P.A. 1964) (Rich, 1, concurring); see also In re DC Comics, Inc., 689
F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A.
1961). See generally Oddi, supra note 550, at 933-51.
574. "Registration on the Federal Principal Register requires either that the mark is arbitrary or inherently distinctive, or . . . it must be proven to have acquired secondary
meaning." Schuman, supra note 564, at 791. Inscription in the Supplemental Register
allowed the symbol to become a registered trademark if it later acquired secondary
meaning. For the benefits of registration on either Register, see id. at 794-96.
575. See, e.g., In re Honeywell,lnc., 532 F.2d 180, 182 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (denying registration
of thermostat design as most utilitarian of a limited number of available designs);
Oddi, supra note 550, at 940 n.95 (citing cases).
576. The eligibility of container configurations for federal trademark protection was not
established until 1958. See, e.g., In re Kotzin, 276 F.2d 411,414 (C.C.P.A. 1960); Ex
parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 US.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm'r Pat. 1958); Schuman, supra
note 564, at 797; see also In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967)
(holding design of wine decanter not unregisterable despite expiration of design patent,
Sears-Compeo notwithstanding). A proprietor's right to register product configurations
was not confirmed until 1964. See, e.g., In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d
836 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (authorizing registration on Supplemental Register of triangular
shaped chemical cake if applicant showed distinctiveness or potential secondary meaning, unless PTO proved overriding utilitarian functionality); see also Deister Concentrator, 289 F.2d 496. See generally Oddi, supra note 550, at 933-38. The theory that
product and container configurations could be registered as trademarks on the Federal
Principal Register turned on their ability to denote either the source of the goods in the
container or the source of the product itself. "That is, the shape of the product is a
trademark for its own source." I J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 525, § 7:31, at 263.
577. See, e.g., Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 US.P.Q. (BNA) 74 (Pat. Off.
Examiner-in-Chief 1952); Nimetz, supra note 69, at 88-90; if. Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 US. Ill, 120 (1938)..
578. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 comment a (1938) (subdividing functionality
into "efficiency," "utility" and "aesthetic" factors); Oddi, supra note 550, at 931
(observing that judicial recognition of the "aesthetic" variant remained controversial);
see also Note, Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528, at 80-90.
579. See, e.g., Oddi, supra note 550, at 928; Brown, supra note 32, at 1361 n.91 (criticizing
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mark and unfair competition laws, whether state or federal, from undermining the patent system and from hindering free competition,580 policies that
acquired constitutional underpinnings in the Sears-Compeo decisions of
1964. 58 ! However, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals believed that
nonfunctionaIity as traditionally interpreted overemphasized a competitor's
right to copy at the expense of a producer's right "to protect ... [his]
method of trade identification" and of the public interest in stimulating
product differentiation. 582
As the C.C.P'A. explained in its Morton-Norwich decision of 1982,583
most three-dimensional configurations would necessarily affect the performance or efficiency of the products embodying them merely because of
their utilitarian nature. 584 Yet, registering these configurations as marks
would seldom hinder competition in practice if courts took pains to separate
source-identiftng features from the functional components of the products
in question. 58 This conclusion followed from the premise that the number
of arbitrary design features capable of source identification-despite some
incidental functional attributes-was large, while the number of critically
functional features also capable of source identification was small. 586 To

580.

581.
582.

583.
584.

585.

586.

Note, Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528, for implying that proof of secondary
meaning might overcome a valid functionality defense).
See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraftex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981); Deister
Concentrator, 289 F.2d at 504; Duft, supra note 550, at 145-55 (linking doctrine of utilitarian nonfunctionality with attempts to protect designs of useful articles, and stating
that the doctrine ensures that competitors would not be "forever precluded from '[sharing] in the benefits of unpatented utilities' "). In all cases, according to the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 (1938), the test of functionality turned on "whether prohibition of
imitation by others will deprive the others of something which will substantially hinder
them in competition." Id.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1361; Oddi, supra note 550, at 938.
In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1337 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (stressing that
fundamental right to compete gives way to protection of "established symbol of trade
identification"); ill. at 1340 (affirming need to "strike a balance" between these goals);
ill. at 1339 (insisting that public policy is "not the right to slavishly copy articles . . .
not protected by patent or copyright. but the need to copy those articles which is ...
the right to compete effectively") (emphasis in original); see also In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d
496. 503 (C.C.P.A. 1961); Note, Trade Dress Infringement. supra note 528, at 88
(finding that legislative history viewed major purpose of Lanham Act to be that of "promoting product distinguishability").
671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
See. e.g., ill. at 1338-39 (emphasizing that the issue for trademark protection is "not
... [the] mere existence of utility ... but [the] degree of design utility") (emphasis in
original); see also Deister Concentrator, 289 F.2d at 502 (stating that "mere possession
of a function (utility) is not sufficient reason to deny protection").
See, e.g., Morton-Norwich. 671 F.2d at 1338, 1340-41 (stating that functionality in this
context always refers "to the design of the thing under consideration (in the sense of its
appearance) and not the thing itselJ," adding that "the effect upon competition 'is really
the crux of the matter' ") (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., ill. at 1342; Deister Concentrator, 289 F.2d at 503 (distinguishing between
"functional shapes that are never capable of being monopolized. even if they become
'distinctive of the applicant's goods: and shapes which can be monopolized because
they are of such an arbitrary nature that the law does not recognize a right in the public
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allow competitors to copy design teatures that had acquired secondary
meaning, perhaps as the result of costly advertising campaigns, because
they contributed to the utility or efficiency of a product without more thus
converted nonfunctionality into a formula that encouraged consumer confusion and the appropriation of unearned good will to boot. 587
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals accordingly began to distinguish between package and product designs that were descriptively or "de
.facto functional" in that they pertained to useful articles and those deemed
"de jure functional," which would not be allowed to register even if capable
of source identification. 588 To establish legal or de jure functionality, it
would not suffice that the design component, viewed in isolation, contributed to the efficiency of the underlying product or affected its utility, or even
that the number of alternative shapes available to competitors was relatively
limited. 589 Rather, the court proposed to disqualify an otherwise eligible
design only if, viewed as a whole, it was demonstrably "superior in function
. . . or economy of manufacture" and for this reason had to be copied as a
competitive fact of life. 590 If, in sum, a source-identifying product
configuration or package did not amount to "the best or one of a few superior designs available," the C.C.P.A. would not allow the trademark authorities to deny it registration without evidence that the maintenance of effective
competition in a given product area required a higher standard of nonfunctionality.59t
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals thus favored a nonfunctionality doctrine for purposes of trademark law that resembled the nonfunc-

587.

588.
589.
590.
591.

to copy them. even if some incidental function is associated with them"). The hard
cases fell in between these two poles. See Pegram, supra note 532. at 339-40.
See Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1342-43 ("If the functions of appellant's boule can be
performed equally well by containers of innumerable designs and. thus, no one is
injured in competition. why did the board state that appellant's design is functional and
for that reason not registrable?") (emphasis in original); supra note 586; see also Duft.
supra note 550, at 158 (stressing twin evils of increasing consumer confusion and
allowing unnecessary "infringing upon [a design] owner's trade"); cf. Truck Equip.
Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir. 1976)(ciled with approvalin
Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1339). But see Brown, supra note 32, at 1361 & n.9O,
(criticizing Truck Equip. for its reliance in part on a misappropriation rationale).
See Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1337. But see Brown, supra note 32. at 1369 n.126
(criticizing this distinction as unhelpful jargon).
Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1338-43.
Id. at 1338-39, 1341; see also Duft. supra note 550, at 158; Oddi, supra note 550. at
941-42.
Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1339-41 ("superiority of design" test rests upon the
"essential to effective competition" foundation, citing Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby
Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir. 1979»; see also Pegram, supra note 532, at 342
(stating that "the effect on competition issue was viewed by the court as the crux of its
analysis"). The Morton-Norwich court acknowledged the continued relevance of
assessing whether the design "was created primarily with an eye toward the utility of
the article" or primarily for source identification. when evaluating the lack of distinctiveness in relation to functionality. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1343 (emphasis in
original). But a "nondistinctive design does not necessarily equal a 'functional'
design," id. at 1343, and the functionality bar nonetheless requires a finding that the
design be "functionally or economically superior." Id. at 1342.
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tionality standard that the Court of Ap~als for the Federal Circuit would
later introduce into design patent law. 5 2 ]0 either case, a plaintiff could
parry the charge that his design was "dictated by function"593 by recourse to
a "multiplicity of forms" test that allowed him to prove that the defendant
could compete effectively without imitating the protected form. 594 As
applied to the facts in the Morton-Norwich case of 1982,595 this approach
recognized that a product or container design could indicate the source of
manufacture while contributing to the utility of the underlying product,596
much as a patentable ornamental design could imETOve the appearance of an
article whose utility it simultaneously enhanced. 97
.
In effect, the revisionist test of utilitarian functionality formulated in
Morton-Norwich, coupled with a disdain for the aesthetic functionality doctrine also manifested in 1982,598 meant that the c.c.P.A. had narrowed the
general requirement of nonfunctionality governing the registration of all
product and container configurations599 without even mentioning the SearsCompeo decisions of 1964. 600 It followed that "the more functionality
592. See supra text accompanying notes 269-302.
593. See supra note 591; Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1342 (stating that, while "the overall
composite design comprising both bottle and spray top . . . must be accommodated to
the functions performed, we see no evidence that it was dictated by them and resulted
in a functionally or economically superior design of such a container") (emphasis in
original); see also Duft, supra note 550, at 158 n.28 (stating that "dictated by functional considerations" has to mean that "the design must be the way it is lest its superiority (in utility or economy of manufacture) be diminished").
594. See, e.g., Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1342-43 (finding that competitors "had no need
to simulate appellant's trade dress, in whole or in part, in order to enjoy all of thefunctionai aspects of a spray top container"); supra note 587. For the "multiplicity of
forms" test in United States design patent law after 1982, see supra notes 269-302 and
accompanying text.
595. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d 1332 (holding that registration of a container configuration
for a plastic spray bottle was not barred by the functionality rule, despite existence of a
design patent on the same configuration and of a utility patent on the spray mechanism,
and remanding for determination of distinctiveness or secondary meaning).
596. See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 532, at 341 (noting that the design at issue fell "in the
middle of the range between one entirely determined by function. . . and an arbitrary
one").
597. See supra text accompanying notes 280-302.
.
598. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 E2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (declining to apply broad aesthetic functionality dudrine to two-dimensional configurations of dolls); Oddi, supra
note 550, at 949-53.
599. See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 532, at 341-42 (stating that Morton-Norwich "clarified
. . . and appeared to liberalize" the "law applicable to registration of product
configurations," although the case "involved the shape of a spray container used for
cleansers"). The court repeatedly stressed the extent to which its formula applied to
both container and product configurations. See Monon-Norwich, 671 E2d at 1337-38,
1342. At the outset of the opinion, however, there is a curious disclaimer "that this is
not a 'configuration of goods case." Id. at 1336 (emphasis in original). Whatever distinction the court initially had in mind was thus lost in its general doctrinal reformulation, even though the new formula might be applied differently on a different set of
facts.
600. See supra notes 562-65 and accompanying text. But cf DC Comics, 689 E2d at
1052-53 (Nies, J., concurring) (discussing the interrelatedness of federal trademark,
patent, and copyright laws pertaining to designs of useful articles).
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could be circumscribed, the more design features would be nonfunctional
and protectable. ,,6()l The formula adopted by Judge Rich in Morton-Norwich thus invited the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which took
office a few months later,602 to permit registration of numerous three-dimensional configurations that would have failed the utilitarian functionality
test only a decade or so earlier. 603
Ironically, the Federal Circuit has shied away from implementing the
broadest implications of Morton-Norwich,604 and in a prophetic aside, it
warned that the Supreme Court had never rescinded the application of SearsCompco to three-dimensional designs of useful articles. 60S Outside the
Federal Circuit, however, the c.c.P.A.'s pioneer decision concerning registered marks in 1982606 profoundly influenced other federal appellate courts
to relax the few remaining doctrinal barriers still limiting the protection of
package and product designs as unregistered trademarks under section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act. 607

601. Brown, supra note 32, at 1361. The Supreme Court, in dictum, provided another
definition of functionality that same year: "In general terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article." Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 US. 844,
850 n.lO (1982). But the Court did not resolve the functionality issue before it, another
definition in a concurring opinion was quite different, and the dictum in Inwood Loboralories was but "one of several competing views of the meaning of functionality."
Brown, supra note 32, at 1361-62.
602. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
60). Compare, e.g .• In re Honeywell, Inc., 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (denying application
to register the configuration of a round thermostat cover as a trademark on grounds of
functionality and noting that thermostat was covered by expired design patent plus two
utility patents) with In re Honeywell, Inc., 8 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (PTO Trademark
Tr. & App. Bd. 1988) (reversing examiner's decision to deny registration to slightly different configuration of thermostat cover, despite limited number of alternative designs,
because examiner had not demonstrated de jure functionality under Morton-Norwich);
see also In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866,872 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Pegram, supra note 532,
at 341-44; Oddi, supra note 550, at 943 (citing cases).
604. See. e.g., Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(holding clam shell package for dimmer switch functional for purposes of Lanham Act
§ 43(a»; Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding loudspeaker enclosure functional for purposes of § 43(a»; see also Textron,
Inc. v. United Stales Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re
Teledyne Indus., Inc .• 696 F.2d 968 (Fed. Cir. 1982). But see Black & Decker, Inc. v.
Hoover Serv. Center, 886 F.2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that lower court erred in
finding wedge-shaped bowl of vacuum cleaner functional under § 43(a) without evaluating defendant's ability to compete using other forms and without evidence of
confusion). As regards unregistered marks that happen to reach the Federal Circuit in
connection with mailers exclusively within its jurisdiction, the court formally applied
the law of the circuit in which the case arose.
605. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1984). For the
fulfillment of the court's premonitions concerning Sears-Compco, see Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 US. 141 (1989); infra text accompanying notes
713-24.
606. See supra notes 598-603.
607. See infra text accompanying notes 608-705.
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c. Eclipse of the Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine

The more that the Morton-Norwich view of utilitarian functionality
seduced other circuits applying section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the more
these courts balked at the idea of penalizing commercially successful
appearance designs for their aesthetic functionality.608 If the relaxed test of
utilitarian functionality applied without regard to commercial success, few
package or product designs that had acquired secondary meaning would
ever look so technically or economically superior as to necessitate copying
for competitive purposes. 609 Yet, critics of aesthetic functionality posited
that the pool of appearance designs capable of indicating origin was potentially unlimited, whereas the corresponding pool of technically proficient
designs also capable of source identification was not. ~1O To allow the broad
aesthetic functionality doctrine to exclude most commercially successful
appearance designs while courts implementing the revisionist view of utilitarian functionality no longer disqualified even technically significant
designs thus appeared to yield a paradoxical result. It afforded greater deference to the border between trademark and design patent law than to the
economically more important border separating trademarks from utility patents. 611
Such reasoning tends, however, to obscure the different policies underlying utilitarian and aesthetic functionality by overemphasizing the notion
of "functionality" as their common denominator. A lowering of the utilitarian functionality barrier has no necessary or logical bearing on the height of
the aesthetic functionality barrier so long as commercial success adversely
affects both highly functional and not very functional product
configurations on the same independent grounds. Those who think com-,
mercial success irrelevant then ignore the competitive mandate underlying
the congressional decision not to afford sui generis protection to industrial
designs in 1976,612 as if the federal trademark and unfair competition laws
constituted a world apart.
Perhaps to cover this nakedness, courts and commentators seeking to
justify a protectionist bent now discovered that the aesthetic functionality
doctrine had led all along to a socially undesirable result. The more that
608. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983) IWarner
Bros. II} (approving Morton-Norwich view of utilitarian functionality and declining to
apply aesthetic functionality bar); infra notes 610, 613-30 and accompanying text; see
also Dratler, supra note 564, at 941.
609. See supra notes 588-603 and accompanying text.
610. See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,429 (5th Cir. 1984); John J.
Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 982-83 n.27 (11th Cir. 1983); Duft,
supra note 550, at 181, 202.
611. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 564, at 941 (identifying aesthetic functionality as inadequate attempt to mediate tension between design patent law and trademark law).
612. See, e.g .• Bauer. supra Dote 534, at 725 n.219 (concluding that trademark law need not
defer to patent law because the trademark law promotes creativity and investment!). But
see Brown, supra note 32. at 1383-86; Meyer, supra note 528 (responding to Bauer).

96

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 19

ornamental designs stimulated sales of given products because consumers
appreciated their aesthetic qualities, the less eligible they became for protection as unregistered marks. or dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham
ACt. 613 The aesthetic functionality doctrine thus discouraged investment in
imaginative and attractive designs, to the detriment of the social environment and of the nation's industrial competitiveness. 614 Conversely, if courts
lowered this doctrinal barrier, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act could stimulate domestic industries to improve the eye appeal of their products,6lS
which was "an important element in today's competitive economy.'t616
By 1984, in short, it had become fashionable to tout the social benefits
of rewarding design innovation for an unlimited period of time under the
federal unfair competition law even though Congress had refused to grant
short-term sui generis protection for that very purpose in 1976. 617 In this
climate, the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits formed a united front
in rejecting the aesthetic functionality doctrine as traditionally conceived. 618 In the Second Circuit, however, the status of this doctrine
remained uncertain because two of its panels had reached opposite conclusions in the period 1983 to 1984. 619 The extent to which this prestigious
court would protect commercially successful product configurations as
unregistered marks only became clear in 1985, when the Second Circuit
reexamined these issues in LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.620
613. See, e.g., Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 427-28; Keene Corp. v. Paraftex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822,
825 (3d Cir. 1981); Duft, supra note 550, at 180-83,201-03.
614. See, e.g., Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 428; In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1051-52
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, 1., concurring); infra text accompanying notes 621-33 (discussing LeSporisac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71,77 (2d Cir. 1985»; see also Note,
Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528, at 88-89; Note, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic
Functionality, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 345,376 (1982) [hereinafter Note. Broad Sweep).
615. See, e.g., Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 428 (stressing public interest in providin~ incentives for
better appearance designs); Keene Corp., 653 F.2d at 825 (stating that "[i]t would be
unfortunate were we to discourage use of a spark of originality which could transform
an ordinary product into one of grace"); Schuman, supra note 564, at 803; Bauer, supra
note 534, at 725 n.219 (stating that "in the long run prohibition of trademark copying
will encourage creativity and investment in new products and product features") .
. 616. Note, Broad Sweep, supra note 614, at 376 (cited in Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 428).
617. For criticism of this phenomenon, see, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1358-62,1385-86;
Meyer, supra note 528, at 101-12.
618. See Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 426-30; John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d
966,982-84 (11th Cit. 1983); Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890,895-96
(9th Cit. 1983), discussed in supra text accompanying notes 553-71; Keene, 653 F.2d at
825-26.
619. Compare Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ud., 725 F.2d 18,
19-20 (2d Cit. 1984) (holding design of sofa unprotectable under Lanham Act § 43(a)
because it contributed to commercial success of the product and thus violated aesthetic
functionality doctrine) with Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 E2d 327,331 (2d Cir.
1983) (holding design oftoy car identified with television series not barred by aesthetic
functionality and approving nexus between narrow utilitarian functionality doctrine
and narrow aesthetic functionality doctrine after Morton-Norwich).
620. 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming the grant of preliminary injunction against copying the overall design of lightweight luggage that qualified as unregistered mark and
dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
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In this opinion, a veteran panel reaffirmed the now prevalent theory
that the overall design of a product, including its three-dimensional shape,
could itself function as the packaging of that same product and thus qualify
as "appearance trade dress.,,621 Once the "look" of any given product,
viewed as a whole, had demonstrably acquired secondary meaning,622 section 43(a) of the Lanham Act would therefore oblige producers of competing
products to differentiate their own trade dress to avoid a likelihood of consumer confusion. 623 It followed that the defendant could not copy the overall designs of certain LeSportsac luggage for an indefinite period of time,624
assuming the design had acquired secondary meaning,625 unless he proved
that it failed to meet the requirements of either utilitarian or aesthetic nonfunctionality.626 Because the luggage designs easily satisfied the revisionist
test of utilitarian nonfunctionality that the Second Circuit had embraced in
1983,627 the defendant had only the aesthetic functionality defense to fall
621. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75 (case heard by Feinberg, Chief Judge; Kaufman, Circuit
Judge; and Rosenn, Senior Judge, Third Circuit, sitting by designation); see supra notes
553-71 and accompanying text. The panel approved previous Second Circuit decisions
to this effect in Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), see supra
notes 541-51 and accompanying text, and Harlequin Enters. Ud. v. Gulf & Western
Corp., 644 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981). It also cited John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks,
Inc., 711 F.2d 966 (I IthCir. 1983).
622. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75, 78 (stating that the purchasing public must associate the
image of the product with a single producer or source "rather than just with the product
itself"). The panel thus seemed to align the Second Circuit with those circuits that
require evidence of secondary meaning for product configurations eligible under
§ 43(a), as opposed to other circuits that will also protect both product configurations
and packaging deemed to be inherently distinctive. See, e.g., J. GILSON, supra note
538, §§ 7.02[21, 7.02(2)[c] (citing authorities); infra text accompanying notes 691-94.
623. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75, 79. If the competitor merely copied a design that had
already acquired secondary meaning, the trier of fact could infer a likelihood of confusion without more.
624. Unregistered trademark protection, once acquired, has no fixed duration, although it
may be forfeited either through non-use for an extended period or because the mark
ceases to function as a designation of origin and no longer distinguishes the goods from
those of others. See, e.g., J. GILSON, supra note 538, §§ 1.03[11, 3.06. Although the
notion that trademarks last forever is open to criticism, see In re DC Comics, Inc., 689
F.2d 1042. 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.• concurring). the fact remains that, under
ordinary circumstances, this form of protection will deter imitation of the mark for the
life of the product or so long as it remains of interest to competitors. This contrasts
with intellectual property rights subjcct to US. CoNlloT. art. I. § 8 (allowing grants of
exclusive rights for "limited times" only).
625. See supra note 622. Since the appeal in LeSportsac questioned the grant of a preliminarY'injunction, the case was remanded for trial on the merits as regards secondary
meaning. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78.
626. LeSportsac. 754 F.2d at 75-78. The Second Circuit thus sided with those courts that
placed the burden of proving illicit functionality on the alleged infringer. See iii. at 76
(accepting the thesis of Note, Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528. at 87 n.78).
627. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76-77 (quoting Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327.
331 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332. 1342 (C.C.P.A.
1982». The particular combination of design features was to be viewed as a whole and
not disassembled into its component parts for purposes of the utilitarian functionality
test. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76. Under this test, nothing prevented third parties from
marketing suitably differentiated products of the same general type. Id. at 77.
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back upon, a defense that one panel of the Second Circuit had reaffirmed in'
Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Lld. 628
By 1985, however, the Second Circuit had resolved no longer to deny
trademark protection to unpatented, noncopyrightable product
configurations merely because they constituted "an important ingredient in
the commercial success of the product" or otherwise enhanced the "salability of the goods.,,629 On the contrary, this panel emphatically joined the
chorus of courts and commentators that had repudiated aesthetic functionality as an unwarranted disincentive to the development of imaginative and
attractive designs. 63o
Formally, to be sure, the LeSportsac opinion reserved the "important
ingredient" test for cases in which the alleged infringer might still prove that
the design in question was "primarily functional" even in the aesthetic
sense. 63 I In principle, this allowed the defendant some opportunity, on
remand, to show that consumers bought the luggage at issue principally
because they found its overall design aesthetically pleasing, and that the
. capacity of the design to identify some of the goods left them indifferent. 632
In reality, later decisions confirmed that the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in the LeSportsac decision of 1985, had "weakened if not eliminated" the last doctrinal barrier that prevented the transformation of section
43(a) into a judge-made design protection law. 633
2. The Most Protectionist Design Law of Them All

The magnitude of the changing judicial approach that LeSportsac consecrated becomes clear when one contrasts its bold thesis with the doctrinal
constraints courts had thought they labored under only a few years earlier.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
628. 725 E2d 18 (2d Cir. 1984).
629. LeSporlsac, 754 E2d at 77-78.
630. Id. at 77 (quoting Keene Corp. v. Paraftex Indus., Inc., 653 E2d 822,825 (3d Cir. 1981);
citing with approval Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 E2d 769,773 (9th
Cir. 1981». But see Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916
E2d 76 (2d Cir., 1990) (rehabilitating a modified test of aesthetic functionality); infra
note 721 and accompanying text.
631. LeSportsac, 754 E2d at 77-78; see, e.g., Villeroy & Bach, S.a.r.l. v. THC Sys., Inc., 10
US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2027 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding china pattern was aesthetically functional within space left by LeSportsac); see also Brown, supra note 32, at 1364-65.
632. LeSportsac, 754 E2d at 78.
633. See, e.g., Morex S.p.A. v. Design Inst. Am., Inc., 779 E2d 799,801 (2d Cir. 1985) (per
curiam) ("The Craig standard for functionality was implicitly rejected ... by our
decision in LeSportsac."); Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco,lnc., 618 E Supp. 273,
275 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd without opinion, 800 E2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that,
in LeSportsac, "the principle that an aesthetic design can be functional purely because
its aesthetic quality promotes sales was weakened, if not eliminated"); see also PAF
S.rJ. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 E Supp. 394, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). But see, e.g.,
Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 E2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990)
(finding that silverware design was aesthetically functional because the limited range
of adequate alternative designs hindered effective competition). ,'
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which had criticized the aesthetic functionality doctrine in 1981, still hesitated to protect a product configuration in federal unfair competition law out
of respect for the Supreme Court's Sears-Compeo decisions of 1964. 634
After LeSportsae, however, most federal appellate courts overcame any
residual inhibitions of this nature simply by treating the overall shape of a
product as its trade dress desFite the traditional view to the contrary. 635
This magical transformation63 then enabled these courts to rescue unpatented, noncopyrightable product configurations from the public domain on
the theory that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act implemented valid, congressionally approved federal policies of its own. 637
634. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981) (declining to protect design of outdoor "architectural luminaire" under Lanham Act § 43(a) because it
integrated form and function and Sears-Compeo were thought to govern); see also
Prufrock, Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986) (approving aesthetic functionality doctrine and stating that "if the trade dress is an important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product, it is clearly functional").
635. The following lines from LeSportsae were widely quoted or paraphrased: "Most trade
dress infringement actions involve the packaging or labeling of goods. Recently, however, we have recognized that the design of a product itself may function as its packaging, serving to distinguish it from other products, and hence be protectable trade dress
under § 43(a)." LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75. The following cases are representative:
Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,517 (lOth Cir. 1987); Vaughan Mfg.
Co. v. Brikam Int'I, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987); American Greetings
Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (3d Cir. 1986); M. Kramer
Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 n.25 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that trademark
infringement focuses on "one aspect of a product's 'image,'" while "trade dress
infringement focuses on 'the total image of plaintiff's product, package and advertising' " (quoting 1 1.T. McCARTHY, supra note 525, § 8.1, at 282-83».
636. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1358, 1361 n.91 (stating that the "distinction
between dress of goods (packaging and display) and the configuration of . . . useful
articles ... [is) vital"). The Third Circuit was candid in describing the legal fiction
being relied on:
Attempts to incorporate protection for a product's overall design or appearance into § 43(a) have come under a variety of guises. Some courts have
found an unregistered trademark in the product's trade dress. . .. Others
simply find that copying a product's overall trade dress or design is unfair
competition. Still others have found such copying to be trade dress infringement without attempting to link it to trademark infringement or designating it
a subcategory of uilfair competition.
American Greetings, 807 F.2d at 1140 n.2.
637. See generally Dratler, supra note 564, at 924-35 (taking a cautious view); supra notes
562-65 and accompanying text. On this theory, nothing inherently subordinated the
legitimate protection of trade dress in federal unfair competition law to the patent or
copyright laws. But see Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F. 2d 971, 977-78
(2d Cir. 1987) (warning that overly broad trademark protection could undermine the
objectives of the patent law and conflict with &ars-Compco); w.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene,
778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cu. 1985) (stressing danger of "a collision between section
43(a) and patent law"); Brown. supra note 32. at 1360-61 & n.91 (arguing that the
Supreme Court, in Sears-Compeo, had "pre-empted" product configurations from both
federal and state unfair competition laws because they interfered with the patent and
copyright laws and with free competition); see also Meyer. supra note 528. at lot
(overly broad trademark protection fails to separate goods from alleged mark and
encroaches on domain of copyright law).
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Equally revealing was the notion that the federal judiciary should help
to stimulate better industrial designs by scuttling the aesthetic functionality
doctrine. 638 Because statutory encouragement of industrial design fell to
the design patent law, the Second Circuit's willingness to stretch section
43(a) to protect commercial designs as trade dress implicitly criticized the
level of incentives that Congress had approved in 1976. By allowing section
43(a) to provide incentives beyond those available as positive legal rights,'
courts following the Second Circuit's lead cooperated in establishing a provisional regime of design protection that tried to compensate for the flawed
congressional outcome of 1976. 639

a. Functionality and the Multiplicity of Forms Revisited
The Second Circuit confirmed the deeper implications of LeSportsac in
subsequent decisions handed down between 1985 and the first half of 1990.
These decisions expanded the kinds of subject matter now eligible as
appearance trade dress to include the designs of a shelf unit, 640 of an orange
juice squeezer,641 a raincoat,642 and the bicycle rack denied copyright protection in Brandir. 643 Other federal appellate courts influenced by LeSponsac soon extended the mantle of section 43(a) beyond borderline literary and
artistic products, such as toy dolls,644 greeting cards,64s and magazine
638. See supra notes 613-18, 629-30 and accompanying text.
639. See, e.g., Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (contrasting public interest "in maintaining pleasing substitutes for known product brands"
with producer's interest "in protecting its products' design from infringement"); Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 518-19 (stressing emphasis of LeSportsac on "protecting a producer
who takes the initiative to develop innovative or imaginative designs to identify his
product" and avoidance of "disincentives to creative design"); infra notes 702-03 and
accompanying text.
640. Morex S.p.A. v. Design Inst. Am., Inc., 779 F.2d 799,801 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
641. Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 273, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
affd without opinion, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986).
642. Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974-75 (2d Cir. 1987) (conceding
that design of waterproof rain jacket was protectable trade dress unless barred by functionality doctrine).
643. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir. 1987)
("As to whether the [noncopyrightable] configuration of Brandir's bicycle rack can be
protected under . . . section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, ... we are reminded that the
design of a product itself may function as its packaging or protectable trade dress."
(citing LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75»; see supra text accompanying notes 451-75,515-16;
see also PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Jolly Good
Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Artemide S.p.A. v. Grandlite Design & Mfg. Co., 672 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). But this expansion of subject matter was not totally unlimited. See, e.g., Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F.
Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding house designs to be. inherently functional).
644. See, e.g., American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.
1986) (holding design of teddy bears protectable as trade dress against unprivileged
imitation if further evidence satisfied functionality test).
645. See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that unique
"feeling sensitive" line of greeting cards was protectable trade dress); Hartford House,
Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that line of greeting cards possessed combination of features protectable as trade dress).
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covers,646 in order to protect commercial designs of an increasingly functional or utilitarian nature. For example, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits,
respectively, found the external designs of a video game and of a medical
cart to be protectable trade dress within the purview of this provision. 647
. Various panels of the Seventh Circuit found the configuration and overall
designs of plastic stacking trays, folding picnic tables, insulated beverage
servers, and exercise bicycles all eligible, in principle, for protection as
unregistered trade dress,648 although there were second thoughts about the
exercise bicycle in 1989.649 The Ninth Circuit extended trade dress protection from the interior decor of a restaurant650 to cantilevered industrial
clamps that had been manufactured under a utility patent since the 1950s. 6S I
The Tenth Circuit protected the design of a fishing reel in 1987. 652
As the list of eligible subject matter encompassed ever more utilitarian
design features, only the nonfunctionality requirement kept the federal
trademark and unfair competition laws from protecting the very utility
models in disguise that have always posed such a challenge to the design patent law. 653 Indeed, one panel of the Second Circuit, led by Judge Newman,
and another panel of the Seventh Circuit, led by Judge Posner, expressly
646. See Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 E2d 800 (D.C. Cir. (987)
(holding that magazine cover was protected trade dress).
647. See Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad Inc., 864 E2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
design of medical carts to be protectable trade dress that was not infringed); M.
Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 E2d 421,447-50 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding design of
the glass panel and console of video game to be protectable trade dress that was
infringed).
648. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. III. (988) (holding
that design of exercise bicycle was protected trade dress and infringed), vacated and
remanded, 870 E2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that issues of confusion and functionality required further findings); Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118 (7th
Cir. (988) (holding that design of insulated beverage server was protectable trade dress
and infringed); Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 E2d 346 (7th Cir. (987)
(finding design of folding picnic table was protectable trade dress and infringed); W.T.
Rogers Co. v. Keene, 178 E 2d 334 (7th Cir. (985) (holding that configuration of plastic
stacking trays was, in principle, eligible for protection, and reversing and remanding
lower court's finding of functionality); see also Sun Prods. Group, Inc. v. B & E Sales
Co., 700 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mich. (988) (finding overall design and appearance of
foldable headrest, protected by utility patent, was nonfunctional trade dress "although
it greatly aided the product's sales").
649. See Schwinn Bicycle, 678 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. 1JI. 1988), vacated and remanded, 870
F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989); infra text accompanying notes 717-21.
650. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 E2d 837,841 (9th Cir. (987).
651. Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that design of
cantilevered "C" clamps was protectable, nonfunctional, and infringed, despite existence of expired utility patent).
652. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 E2d 513,516 (lOth Cir. (987) (holding that
particular configuration of "closed face spin-cast fishing reel" was protected as unregistered mark and infringed).
653. See supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text; Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 753 E2d 1019, 1025 (Fed. Cir. (985) (stating that "the right to copy
better working designs would, in due course, be stripped of all meaning if overall functional designs were accorded trademark protection because they included a few arbitrary and nonfunctional features").
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urged their colleagues not to vitiate the exclusionary power of the nonfunctionality doctrine at the expense of the patent law, which these jurists viewed
as supreme within its proper sphere of influence. 6s4 The LeSportsac manifesto thrust in the opposite direction, however, because it viewed utilitarian
functionality as excluding only superior or optimal design features and
because it emptied the aesthetic functionality doctrine of its former exclusionary power. 65S It followed that once complainants demonstrated secondary meaning, the functionality doctrine as thus reformulated no longer
disqualified the bulk of the highly functional des!fsns now eligible for longterm protection in federal unfair competition law. S6
The Second Circuit reached this very conclusion just after LeSpoTtsac,
when it reversed a lower court's finding of functionality in regard to the
design of a shelf unit,657 and again when it affirmed that a high-tech design
of an orange juice squeezer was not dictated by function. 658 In 1987, the
Second Circuit suggested that the 'same reasonin§ applied to the noncopyrightable design of the bicycle rack in Brandir6 9 because competitors
could market numerous other bicycle racks without copying that particular
form. 660 Outside the Second Circuit, the functionality barrier crumbled
after 1985 as other appellate courts influenced by LeSpoTtsac declined to
bar the designs of such objects as video games, plastic slacking letter tr~s,
folding picnic tables, insulated beverage servers, and industrial clamps. 1
654. See Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 976-78 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Even if
Stormy Clime were to have a patent on the use of horizontal shingled vents in rainjackets, it is unlikely that it would have such monopoly power as an unregistered trademark in the shingled look would provide."); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334,
338-39 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that functionality defense avoids collision between
§ 43(a) and patent law).
655. See supra notes 624-33 and accompanying text.
656. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1188-91 (7th Cir.
1989) (recognizing and criticizing this result); see also Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 518 (noting that both the Second and Ninth Circuits bad "redefined their interpretations of
functionality" and bad rejected explicitly or implicitly the per se exclusion of a product
feature that contributes to consumer appeal and marketability).
657. Morex S.p.A. v. Design Inst. Am., Inc., 779 F.2d 799, 801 (2d Cir. 1985).
658. See Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 273, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), affd without opinion, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986).
659. See supra text accompanying notes 515-16.
660. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber, Inc., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir. 1987).
By the same token, the Southern District of New York found that certain high-tech
designs of halogen desk lamps met the nonfunctionality requirement, even though their
overall configurations combined functional with nonfunctional elements. See PAF
S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Artemide S.p.A. v. Grandlite Design & Mfg. Co., 672 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In these cases, the presiding judges understood the LeSportsac standard as excluding only design features that
represented a superior enhancement of the use or purpose of the product, and they took
the availability of alternate marketable forms largely for granted. Bur see the Second
Circuit's recent decision in Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co.,
916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir., 1990) (finding that aesthetic functionality applied because alternative forms were not available).
661. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1989)
(finding design of industrial clamp nonfunctional despite expired utility patent); Ser-
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Sometimes an appellate panel neglected to consider functionality at
all, as if the issue no longer remained of much consequence. 662 More often,
courts went through the motions of applying the superior design test as
refined by LeSportsac, only to presume that competitors had alternate forms
at their disposal without copying a configuration said to have acquired secondary meaning. This presumption followed more or less automatically
from evidence that the alleged infringer intended to imitate the originator's
design and from his corresponding inability to circumstantiate any failed
attempts to.market a different design. 663
.
Courts in this frame of mind seldom considered the economic disabilities that might actually have prevented alleged infringers from trying to
design around a protected configuration. 664 For example, the LeSportsac
doctrine had stressed that courts should evaluate an originator's design as a
"total image" without disassembling it-into'its component parts for purposes
of the functionality analysis. 665 By manipulating this apparently innocuous
premise, later decisions resisted arguments suggesting that single components of a combination design might significantly enhance the utility of the
products embodying them or that such components might attain the status of
market standards owing to their popularity or efficiency or both. 666 A univice Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding
design of insulated beverage server not dictated by function); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit
Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,519-20 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding unique design of fishing reel
nonfunctional); Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding design of folding picnic table not functional because not "superior or
optimal in terms of engineering, economy of manufacture, or accommodation of utilitarian function or performance"); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421.
447-49 (4th Cir. 1986); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene. 778 F.2d 334.338-47 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that design of plastic stacking letter tray was not functional unless further evidence showed that its hexagonal shape had become intrinsic to the product and indis-t
pensable to competition).
.
662. See, e.g., Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d 421. This methodology resembled that of the Second
Circuit's first Warner Bros. decision in 1981. See supra notes 541-52 and accompanying
text.
663. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg., 870 F.2d at 516-17 (deeming commercially feasible alternatives
to be available despite expired utility patent); Service Ideas, 846 F.2d at 1123-24 (stating that defendant could have adopted other functional features instead of copying a
successful configuration); Brunswick. 832 F.2d at 520-21 & n.4 (finding that alternative
shapes appeared to be available. despite evidence that commerciai success of plaintiff's
design derived from utilitarian advantages); Vaughan Mfg., 814 F.2d at 350-51 (stressing that defendant "copied a successful product lock, stock and barrel" and that "(nJo
money was expended in determining which features were necessary to the function of
the product"); Hartford House Ud. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268. 1273-74
(10th Cir. 1988) (stressing infinite availability of alternative designs without imitating
"overall look" of protected designs).
664. A notable exception, however, was Judge Posner's opinion in w.T. Rogers. 778 F.2d 334;
see infra text accompanying notes 710-11.
665. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76-77. LeSportsac was followed in numerous cases including
CiLlmp Mfg., 870 F.2d 512; Hartford House, 846 F.2d 1268; Service Ideas., 846 F.2d
1118; Brunswick, 832 F.2d 513; Vaughan Mfg., 814 F.2d 346.
666. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg., 870 F.2d 512 (holding that although design of "single screwactu. ated pivoted clamp" was object of utility patent that had issued i~ 1955 and expired in
1972, and despite emphasis on utility features in advertising, the overall design was
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tarian approach similarly dissuaded courts from considering that certain
appearance designs embodied ideas, methods, concepts, or marketing
schemes that could constitute barriers to entry if monopolized along with the
more fanciful or decorative features. 667
.
At the limit, some courts precluded even the possibility of disqualifying product configurations on grounds of functionality unless the defendants could establish that effective competition required them slavishly to
imitate the designs in question. On this approach, "if the feature enables
the second comer simply to market his product more effectively, it is entitled
to protection.,,668 Even in more conservative jurisdictions, the notion that
defendants had a multiplicity of noninfringing forms at their disposal paradoxically constituted a more complete answer to the functionality defense in
the trade dress environment than it did in the design patent environment as
administered by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ..669
nonfunctional because defendant copied the whole configuration); Service Ideas, 846
F.2d at 1123 (design of insulated beverage server, unchanged for over thirty years, with
sales of some 2.5 million units, was object of expired design patent; held nonfunctional
trade dress when viewed as a combination of functional features constituting a protectable whole); Vaughan Mfg., 814 E2d 346. BUI see Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycle
Co., 870 F.2d 1176, 1191 (7th Cir. 1989) (criticizing judicial emphasis on failure to
research alternative designs or to conduct cost studies as flawed analysis because it
overlooks "the required ultimate question 9f whether [defendant] ... would be able to
'effectively' compete if it used an alternative design"), vacating and remanding 678 F.
Supp. 1336 (N.D. III. 1988); see also w.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 345-48 (questioning
whether design of plastic stacking letter tray had become market standard).
667. See. e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 E2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that overall
design of nonoccasion emotional greeting cards combined functional and nonfunctional features into protect able whole that could not be emulated); Brunswick, 832 F.2d
at 520-21 (holding that although plaintiff had developed concept of closed-face spincast fishing reel and had dominated market with unique product since 1954, his design
was nonfunctional when viewed as a whole, and it was "unnecessary for the district
court to perform a feature-by-feature functionality analysis"); Fuddruckers, Inc. v.
Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding interior decor of restaurant was nonfunctional trade dress when viewed as a whole, even though it included
functional elements); Vaughan Mfg., 814 F.2d at 348, 350 (finding design of folding picnic table was nonfunctional when viewed as a whole, despite plaintiffs dominant market position and noting competitors selling significantly different tables "continue to
comprise only a small portion of the market"). But cf. 17 U.S.C. § I02(b) (1988)
(excluding copyright protection of ideas, methods, and the like).
668. Brunswick, 832 E2d at 519 (fishing reel); see also Hartford House, 846 E2d at 1274
(defendant could "compete effectively without having to slavishly copy or imitate the
distinctive combination of features comprising plaintiff's line" of greeting cards); Service Ideas, 846 E2d at 1123-24 (involving an insulated beverage server); Vaughan Mfg.,
814 F.2d at 350 (stating that "[ilt strains the imagination to assert that someone designing such a table from scratch would ineluctably choose ... [the identical design features] or that one seeking to buy a folding picnic table would necessarily prefer such a
table over all others"). This approach followed in large part from a reading ofthe functionality requirement that excluded only superior, optimal, or "the best possible"
design solutions, in keeping with Morton-Norwich and LeSponsac. But see Schwinn
Bicycle, 870 E2d at 1189 (criticizing this methodology).
669. Compare authorities cited supra notes 663, 667-68 with authorities cited supra notes
269-302 (multiplicity of forms in context of design patent law). A parodox arises
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b. Secondary Considerations Without Nonobviousness

Not all courts took the same approach, to be sure, nor was it axiomatic
that every product configuration masquerading as trade dress would automatically benefit from a kid-gloved application of the nonfunctionality
requirement between 1985 and the first half of 1990. In fact, a number of
panels in different federal appellate jurisdictions continued to use the nonfunctionality test to deny or retard protection for sundry commercial
designs seeking a refuge from competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 670 One should remember, however, that nonprotection of product
configurations on grounds of functionality had been the norm, and not the
exception, until Morton-Norwich and LeSportsac undertook to reshape the
relevant legal methodology in the period 1982 to 1985. 611 What strikes the
investigator reviewing the post-LeSportsac decisions, therefore, is the rapidity with which a protectionist line gained ascendancy notwithstanding the
woolly doctrinal formulations it proclaimed672 and the solid pockets of
because the novelty and nonobviousness standards of patent law already eliminate most
candidate designs before the functionality test applies, whereas functionality and secondary meaning are the principal guardians against overprotection in regard to unregistered marks. Any radical lowering of the functionality standard in the latter milieu,
unless offset by a stiffening of the secondary meaning requirement, thus leads to a misappropriation rationale at the expense of the Competitive ethos. See infra text accompanying notes 702-05.
670. See. e.g., Wallace Int'I Silversmiths. Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1990); Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1189-91, discussed in infra text accompanying
notes 717-21; Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that design of synthetic animal heads was functional because critical features conferred
the actual benefit the consumer wanted to purchase as distinct from source identifying
features); Inverness Corp. v. Whitehall Laboratories, 819 F.2d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1987)
(remanding to determine if design of roll-on hair remover was functional); First Brands
Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381-83 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that yellowcoloured, F-shaped design of antifreeze container was functional); Stormy Clime Ltd.
v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1987); American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee
Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141-43 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding design of teddy bear with
"tummy graphics" could be functional; only clear labelling may be required, and neither standard configuration nor maIiceting method should be removed from public
domain); Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1986)
(finding weave and pattern of imported towel were functional; both utilitarian and
modified aesthetic functionality invoked); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods.
Co., 791 F.2d 423. 426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (deeming design of machine to make ice
shaving desserts probably functional, in dicta, because optimal in engineering sense
and changes would have economic or functional drawbacks); Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater.
781 F.2d 129, 133-35 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that interior design of restaurant was
"core concept" excluded by functionality doctrine); see also w.r. Rogers, 778 F.2d at
345-47, discussed in infra text accompanying notes 720-21, 754-63; Textron, Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1026-27 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding
that overall configuration of milling machine was functional, although curved design
of the column and ram could be protected as mark if inherently distinctive or if it had
acquired secondary meaning).
671. See supra text accompanying notes 572-633.
672. See. e.g .• Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 518 ("Despite their criticism of the 'important ingredient' formulation. neither court (i.e.. the Second and Ninth Circuitsl clearly stated a test
to be used for functionality. ").
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resistance it encountered. 673 Egged on by the fashionable commentaries,
the federal judiciary's basic attitude concerning unregistered product
configurations changed almost overnight from one that viewed imitation as
the lifeblood of commerce to one that stigmatized "unprivileged imitation"
as parasitical conduct leading to unhealthy market conditions. 674
In this protectionist atmosphere, the functionality test continued to
raise the same issues as before, issues not dissimilar from those that had
always vexed the design patent law. 675 Moreover, courts increasingly
addressed these issues in the trade dress environment by recourse to a multiplicity of forms test not unlike that which the Federal Circuit had employed
to revitalize the statutory design protection law. 676 As applied to design
patents, however, the multiplicity of forms test bore solely on the threshold
issue of functionality, in conjunction with the statutory requirement of ornamentation, while evidence of copying-as an important secondary factorbore solely on the issue of nonobviousness. 677 In other words, evidence that
alternate forms were available to produce comparable utilitarian yields and
evidence of copying by second comers helped design patent owners to withstand two independent threshold challenges, either of which might suffice to
invalidate the patent. Neither body of evidence necessarily determined the
outcome of particular design patent cases at the infringement stage because
highly functional designs still had to meet a stiffer standard of scrutiny,
including the "point of novelty" test, to determine if the protect able matter
had in fact been copied. 678
In the trade dress environment after 1985, in contrast, evidence of
copying tended in and of itself to determine the outcome of the multiplicity
of forms test, even though this test nominally controlled the level of the
functionality barrier. 679 In other words, fewer and fewer panels that per673. See supra note 670 and accompanying text.
674. Compare KeUogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. Ill, 122 (1938) (staling that
"[s)haring in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trademark is the exercise of a right possessed by aU") with International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 239-40 (stigmatizing wholesale appropriation of fruits of others' labors as
"endeavoring to reap where ... [one) has not sown"). See generally Brown, supra note
32, at 1341, 1386-95 ("Free Riders and Level Playing Fields"). For comparable tensions in foreign and international law, see Reichman, GKI'T Connection, supra note 50,
at 784-96.
675. See supra text accompanying notes 191-233,269-302.
676. See supra text accompanying notes 656-69.
677. See supra text accompanying notes 269-302.
678. See supra notes 303-18 and accompanying text; see also Winner Int'! Corp. v. Wolo
Mfg. Corp., 905 E2d 375 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
679. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1989)
(given copying, commercially feasible alternatives were deemed available despite
expired utility patent on clamp design); Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d
1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that while other forms were possible, "[a)U of the
evidence ... indicate[s) an intent to duplicate the external design of the plaintiff's
product"); Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 E2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1987)
(stressing the fact of copying while making no reference to the fact that a utility patent
on the picnic table at issue had expired). But see .. e.g., Woodsmith Publishing Co. v.
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ceived a taint of copying would actually apply the nonfunctionality requirement to narrow the protection afforded product configurations under section
43 (a), no matter how much courts professed to recognize the dangers of
overprotecting utilitarian features in the abstract. Moreover, evidence of
copying would increasingly determine the outcome of the trade dress cases
at the infringement stage, too, as courts swayed by the protectionist ethos of
LeSportsac weakened the collateral prerequisites still to be met once plaintiffs had surmounted a functionality challenge. 680
Evidence of commercial success or of large advertising expenditures,
for example, readily established secondary meaning without more,681 while
evidence of a failed negotiation sometimes played a similar role. 682 In such
cases, courts seldom required complainants to establish a nexus between
these factors and consumer identification of the design with a particular
manufacturing source. This left open the possibility that consumers simply
bought the product because they liked its design. 683
Moreover, evidence of copying frequently supported either a presumption that plaintiff's design had acquired secondary meaning684 or a pre-

680.
681.

682.

683.

684.

Meredith Corp., 904 E2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding features of magazine format
and mailer to be functional and in common use in industry).
See infra notes 681-701 and accompanying text; see also supra note 661 (citing cases).
See, e.g., Clamp Mfg., 870 F.2d at 517; Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
846 F.2d 1268, 1270, 1272 (lOth Cir. 1988); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d
421,448-49 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Reader's Digest v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821
F.2d 800, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Courts uniformly have held that evidence of substantial sales and promotion of a product tends to show that the trade dress of the product
has acquired secondary meaning."). For a common source, see LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at
78.
See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,516 (10th Cir. 1987) (failed
negotiations; issue of secondary meaning or distinctiveness not raised on appeal);
Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2a974, 977, 985 (11th Cir. 1986); LeSportsac, 754
F.2d at 78.
See, e.g., Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 618 E Supp. 273, 276 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd without opinion, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986), which stated as follows: "In
LeSportsac, the Second Circuit found that a company's proof of 'phenomenal sales success, substantial advertising expenditures, unsolicited media .coverage, requests for
third parties to license the use of its design and [defendant's] deliberate attempt to imitate its-trade dress' was sufficient evidence to support a preliminary injunction...."
Metro Kane, 618 F. Supp. at 276 (quoting LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78). Some panels
were more fastidious about such a nexus, however. See, e.g., Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia
Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that sales
success may show only that consumers wanted aesthetically pleasing: telephone, not
secondary meaning); First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d·1378, 1383 (9th
Cir. 1987) (insisting on nexus between advertising expenditure and "image advertising" that fosters source identification of trade dress); Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019: 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that advertising of
maChine tool did not focus attention on nonfunctional features of design as source identifiers).
See generally Bryant, Trademark Infringement: TIu! Irrelevance of Evidence of Copying
to Secondary Meaning, 83 Nw. U.L. Rev. 473 (I 989} According to Bryant, evidence of
copying may create either an irrebuttable presumption of secondary meaning or a
rebuttable presumption, or it m~y serve only as one factor in the proof of.infringement.

108

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 19

sumption that the defendant's design would confuse the relevant consumer
group, or at times both presumptions in concert. 685 These presumptions
followed from the simplifying premise that defendants would not have copied the designs at issue unless they wanted to trade on the originators' good
will,686 hence the copied designs must already have possessed secondary
meaning. 687 But this reasoning ignores other possible justifications for
copying appearance designs, including a second comer's need to satisfy
market demand or merely to engage in competition with a preexisting product. 688 It also masks a tautology if "secondary meaning is proven by the
defendant's intent to confuse the public, and . . . the defendant's intent to
confuse the public is proven by the secondary meaning found in the original
mark."689 Such a tautology then inclines courts to base the very existence
[d. at 487 (citing authorities). There is little consistency in applying these nuances,
however, and panels smitten with the LeSpoTlsac virus will tend to rely on evidence of
copying regardless of the strength of the formal presumption. See infra note 685 (citing cases). Moreover, the "evidentiary weight that courts give this inference corresponds to the court's interpretation of the ethical importance of copying." Bryant,
supra note 684, at 487. Hence, there are considerable inconsistencies even within single circuits that formally apply the same presumption. Compare, e.g., Blau Plumbing,
Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 610-11 (7th Cir. 1986) (declining to allow
copying to establish secondary meaning) with Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc.,
814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that "proof of intentional copying was probative . . . of secondary meaning").
685. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 513-14, 517-18 (9th Cir.
1989) (copying tacitly reinforced inference of secondary meaning after the fact and
expressly supported inference of likelihood of confusion); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's
B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that evidence of
deliberate copying was relevant to a determination of secondary meaning, but declining to shift burden to defendant because of copying); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800,804 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that secondary meaning
was shown by copying); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 n.241 (4th
Cir. 1986) (stating that proof of deliberate copying of video game design established
prima facie case of secondary meaning and supported presumption of likelihood of
confusion). But see Brown, supra note 32, at 1377 n.163 (criticizing this double inference); Bryant, supra note 684, at 495-511 (criticizing all use of copying to show secondary meaning).
686. See, e.g., Reader's Digest, 821 F.2d at 804; M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d at 448-49; Jolly
Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stressing that a
defendant was not to "piggy back on [plaintiff's] goods, reputation, or market share"
by means of intentional copying). But see, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles,
Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1183-85 & n.16 (7th Cir. 1989) (criticizing these presumptions);
Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 427-30 (5th Cir. 1986)
(finding that defendant was not cashing in on plaintiff's goodwill because copying permitted him to use interchangeable machine parts and to make repairs).
687. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 684, at 486,498 (,'The basis for this assumption is that no
producer would be motivated to copy a mark that does not have secondary meaning.
,This proposition is counterintuitive. ").
688. See, e.g., Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1553
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that attempt to capitalize on consumer demand for seethrough neon-lit telephone was licit absent strong evidence of secondary meaning).
MoreOver, the conduct of a defendant is irrelevant absent secondary meaning because
copying another's product is a right unless abrogated by positive law. See generally
Bryant, supra note 684, at 487-511; infra text accompanying notes 712-24.
689. Bryant, supra note 684, at 498-99.
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of source-identifying characteristics on a moral judgment about copying. 690
In some jurisdictions, courts were increasingly willing to dispense with
proof of secondary meaning altogether and to protect product
configurations deemed inherently distinctive. 691 While this practice could
be rationalized so long as the term trade dress retained its historical reference to packaging and container designs,692 use of the distinctiveness doctrine in the product configuration cases merely served to perfect a mystical
judicial transformation of one thing into its opposite. At step one, courts
converted product configurations into trade dress because "appearance. . .
may function as packaging.'>693 At step two, courts that accepted a distinctiveness test applied the lowest and most subjective standard of eligibility to
690. Id; see also P.J. KAuFMANN, supra note 50, at 12-13 (criticizing analogous moral evaluations in foreign law). In the Second Circuit, the tautology discussed in the text is further perfected by the notion that product designs may acquire instonl secondary meaning, or "secondary meaning in the making," which an alleged infringer's act of copying
had tortiously nipped in the bud. See, e.g., Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 313,315-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affdwithout opinion, 800
F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986); Jolly Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227, 230
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn MeAn Shoe Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (recognizing doctrine of secondary meaning in the making, though
not expressly approved by Second Circuit, because "defendants should not be entitled
to benefit from their speedy efforts to appropriate the goodwill plaintiff was in the precess of generating"). But see Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Thlecommunications Group, 900
F.2d 1546, 1548-49 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding this doctrine inconsistent with Lanham
Act § 43(a»; see also Pegram, supra note 532, at 351 (stating that trademark protection
of most new product configurations is unsatisfactory because secondary meaning takes
time to acquire and can be thwarted "without protection at the outset").
691. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Federal Circuits all appear to have embraced
the doctrine of "inherent distinctiveness" for these purposes, with varying degrees of
enthusiasm. See, e.g., Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256-57
(5th Cir. 1989); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,517 n.2 (10th Cir.
1987); Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974, 979 (lIth Cir. 1986), em. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 n.26 (4th Cir.
1986); Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604,608 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[i]f any of these cases stands for the broader proposition that secondary
meaning. must be shown even if the trade dress is a distinctive, identifying mark, then
we think they are wrong"). Jurisdictions reportedly requiring that a product
configuration or package have acquired secondary meaning for purposes of § 43(a)
include the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See Brunswick,
832 F.2d 513 (citing authorities); see also Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1550 & n.5 (limiting
distinctiveness to trademarks but requiring secondary meaning for trade dress under
§ 43(a». Moreover, the status of this issue in the Ninth Circuit remains uncertain.
See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir.
1987) (criticizing this doctrine but not resolving the issue).
692. See supra note 558 (citing cases); Brown, supra note 32, at 1378-80. Because the pool
of packaging and container designs is infinitely large, at least in theory, a wide range of
options allows a producer to appropriate a distinctive identity without unduly hindering competition. On this theory, secondary meaning had to be proved only if the dress
were not sufficiently distinctive. See, e.g., Blue Bell, 864 F.2d 1253; Blou Plumbing,
781 F.2d 604; Chevron Chern. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing, Inc.; 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir.
Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982). But see Cicena, 900 F.2d 1546.
693. Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. V. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986)
(citing Note, Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528, at 79); see also supra notes
621-23 and accompal"!yill8 text.
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product configurations that were ,patently constrained by functional
efficiency and market expectations. 69
Whether they settled for distinctiveness or required proof of secondary
meaning, courts imbued with the spirit of LeSportsac seldom allowed imitators to exculpate themselves by a demonstration that labelling or other measures could avoid a likelihood of confusion69s due to similarities of
design.696 Most panels, indeed, regarded intent to imitate as the critical
factor because it showed that a defendant meant to profit from the plaintiff's
good will and reputation. 697 Once this critical factor came into play, courts
694. See Brown, supra note 32, at 1380. Professor Brown wrote:
To say that the overall design of a useful article is "inherently distinctive" of a
particular source just by examining it ... substitutes an impression that the
design is outstanding, or eccentric, or clever ... for the proofs of association
with a source, gained in the marketplace, that add up to a showing of secondary meaning. Furthermore, such a short-cut subordinates the functionality
inquiry . . . indispensible in appraising a design.
Id. The fallacy was thus to apply the distinctiveness standard of eligibility reserved for
true trade dress to three-dimensional industrial designs, as if the pool of configurations
potentially available for any given product were as unlimited as the pool of packaging
and container designs potentially available for that same product.
695. Formally, a plaintiff had not made out a case for trade dress infringement until he had
shown "some 'likelihood of confusion' on the part of consumers as to the source of the
product" once he established that the trade dress was either inherently distinctive (in
some circuits only) or that it had acquired secondary meaning to consumers. See, e.g.,
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1I76, 1I83 n.14 (7th Cir. 1989).
The likelihood of confusion test examines the behavior of "ordinary purchasers purchasing in the ordinary manner." Id. at 1187 n.19.
696. See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837,846 & n.13 (9th
Cir. 1987); Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974,984 (lith Cir. 1986) (use of distinguishing word marks did not preclude a finding of actionable design similarity),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421,
448 n.24 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846
F.2d 1268 (lOth Cir. 1988) (holding that strong brand of defendant did not suffice to
offset confusingly similar line of nonoccasion greeting cards). On one view, indeed,
the confusion standard applicable to trade dress cases ought to be more encompassing
than that used for symbols protected as true trademarks, even though trade dress now
included three-dimensional prodUct configurations. This followed because § 43(a)
dealt with unfair competition, which was a body of law that reached "the total image of
plaintiffs product, package, and advertising" and not "merely one facet of plaintiff's
total selling image as in trademark law." I J.T. McCARl1fY, supra note 525, § 8:1, at
282-83.
697. See, e.g., Hartford House, 846 F.2d 1268; Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d
1118 (7th Cir. 1988); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir.
1987); Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d 837; Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'I,lnc., 814 F.2d 346
(7th Cir. 1987); M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d 421. However, a few courts, undeterred by
this philosophy, did allow for labelling and looked into the nature of, and reasons for,
specific acts of copying. See Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1184-88 & n.16 (refusing to
presume likelihood of confusion without application of "digits of confusion" test; noting that "labeling may be an important factual factor ... [in] a particular case and
may not, as a matter of law, be deemphasized merely because the element of secondary
meaning is established; and fearing the creation of a "product monopoly rather than the
protection of trade dress," especially if the product had been the first of its type on the
market). In some courts, labelling carried more weight if the design was viewed as a
"weak mark" or if the underlying goods were purchased by discriminating buyers.
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adjudicating actions for infringement of appearance trade dress would routinely issue temporary and permanent injunctions, much as copyright courts
would do if artistic property rights had been violated. 698 The federal appellate courts tended, in short, to eliminate all further possibility of confusing
similarity by prohibiting imitation as such, rather than imposing reasonable
measures to avoid the actual or probable confusion that was nominally the
crux of the matter.
In sum, evidence of commercial success, extensive advertising, copying, and failed negotiations often combined to truncate all further judicial
deliberations once courts began routinely to validate product configurations
as trade dress on grounds of nonfunctionality.699 Yet, these were the very
secondary considerations most likely to cement a finding of nonobviousness
for purposes of validating issued design patents. 7OO While these factors in
that legal subculture could yield a fourteen-year monopoly on very strict
conditions, the same factors operating in the trade dress milieu produced an
equally powerful monopoly, without any requirements of novelty or nonobviousness, that could last as long as the proprietor cared to defend it. 701
c. Misappropriation and Its Countervailing Tendencies

The patterns repeated in these cases demonstrate that most federal
courts applying section 43(a) to unpatented, noncopyrightable industrial
designs in the period 1985 to 1990 aimed to repress misappropriation as
such, in the spirit of International News Service v. Associated Press,702 and

698.

699.
700.
701.
702.

See, e.g., Blue Bell Bie-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1989); First
Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1384-85 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1987); SnoWizard, 791 F.2d at 428-29.
See, e.g., Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1270, 1274 (enjoining defendant from copying,
imitating or marketing greeting cards that reproduced plaintiff's "specific artistic
expression, in combination with other features to produce an overall ... look," and
stating that such protection did not conflict with the policy of copyright law); Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 524-25 (affirming injunction against imitating present or similar
configuration of fishing reel design .despite defendant's alterations to avoid confusion
and despite evidence that design enhanced function); Service Ideas, 846 F.2d at 1125;
and Vaughan Mfg., 814 F.2d at 351 (holding designs of beverage server and of folding
picnic table protected by trade-dress injunctions despite expired patents); see also
supra notc 697. However, some courts worried that overly broad injunctions could prevent a defendant from marketing functional as well as nonfunctional features of a given
configuration or design. See, e.g., Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904
F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1990) (magazine format not actionably similar despite evidence of
actual confusion); Inverness Corp. v. Whitehall Laboratories, 819 F.2d 48,51 (2d Cir.
1987); American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1144 (3d
Cir. 1986); Ambril, 805 F.2d at 990-92 (modifying overly broad injunction that
restricted use of royal blue color on ice cream wrapper).
See supra note 683 (quoting LeSponsac. 754 F.2d at 78).
See supra notes 151-70, 177-90,259-68 and aceompanyin,g text.
See supra notes 624,654 (quoting. Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971,
976-78 (2d Cir. 1987); infra text accompanying notes 729-33.
248 U.S. 215 (1918); see supra notes 548-49 and accompanying text.
Misappropriation is an ill-defined tort that provides relief when the intellectual
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not merely to prevent confusion in the marketplace due to similar, sourceidentifying features of trade dress. The net result, as one panel of the Seventh Circuit recently admitted with chagrin, is that "most of the plaintiff's
required proof for both trademark infringement and for preliminary injunction can be accomplished by simply filing suit and proving intentional copying. ,,703 As the decade drew to a close, moreover, the protectionist surge
that followed LeSportsac in 1985 showed few outward signs of abating. 704
Indeed, Professor Brown observed in 1987 that "li]f the flow of reported
decisions is any guide to the pace of activity in the real world, unfair competition law appears to be overtaking both copyright and design patent as a
source of protection for designs. ,,70S
Countervailing tendencies were nonetheless at work throughout the
period under review, both in the case law and the literature. Some courts
recognized, for example, that application of a weak functionality standard to
product configurations in keeping with the prevailing trend could end by
protecting the actual benefits that consumers expected to obtain from certain products as distinct from their source-identifying features. 706 Others
feared it had become too easy to remove ideas, themes, and core concepts

703.

704.

705.
706.

efforts of an individual are used by another. In International News Service v.
Associated Press the. . . Supreme Coon defined misappropriation as "endeavoring to reap where [one] has not sown." So defined. misappropriation swallows all other intellectual property doctrines and creates property rights
where none would otherwise exist. . . . The holding in INS is diametrically
opposed to that in Sears and Compco.
Meyer. supra note 528. at 88-89.92; see also Baird. supra note 549. at 412-15; Terry.
Unfair Competition and tlu: Misappropriation of a Competitor's Trade Values. 51 Moll.
L. REV. 296. 319-22 (1988).
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles. Inc.• 870 F.2d 1176. 1184 n.16 (7th Cir. 1989).
This followed because evidence of a defendant's intent to imitate could give rise to a
nearly conclusive presumption of source confusion. often preceded by an equally
strong presumption of secondary meaning that was also premised on the fact of copying. See also supra notes 681-90 and accompanying text; Brown. supra note 32. at
1377 n.163 ("The coup de grace is to combine these inferences.... "). Preliminary
injunctions could then follow almost automatically because lack of an adequate remedy
at law and irreparable harm were themselves standard inferences to be drawn from evidence that a complainant would probably succeed in proving a likelihood of confusing
similarity at trial. See Schwinn Bicycle. 870 F.2d at 1184 n.16 (noting and criticizing
this phenomenon); supra notes 695-98 and accompanying text. Even the non-functionality requirement was at times indirectly satisfied by a presumption drawn from
evidence of copying. in the sense that a competitor's failure to seek alternate forms
actually determined how some courts applied the multiplicity of forms test and inhibited them from evaluating the larger public interest. See supra notes 697-98 and
accompanying text.
See. e.g .• 1. Gn.sON. supra note 538. § 2.13[1] (noting "a torrent of cases granting relief
on this ground" and stating that § 43(a) as applied to trade dress "has eclipsed state law
on the subject").
Brown, supra note 32, at 1357. For the view that this represents a positive rather than a
negative development, see generally Dratler, supra note 564; Franzosi. Unfair Competition. supra note 522.
See. e.g .• Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F. 2d at 1184 n. 16 (fearing creation of product monopoly); Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987); American Greet-
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from the public domain. 707 Still others rejected any indeterminate limitations on a competitor's fundamental right to imitate superior products708
and warned against undermining the patent law by indirectly pr~tecting
utilitarian advantages that did not satisfy the novelty and nonobviousness
standards. 709
In 1987, moreover, Landes and Posner published an economic analysis
of general trademark law that called into question the excesses of the product configuration cases. 710 Their findings confirmed and refined insights
concerning the limits of trademark protection for appearance designs that
Judge Posner had advanced in w.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene/II a 1985 decision
of the Seventh Circuit that LeSportsac had temporarily eclipsed. An article
by Professor Brown, also published in 1987, reminded the relevant legal
community that decisions sounding in misappropriation rested on shaky
legal and economic foundations in United States law.712
These countervailing pressures gave rise, in 1989, to two judicial pronouncements of capital importance for future developments in this field. In
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,713 the United States Supreme
Court invalidated state plugmold statutes on the grounds that they unduly
interfered with the federal patent law. In so doing, the Supreme Court again
rejected the misappropriation rationale of International News Service and
appeared to invest a competitor's right to reverse engineer unpatented prod-

707.

708.

709.

710.

711.
712.
713.

ings corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); see also supra note
670 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Co., 904 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1990)
(finding method and style of doing business not protectable); Prufrack Ltd., Inc. v.
Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 134 (8th Cir. 1986)(holding chosen theme or concept not protectable trade dress); see also First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1987) (finding shape was industry standard); American Greetings, 807 F.2d at 1145
(holding standard configurations and marketing methods not protectable).
See, e.g., Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Thlecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1551 &
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that § 43(a), at least prior to its amendment, does not
protect skilled efforts as such); Thxtron, Inc. v. United States Infl1rade Comm'n, 753
F.2d 1019~ 1024-25 (Fed. Cir. 1985); infra notes 717-21 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971,977-78, (2d Cir. 1987)
(noting that trade dress protection of product design can bar entry to markets not foreclosed by patents, and stressing monopoly power of unregistered trademark); Standard
Thrry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778, 781, 7% (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that
judicial disapprobation of copying must give way to public policy favoring competition
in regard to unpatentable products); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co.,
791 F.2d 423,426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986); supra note 670 and accompanying text.
See Landes & Posner, 7rademarlc Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 265,
297-306 (1987); see also Bryant, supra note 684; Denicola, Institutional Publicity
Rights: An Analysis of the Mercluzndizing of Famous 7rade Symbols, 7S TRADEMARK
RER 41, 44-61 (1985); Note, Promotional Goods and the FUllCtionality Doctrine: An
Economic Model of Trademarlcs, 63 TEX. L. Rev. 639,656-69 (1984).
778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
See generally Brown, supra note 32; see also Meyer. supra note 528, at 88-92.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding state laws
forbidding unauthorized reproduction of product configurations by direct molding process unconstitutional under Sears-Compco).
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ucts with constitutional underpinnings. 714 Flatly declaring that the legitimate concern of unfair competition law lay in "protecting consumers from
confusion as to source. . . not [in] the protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation,'o7JS the Court cited Professor Brown's 1987 article and reaffirmed the antiprotectionist mandate of Sears-Compeo with particular reference to industrial designs. 716
A few months later, in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc.,717 the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied economic analysis to the
design of an exercise bicycle and backed away from the protectionist line
identified with LeSportsac. 718 In a ground-breaking opinion, the panel
found that the "superior" or "optimal" design test derived from Morton-Norwich and LeSponsac had induced courts to exclude only the best possible
designs and to ignore real difficulties competitors might face in trying to
engineer around successful product configurations at a reasonable cost. 719
The Schwinn Bicycle panel, like its predecessor in W. T. Rogers, 720 advocated
the retention of a modified aesthetic functionality test capable of excluding
designs that became market standards or that were so much valued for their
own sake that effective competition could not occur without product simulation.721
.
Although one cannot foresee the future impact of these decisions with
any degree of certainty, they add to a growing reaffirmation of the fundamental principle that allows competitors to copy all products not qualifying
as "inventions" or "literary and artistic works."722 Whether the raw com714.
715.
716.
717.
718.

719.

720.
721.

722.

Id. at 159-64; see Wiley, supra note 537, at 301-02.
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 159-68.
870 R2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. (vacating preliminary injunction protecting design of exercise bicycle as trade dress
because fact of copying did not support presumption of likelihood of confusion and
modified aesthetic functionality test should have been applied); see also W.T. Rogers
Co. v. Keene, 778 R2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985) (followed in Schwinn Bicycle, 870 R2d 1176);
supra notes 710-11 and accompanying text.
.
See Schwinn Bicycle, 870 R2d at 1189-90; Bloomfield Indus. v. Stewart Sandwiches,
Inc., 716 R Supp. 380 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (applying Schwinn Bicycle to exclude look-alike
design of coffeemaker); see also Sno-Wizard Mfg., Co. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 R2d
423 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that evidence suggested that design of machine was the
most effective, practical, and cost-effective, so that other designs would have economic
or functional·draw-backs).
778 RZd 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
See Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1191; WT. Rogers, 778 R2d at 346-47. For the most
recent case, see Wallace Int'. Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 R2d 76
(2d Cir. 1990); cf Estabilimento Miliardi-Zanova S.r.L. v. Cassina, at 453 (Court of
App., florence, Italy, Feb. 4, 1989) (rejecting claim for unfair competition, holding that
defendant's minor variations on the LeCorbusier chair designs were either sufficient to
identify it as the source of manufacture or were tbe only variations it could have made
without compromising the value of the unpatented models), discussed in supra note
380 ..
See Bonito BoalS, 489 U.S. at 163-68 (reaffirming the right of competitors to reproduce
unpatented, noncopyrightable designs, and declaring that Congress had decided to
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petitive mandate institutionalized in this historical dichotomy infallibly promotes the public welfare under modern economic conditions remains open
to doubt.723 Even so, Bonito Boats and Schwinn Bicycle may well prefigure
yet another swing of the pendulum away from the misappropriation rationale of International News Service and LeSportsac back to the free-market
ethos of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. and Sears-Compco.724 Scholars
and practitioners seeking to ascertain the status of design protection law in
the United States will therefore need to test the trade-dress waters at frequent intervals in order to determine if the floodgates of protection thrown
open in the 1980s are not abruptly to close before the 1990s get very far
under way.
3. Critical Evaluation of Current Law
The fiction that product configurations are just another form of trade
dress leads to the odd conclusion that every product comes equipped with at
least two trade dresses for purposes of section 43(a). One comprises the
exterior shell or three-dimensional form that houses whatever else the product consists of, known today as "appearance trade dress." The other comprises the package or container placed around the product when sold or
transported from one place to another, which is what trade dress signified in
the past. 72S
.
.
Some courts and commentators who favor this result fear that a tenuous
distinction between "trade dress" and "trademarks" could allow different
legal rights to flow fro~ mere differences in labels.726 While this concern
is valid in a narrow, technical sense, it ignores that product configurations
traditionally received only marginal protection in unfair competition law
because positive intellectual property law ordained that unpatented, non-

723.
724.
725.
726.

leave industrial designs unprotected); Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1184 n.16 (criticizing presumptions rooted in copying that result in product monopoly); id. at 1189-90
(rejecting optimal design test of utilitarian functionality and focusing on whether features are costly to design around or to do without); id. at 1191-92 (affirming modified
aesthetic functionality test based on existence of competitive alternatives and insisting
that trade dress protection must never prevent effective competition); see also Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Co., 904 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting theory of
trade dress in the making); Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900
F.2d 1546, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (disapproving theory of secondary meaning in the
making, and stressing that § 43(a) as originally enacted does not protect skilled
efforts). But see Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1550 n.7 (hinting in dicta that "the substantial
amendments made to § 43(a) by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 changed the
scope of protection" to reach deliberate copying as such).
See, e.g., Wiley, supra DOte 537, at 296-302; Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra
note 23, at 648-62 ("New Directions in Legal Protection of Industrial Know-How");
infra text accompanying notes 866-972.
See supra notes 527-29, 549 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 556-63,635-36 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604,608 (7th Cir. 1986).
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copyrightable "industrial designs" should compete on the open market. 727
If substantive rights ought not to depend on mere labels, then calling product configurations "appearance trade dress" will not make them any the less
product configurations. Nor should it automatically entitle them to the generous modalities of protection afforded packaging and container designs in
recent years.728 The question is not whether trade dress should be assimilated to trademarks. It is how to protect product configurations-that is to
say, three-dimensional designs of useful articles-within a federal intellectual property system that has been artificially carved up into semi-autonomous subcultures each at war with the others.
In this connection, one hears too much loose talk about protecting the
good wilJ129 associated with product configurations under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act. 73o Although a manufacturer's advantageous relations
with the public are to some extent symbolized by his mark, a property right
in the mark protects good will only insofar as it excludes others from drawing on the information it provides, but not from using the qualities or features of the underlying product. 731 So long as both Congress and the
Supreme Court continue to regard the broad misappropriation doctrine of
International News Service as inconsistent with free-market principles,732 it
727. See supra notes 28-37,713-16 and accompanying text; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,157-68 (1989).
728. The turning point was apparently Chevron Chern. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups,
Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), which Professor McCarthy believes
"brought trade dress cases into the mainstream of trademark law." I 1.T. McCAIrrHY,
supra note 525, at 287.
729. Broadly conceived, good will results from a manufacturer's investment of time, money
and skill, and it encompasses most of the factors that fan consumer demand for given
products or services. See, e.g., 3 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 1677-78, 1705-06 (stressing that a competitor's improper conduct may disrupt advantageous business relations
built on goodwill without direct harm to the consuming public); Dratler, supra note
564, at 927 & n.212 (designating protection of goodwill as the least important purpose
of trademark law).
730. See, e.g., Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844,854 n.14
(1982) (stating that "by applying a trademark to goods produced by one other than the
trademark's owner, the infringer deprives the owner of the good will which he has spent
energy, time, and money to obtain"); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 678 F.
Supp. 1336, 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (declaring that, even without a showing of secondary
meaning, the competitor should not be allowed to "cash in" on the plaintiff's good will
in the design of an exercise bicycle), vacated, 870 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989); see also
Jolly Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (defendant not
to "piggyback on [plaintiff's] goods, reputation, or market share").
731. See, e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note 1, at 967-68; Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at
268-75.
732. See supra notes 527-28, 546-49 and accompanying text; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (reconfirming that patent system "embodied
a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are . . . the very lifeblood of a competitive
economy"); see also P.J. KAuFMANN, supra note 50, at 4-5 (criticizing a "quasi-patent"
analysis that allows the goodwill in an imitated product to be protected as such). But
see, e.g., R. CALLMAN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR CoMPETITION 33 (L. Altman 4th ed. 1981)
("If the copyist rival is permitted to ride 'piggy-back' into the market on the shoulders
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is not the province of trademark and unfair competition laws to protect
investment as such, nor indirectly to protect design concepts, ideas, methods, principles, and marketing strategies. 733
Trademarks serve to distinguish the go~ds or services of single firms
from those of other firms. 734 By protecting the signs and symbols used to
make these distinctions, trademark law reduces the search costs to consumers,735 stimulates manufacturers to "maintain a consistent quality over time
and across consumers, ..736 and discourages conduct tending to deceive or
confuse consumers. 737 That there are sound economic justifications for
securing property rights in trademarks 738 does not mean that courts should
use trademark law to stimulate innovation or to provide incentives for product development that derogate from the norms of competition. 739 The
opposite is true, as Stephen Ladas pointed out,74O because trademark law
lacks the limitations and safeguards that positive intellectual property law
establishes in order to balance the long-term public interest against shortterm restraints on trade. 74 1 To the extent that trademark and unfair competition laws attempt to remedy the perceived inadequacies of other legal disci-

733.

734.
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.

740.
741.

of one who has legitimately sown, the classical injunction against the reaping of another's harvest is violated."); see also Reichman, GAlT Connection, supra note 50, at
780-96 ("Imitation as a Paradox of International Economic Law").
See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. Ill, 122 (1938). The Court stated:
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the article known
as "Shredded Wheat," and thus is sharing in a market which was created by
the skill and judgment of plaintiff's predecessor ... [as] extended by vast
expenditures in advertising. . . . But that is not unfair. Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right
possessed by all-and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is
deeply interested.
.
Id.; see Brown, supra note 32, at 1357-58 (stressing that product simulation is legal
right absent tortious acts of confusion or deception); see also Wiley, supra note 537, at
292-93 (reading Bonilo BoalS as inhibiting judicial use of trademark law to encourage
innovation).
See, e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note 1, at 967; Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 268.
Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 269-70,275.
Id. at 269.
See, e.g., B. PATIISHALL & D. HILUARD, UNFAIR CoMPETITION AND UNFAIR TRADE
PR ArrtCES 5 (1985); 2 s. LADAS, supra note 1, at 967; Oddi, supra note 550, at 926-27.
See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 268-84. According to Ladas, "competition is not possible if the purchasing public cannot distinguish the competing goods
and have a chance to choose among them." 2 S. LADAS, supra note 1, at 968.
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (recognizing the creation of" 'quasi-property rights' in communicative symbols" as a vehicle
for the protection of consumers but disavowing the use of unfair competition law "as an
incentive to product innovation" for the protection of producers).
See 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 967-68 (stating that although linked with patents for
purposes of the relevant international conventions, "trademark protection has none of
the elements of patent protection").
Id. "[N]or is there any theory of public property or public possession of trademarks as
there is in the case of inventions. . . . On the contrary, the public interest is that every
producer or trader should use different marks so that the public may be able to distinguish between them ... without being confused or deceived." Id. at 968.
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plines,742 they set up a competing forum capable of furnishing longer and
tougher forms of protection on softer conditions. 743 At the limit, unfair
competition law provides a ritual formula for suspending the rules of competition in favor of perpetual monopolies744 that are conferred on a hit-or-miss
basis for reasons that vary with the outlook of single judges. 74S
The recent erosion of the functionality standard applied to product
configurations under section 43(a) illustrates this disruptive· capacity. 746
Time and again case law and the literature postulate that arbitrary or fanciful trademarks are always available and that competitors never lack substitute symbols. 747 In reality, product configurations are most efficient when
they combine functional and aesthetic attributes into an indissoluble whole
that self-advertises the manufacturer and the product. 748 Such forms are
hardly limitless, however. When the utilitarian nonfunctionality standard
is unduly weakened in order to defend source-identifying aspects of these
configurations, second comers may have to engineer around either the
design as a whole or some of its constituent features in order to obtain comparable technical yields or even to gain entry into the market. 749
To avoid these anomalies, trademark and unfair competition laws must
require highly utilitarian~roduct designs to undergo stringent tests of eligibility and infringement. 7 If functional design features cannot realistically
be separated from aesthetic or distinctive features without loss of technical
efficiency or output, no amount of secondary meaning should oblige a sec742. See, e.g., Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 661-67.
743. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 528, at 111-12; Pegram, supra note 532,:at 349-51. But
see Dratler, supra note 564, at 975 (contending that "trademark law can accommodate
protection of industrial design with the congressional mandate for free and robust competition").
744. See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 532, at 348-49; supra note 624.
745. See, e.g., van Nieuwenhoven Helbach, supra note 522, at 7 (referring to Netherlands
law).
746. See supra notes 653-69 and accompanying text.
747. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 274; supra notes 608-12 and accompanying text. But see, e.g., Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE LJ. 759, 760,
787-88 (1990) (criticizing barriers to entry sheltered by this doubtful premise).
748. See, e.g., van der Put & Komarnicki, Cooperation Between the Industrial Designer and
the Lawyer Within an Enterprise, in DEsIGN PRon:cnON, supra note 8, at 181-203;
Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 280-82. See generally 1. HESKETT,
supra note 493, at 127-44 ("Corporate Design and Product Identity").
749. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1188-89 (1989)
(stating that a "feature is functional if it is one that is costly to design around or do
without, rather than one that is costly to have," and suggesting that a second comer
might have tQ duplicate aspects of the appearance of an exercise bicycle in order to
duplicate its utilitarian features); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene. 778 F.2d 334, 339-40 (7th
Cir. 1985); Landes & Posner. supra note 710. at 297; see also supra text accompanying
notes 196-210, 269-302 (discussing nonprotection of utility models in United States
intellectual property law).
750. Utilitarian designs, for example, should never qualify as unregistered marks without
evidence of strong secondary meaning, and a defendant's intent to copy is irrelevant to
this determination. See, e.g., Bryant. supra note 684, at 510-11; Duft, supra note 550,
at 184-93.201-03.
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ond comer to engineer around the ensemble in order to compete effectively. 75 I To reduce this risk, courts should demand correspondingly
stronger evidence of secondary meaning and probable .confusion when evaluating very functional designs at the infringement stage. They should also
insist that the elements said to foster confusion actually pertain to protectable components of the design and not to components that bear on functional yields or standardized results. 752 In principle, courts should prefer
remedies that are the .least disruptive of normal market forces, especially
that of corrective labelling, rather than injunctive relief. 753
Even when the appearance design of a useful article meets stiff
requirements of secondary meaning754 and of utilitarian nonfunctionality,
and there is a real likelihood of confusion, the design should not qualify as
an unregistered mark if it becomes an intrinsic part of the product in the
minds of the purchasing public; or if it attains the status of a market standard for goods of a particular class; or if its popularity as a product design
significantly outweighs its source-identifying capability within the relevant
consumer group.755 Over time, commercial success can render any sourceidentifying appearance design quasi-generic because of its popular association with a product rather than a producer.756 Such features become "aes751. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164 (1989)
("Where an item in general circulation is unprotected by patent, '[r]eproduction of a
functional attribute is legitimate competitive activity.' " (quoting Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982) (White, J., concurring in
result»; see also Pegram, supra note 532, at 350 (stating that Bonito Boats appears not
to adopt the methodology of Morton-Norwich in this dicta).
752. See, e.g., Bloomfield Indus., Div. of Specialty Equip. Cos. v. Stewart Sandwiches, Inc.,
716 F. Supp. 380, 388 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (applying Schwinn Bicycle to deny a presumption of secondary meaning from direct copying because "all coffeemakers are similar
in design"); cf. supra text accompanying notes 303-18 (discussing parallel approach to
design patent$ in Federal Circuit).
753. See. e.g., Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d 1176.
754. See supra note 750. Even when appearance designs are not highly functional, courts
must nonetheless ensure that true·secondary meaning has been acquired over. and above
the popularity of the product, and they should ascertain that a nexus exists between
advertising or commercial success and source identification. See, e.g., Duft, supra
note 550, at 184-93, 201-03 (arguing for stiff standard of secondary meaning in regard
to commercially successful ornamental designs).
755. See. e.g .• Schwinn Bit:-ycle, 870 F.2d at 1190; W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334,
338, 340-48 (7th Cir. 1985). See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at
297-99.
756. See. e.g., Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1990) (finding "no difference between a claim ... [to] basic elements of decorative style on silverware and claims to generic names"); w.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 347-48
(comparing loss of trademark because consumers like it for its own sake rather than for
its informational content to loss of a brand name that becomes generic). Judge Posner
observed that the manufacturer remains free to brand his product with identity symbols
even if consumers can no longer look to the configuration for source identification. He
added that what the manufacturer "may fear of course is not the loss of an identifying
mark but the loss of a competitive advantage stemming from the exclusive possession
of a popular design"; yet, for that he "must seek the aid of the design-patent law, with
its stringent requirements and its 14-year limitation, and not the aid of the trademark
laws." [d. at 348.
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thetically functional" if second comers cannot compete effectively without
designing around them, which costs money, or if access to the market
becomes difficult unless copying is allowed, just as occurs in cases of utilitarian functionality.757
The aesthetic functionality doctrine inherited from the first Restatement of Torts, which excluded most commercially successful designs under
the "important ingredient" test, was undoubtedly a crude method of subordinating trademark and unfair competition laws to the sway of copyright
and design patent laws. 758 To vitiate the aesthetic functionality doctrine
without providing other means of restraining trademark law from disrupting
its sister legal subcultures is an even cruder response. One can agree that a
design need not be ugly to qualify as an unregistered mark759 without forgetting that trademark law protects industrial designs only insofar as they
provide information about the source of manufacture760 and do not become
"so important to the value of the product to consumers that continued . . .
protection would deprive them of competitive alternatives."761 A modified
aesthetic functionality doctrine thus provides a useful tool for restraining
the excesses of the trade dress approach,762 and it merits careful development in the future. 763
Neither a modified aesthetic functionality doctrine nor stringent application of other substantive prerequisites, however, will suffice to eradicate
757. See, e.g., id. at 347; Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 297-99 ("The concept of 'aesthetic' functionality gives recognition, highly appropriate from an economic
standpoint, to the fact that utility in an economic sense includes anything that makes a
good more valuable to consumers. . . . A problem arises only if the aesthetic feature
becomes an attribute of the product ... in the minds of consumers."); see also
RESTATEMENT (TmRO) OF UNFAIR CoMPImTION § 17 comment c (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1990) (stating that aesthetic functionality generally applies "only when objective evidence indicates a lack of adequate alternative designs").
758. See supra notes 550-51, 608-12 and accompanying text.
759. See, e.g., w.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 347 ("[A] producer does not lose a design trademark
just because the public finds it pleasing. . . ."); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754
F.2d 71, 76-78 (2d Cir. 1985).
760. See supra notes 733-41 and accompanying text; Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. fix-It,
Inc., 781 F.2d 604,609 (7th Cir. 1986).
761. w.r. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 347; see supra notes 755, 757; see also Meyer, supra note 528,
at 101 (discussing cases in which "it is impossible to separate the goods from the
alleged trademark" and "it is the 'trademark' that consumers want to purchase").
Meyer concludes that an "exclusive right to the mark then confers a monopoly ...
[that) precludes others from offering the same product. In that sense plaintiffs right in
. the valuable symbol is equivalent to a copyright." Id.
762. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1190-91 (remanding to determine whether
design of exercise bicycle had become "so attractive that trade dress protection
deprives consumers of competitive alternatives"); w.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 340, 342-43
(remanding to determine whether the hexagonal end panel was "common to the entire
product as evolved," i.e., to the molded plastic office stacking tray, or whether the
design was otherwise functional); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 299.
763. It is not clear, for example. why such a doctrine should be viewed as imposing a "heavy
burden" on a defendant, as the Schwinn Bicycle panel seemed to believe. See Schwinn
Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1190.
.

1989]

Design Protection and the New Thchnologies

121

the raw protectionist bias that threatens to transform section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act into a law&rQhibiting the misappropriation of three-dimensional industrial designs. 7 The Supreme Court's Bonito Boats decision thus
provides a timely reminder that it cannot be unfair, in principle, to make
free use of that which Congress has wisely or unwisely chosen to leave
unprotected. 765 Some observers expect this latter-day reaffirmation of
Sears-Compco to induce the federal judiciary to moderate protectionist sen.
timents rampant in the 1980s. 766
Yet, no evocation of liberal economic principles will make the design
problem go away or provide a solution worthy of the name. The risk,
indeed, is that unless Bonito Boats were followed by suitable legislative
action, it could merely replace a period of mounting overprotection with a
period of chronic underprotection in the name of nineteenth century economic principles that yield increasin~r unsatisfactory results when applied
to twentieth century technologies. 6 The nature of these oscillations
between states of over- and underprotection is more fully explored in the
final part of this Article. 768 For present purposes, one should recall that the
United States intellectual property authorities urged Congress to provide the
design industries with a sui generis legal regime built on modified copyright
principles, a scheme that was very nearly enacted in 1976. 769 The logical
and most expedient solution is to pass a similar law now, at a time when the
Supreme Court's Bonito Boats decision may have jeopardized recently
acquired rights. Unfortunately, this solution has been compromised by special interests seeking to transform the carefully worked out provisions of the
preexisting ornamental desi~n bill770 into a law that would protect functional designs of every kind 71 without requiring any appreciable creative.
764. See supra notes 702-05 and accompanying text.
765. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156 ("At the heart of Sears and Compeo is the conclusion that
the efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free
trade in publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions.").
766. See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 532, at 345-48; see also Wiley, supra note 537, at 289-94.
767. See, e.g., Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 652-67.
768. See infra text accompanying notes 811-972.
769. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text. See generally Reichman, Designs
Befnre 1976, supra note 17, at 1186-1200 ("Toward an American Regime of Sui
Generis Protection").
770. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1176 & n.169.
771. See H.R. 3499, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Moorhead Dill), reprinted in 38 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (DNA) 684-89 (Oct. 26, 1989) (proposing in § I(a) to protect "an original design of a useful article which makes the article attractive or distinct
in appearance to the purchasing or using public" and excluding in § 2 designs that are
not·original, that are staple or commonplace or that are "dictated solely by a utilitarian
function," and apparel designs) (emphasis supplied); H.R. 3017, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) (Gephart Dill), reprinted in 38 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (DNA) 348-54
(Aug. 3, 1989) (essentially the same as to coverage except that typeface designs are
included while some provision is made to limit the eligibility of automotive spare parts
in § 1002(4»; H.R. 902, IOlst Cong.,. 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (DNA) 359-68 (Feb. 16, 1989) (essentially the same but proposing to
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contribution. 772
As will be seen below, the legal status of functional designs cannot
rationally be severed from the drive to protect applied scientific know-how
in general,773 and no law purporting to regulate the one without addressing
the other deserves serious consideration. 774 In the long run, a satisfactory
solution to the puzzle of applied scientific know-how should determine the
nature of the protection afforded both functional and ornamental designs
within the framework of far-reaching adjustments to the world's intellectual
property system. 775 In the short run, however, tinkering with established
modalities of intellectual property law for the purpose of protecting functional designs that are neither aesthetically nor technically innovative constitutes an unprecedented assault on free-market principles,776 a solution
exclude typeface designs). The precise coverage obtained by allowing protection for
"two-dimensional or three-dimensional features of shape and surface" that make a useful article "attractive or distinct in appearance" is open to question, as is the thrust of
the common exclusion for functionality, which kicks in only when a candidate design is
"dictated solely by a utilitarian function." See, e.g., H.R. 3017, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ lool(a), 1002-03 (1989). It is clear, nevertheless, that by changing the nature of the
subject matter of protection from "ornamental designs" to "industrial designs," leading
supporters of these bills want them to protect nonpatentable functional designs, including automobile and tractor replacement parts. See, e.g., House Panel Looks at Impact
of Proposed Design Protection on Autoparts Market, 40 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 207 (June 28, 1990) (summarizing testimony before House Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice, June 20, 1990); infra
note 776; see also Brown, supra note 32, at 1399-1403 (analyzing and criticizing an
earlier version of these bills); Hearing on H.R. 1179, Protection of 1ndustrial Designs of
Useful Articles Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil liberties & the Admin. ofJustice of
the House Comm. of the Judiciary, looth Cong., 2d Sess. 153-64 (1988) [hereinafter
Design Protection Hearings 1988) (statement of Professor Ralph S. Brown, Yale University); id. at 57-65 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
772. See, e.g., H.R. 3017, Wist Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1001 (a), 1002-03 (1989) (requiring
originality in the sense of independent creation, excluding staple or commonplace
designs and designs dictated solely by function, and allowing substantial revisions of
commonplace or staple designs). The other bills, H.R. 3499 and H.R. 902 are the
same in this respect. Contrast the zero creativity standard of these bills with the relatively stiff standards of inventive height traditionally required of functional designs
under foreign utility model laws. See supra note 198 and accompanying text; see also
infra text accompanying notes 899-972. Another defect of the proposed design bills is
that their line of demarcation with trademarks is also murky and can be read to preserve the broad protection currently available under § 43(a). See, e.g., Brown, supra
note 32, at 1399-1400.
773. See infra text accompanying notes 866-900. See generally Reichman, Programs as
Know-How, supra note 23, at 661-67, 714-17.
774. The recently enacted unregistered design law in the United Kingdom, supra note 202,
only confirms the proposition sustained in the text. According to Fellner, this law was
really an effort to cut back on the exorbitant copyright protection of functional designs
that English couns developed in recent years. See Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note
46; see also infra notes 846, 947-63 and accompanying text.
775. See infra text accompanying notes 866-972.
776. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1399. Professor Brown observed: "The most vigorous support for it [i.e., the pending bill] came from original parts manufacturers....
[T)hey expect to ... register purely utilitarian objects on the strength of design gimmicks that make the article 'distinct in appearance' even if it will never be seen once it
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certain to be challenged in international trade forums 777 and likely to be
repealed once the country returned to its competitive senses.
A protectionist venture of this kind778 would only lengthen the list of
unsolved problems attributable to this unruly legal hybrid and discredit the
cause of design protection generally. What the present situation calls for,
instead, is prompt enactment of a law like the refined sui generis design
bill-meant to be "a model for the whole world,,779- that was so inogportunely deleted from the General Revision of Copyright Law in 1976. 78
III.

PREMISES FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF A
DISRUPTIVE LEGAL HYBRID

A. Cyclical Nature o/the Design Phenomenon in all Legal Environments

The recurring bouts of over- and underprotection depicted in the preceding pages recapitulate the chequered history of design protection law
abroad despite the long period in which American intellectual property law
was relatively isolated from continental influences. 78 1 On both sides of the
Atlantic, one discerns a cyclical pattern in the behavioral response of industrial design to different regulatory approaches. This pattern illuminates the
true nature of the design problem, and it suggests that no lasting international solution will emerge from parochial essays that ignore the lessons of
the past.
I. Pendular Swings in Domestic Law
The cyclical nature of the United States experience can best be illus-

777.

·778.

779.
780.

781.

is installed. . . . Now a fuel injector nozzle would get ten years' proteclion from copying just because it was distinct from other nozzles." Id.; see also Hearings on H.R.
3017 (Industrial Design Anti-Piracy Act of /989) and H.R. 3499 (The Design Protection
Act of 1989) Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (testimony
and statement of Professor 1.H. Reichman on Sept. 27, 1990).
Article XX(d) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exempts specific
forms of intellectual property from the normal disciplines imposed by the GAIT.
However, the terms of this exception are not infinitely expandable at the whim of particular countries, nor can the notion of "intellectual property" as a whole be defined without reference to some objective historical understanding of this institution. Otherwise,
intellectual property would become the label for an exception that swallowed the GATT
whole. See generally Reichman, GAIT Connection, supra note 50, at 831-36.
Moreover, the mandate for the Uruguay Round specifically calls on the negotiators "to
ensure that measures . . . to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves
become barriers to legitimate trade." See id. at 751 n.2.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1399 (calling the pending design bills "a bald piece
of protectionism, aimed . . . at the Japanese and other competitors in the replacement
parts market").
Fisher Address, supra note 16, at 211.
See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text; infra notes 918-34 and accompanying
text.
See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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trated by reference to certain lamp designs that marked turning points in the
relevant legal history.782 It was, for example, a set of lamps in the shape of
dancing figures that dramatically opened the domestic copyright law to
works of applied art in 1954,783 at a time when judicial hostility to desi~n
patents had rendered the statutory design law operationally ineffective. 84
But the Register's adoption of restrictive legal definitions of applied artnotably the criterion of scindibilta or sefarability78S-soon closed the copyright door to modem industrial art,78 and lamp designs not representing
traditional forms of sculpture were consequently left without any effective
protection under federal intellectual property law after 1958. 787
In this legislative vacuum, lamp manufacturers, like other design
industries, looked to state unfair competition laws for relief against free riders who appropriated innovative product configurations. 788 In fact, the
Sears-Compeo cases, which reached the Supreme Court in 1964, dealt with
nonrepresentational lamp designs that had obtained protection afainst copying under state laws rooted in the misappropriation rationale. 78 But when
the Supreme Court barred the states from treating slavish imitation as a discrete business tort,790 the pendulum thus swung brusquely away from incipient overprotection in state unfair competition law towards chronic underprotection in federal intellectual property law once again.791
While the intellectual property authorities sought legislative enactment
of a sui generis design law built on modified copyright principles,792 the
legal community responded to Sears-Compeo by pressing federal courts to
open copyright law to commercial designs notwithstanding administrative
782. The tendency of lamp designs to figure prominently in foreign jurisprudence adds to
the significance of these illustrations.
783. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
784. See supra notes 29-30, 68-77 and accompanying text.
785. See supra notes 332-48 and accompanying text.
786. See supra notes 339-42 and accompanying text.
787. See supra notes 28-32, 72-77, 339-42 and accompanying text. At that time, the notion
of a federal common law of unfair competition was still constrained by constitutional
limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts generally. See, e.g., 3 S. LADAS, supra
note I, at 1701-02 (discussing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938». The federal
appellate courts had not yet dared to move § 43(a) of the Lanham Act in this direction.
See generally Germain, supra note 534.
788. See Brown, Eligibility for CopyrighJ Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70
MINN. L. REV. 579,603-06 (1985) (hereinafter Brown, Eligibility).
789. See id. at 603-05; supra notes 527-29 and accompanying text. The Sears case dealt
with pole lamps and Compco concerned certain fluorescent lighting fixtures. Both
designs had been the subject of issued design patents that were judicially invalidated in
the course of infringement proceedings.
.
790. See supra notes 31-32, 528, 538 and accompanying text. Had state unfair competition
law been allowed to continue on its previous path, it would have instituted a highly protectionist era. This prospect alarmed the copyright authorities. See, e.g., Ringer, The
Case for Design Protection and the O'Mahoney Bill, 7 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 25,
29-30 (1959).
791. See supra notes 332-48 and accompanying text.
792. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
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regulations to the contrarfg.793 Beginning in the 1970s, some courts
acceded to these pressures, 94 a trend that culminated early in 1976 when a
federal district judge held that the streamlined shape of an outdoor parking
lamp qualified as a copyrightable work of applied art. 795 The low threshold
of originality characteristic of United States copyright law and the principle
of nondiscrimination that is deeply rooted in the domestic tradition thus
combined to produce full copyright protection for a growing number of
commercial designs of everyday objects, including this "high-tech" lamp
design, some twelve years after Sears-Compeo had ended the protection of
comparable designs in state unfair competition laws. 796 .
Congress repudiated this and similar decisions a few months later by
codifying the separability test for works of applied art'97 without, however,
enacting the proposed sui generis design law. 798 On the strength of this
codified criterion, a federal appellate court retroactively ejected the outdoor
parking lamp from copyright law in 1978,799 and the prospects for chronic
overprotection of industrial designs as copyrightable works of applied art
subsided once again. Given the past ineffectiveness of the design patent
law, indeed, the pendulum appeared to swing towards another period of
chronic underprotection in federal intellectual property law. 800
In reality, as the empirical evidence surveyed earlier in this Article has
shown, countervailing judicial strategies in the 1980s first checked and then
reversed the seemingly vulnerable legal status of industrial designs. One
influential appellate court tried to expand the availability of copyright protection by devising a more elastic interpretation of the separability criterion
itself, an experiment that now seems to have failed. 801 The new appellate
tribunal specializing in patent appeals has significantly increased the availability and effectiveness of design patent protection. 802 Above all,· the federal appellate courts generally have expanded the protection of product
configurations as "appearance trade dress" under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, with the result that its anticompetitive thrust may actually exceed
that of state unfair competition laws prior to the Sears-Compeo decisions of
1964. 803
793. See generally Reichman. Designs Before 1976. supra note 17, at 1223-49.
794. See id. nt 1238-49; supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
795. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer. 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), rev 'd. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.
1978); see also Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 198. 200-01 (E. D. Va. 1976)
(typeface design was artistic work). affd on other grounds. 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978)
(denying copyright).
796. See supra notes 19-20, 31-32 and accompanying text; Comment, Copyright Protection,
supra note 6; Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17. at 298-303 ("Excesses of
the Copyright Approach").
797. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
798. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
799. See Esquire, 591 F.2d 796; supra notes 369-73 and accompanying text.
800. See supra text accompanying notes 339-48.
801. See supra text accompanying notes 385-91.
802. See supra text accompanying notes 319-31.
803. See supra text accompanying notes 634-705.
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The full irony of this latest swing of the pendulum appears from two
decisions concerning modern designs of halogen desk lamps, imported from
Italy, that were handed down in 1987 and 1989, respectively.804 Under the
legislation currently in force, neither the ''Tizio'' nor the "Dove" lamps
qualified for hard protection on hard conditions for a period of fourteen
years in design patent law,805 nor could they have obtained soft protection on
soft conditions for a period of seventy-five to one hundred years in literary
and artistic property law. 806 A federal district court nonetheless protected
both high-tech designs against copying for an indefinite period of time as
nonfunctional appearance trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. 807 By 1989, in short, lamp designs like that denied copyright protection in 1978808 routinely obtained more than copyright law had to offer
under federal unfair competition law, even though Congress had refused to
grant similar designs even ten years of protection on modified copyright
principles in 1976!809
Whether industrial designs will continue to receive exorbitant protection in unfair competition law after the Supreme Court's Bonito Boats decision in 1989 remains an open question. 810 Either way, barring appropriate
legislative action, the prospects favor continued swings of the pendulum like
those that have characterized the treatment of industrial designs in domestic
law for the past forty years.
2. Under- and Overprotection in Foreign Law
Taken together, virtually all the industrialized countries have experienced the pattern depicted above in one form or another during the two hun804. Artemide S.p.A. v. Grandlite Design & Mfg. Co., 672 E Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(holding "Tizio" design of halogen desk lamp entitled to preliminary injunction
because commercial success, advertising, unsolicited media coverage and evidence of
deliberate copying established "sufficiently serious question of secondary meaning of
lamp's trade dress"); PAF S.r.I. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding "Dove" design of halogen desk lamp protected against copying as appearance
trade dress that had acquired secondary meaning and was not functional).
805. The "Tizio" lamp had been sold throughout the world and, since 1972, in the United
States, where it was the subject of a United States utility patent. The defendant had
apparently managed to design around the utility patent even though his product still
resembled the Tizio lamp in appearance. Artemide, 672 F. Supp. at 698. Had the manufacturer obtained an enforceable design patent in 1972 (there is no evidence that he
tried), it would have expired in 1986 at the latest. See 17 U.S.c. § 173 (1988). As·
regards the "Dove" lamp. it is not clear whether a design patent would have been
granted if sought, given the Tizio design as prior art, although the "Dove" design was
good enough to win numerous international awards. The defendant candidly testified
that "because no design patent had issued for the Dove, he thought he could sell the
Swan [i.e., his copy] freely." PAF, 712 F. Supp. at 399.
806. See supra text accompanying notes 412-75. But see supra text accompanying notes
360-68,385-91.
807. See supra note 804.
808. See supra notes 369-73 and accompanying text (discussing Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591
F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and other relevant decisions).
809. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
810. See supra notes 713-24 and accompanying text.
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dred year period in which the design problem has plagued world intellectual
property law. 811 Although the cyclical movement from underprotection to
overprotection and back to underprotection once again tends to occur at different velocities in different legal environments, comparative analysis shows
it to be a recurrinf behavioral characteristic of most developed intellectual
property systems. 12
a. Excesses of the Copyright Approach

-

Initially, the condition of underprotection stemmed from the assimilation of industrial designs to the full patent paradigm under the aegis of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.813 Few appearance designs satisfied the test of inventive height characteristic of this paradigm814 because most designers strive to produce recognizable variations on
known models or style trends and seldom take major steps beyond the prior
art. 815 Moreover, few commercial designers able to surmount this hurdle
could also satisfy the patent law's rigid novelty requirements, which usually
oblige inventors to file before testing the market on pain of forfeiture. 816
The strict substantive prerequisites and cumbersome procedures of patent
law thus made industrial designs the "foor relation" of both domestic and
international industrial property law. 81
The rigidity of the patent paradigm led the design industries in many
countries to seek copyright protection by emphasizing the artistic skills that
are but one ingredient of most successful product configurations. 818 Partisans of this approach premise the right to copyright protection on the claim
that industrial art is art while stressing that the copyright paradigm forbids
discrimination between various art forms on the basis of merit. 819 Because
811. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
812. See generally Reichman, Designs After 1976. supra note 17, at 366-82 (summarizing

813.
814.
815.
816.

817.
818.

819.

findings of the author's earlier comparative studies). The cyclical movement in France
occurred before that country converted to the unity of art position late in the 19th century. Since then, the situation has proved remarkably stable despite complaints about
chronic overprotection in copyright law. See supra note 500. The significance of this
relative stability is examined below. See infra text accompanying notes 900-69.
See G. BoDEN HAUSEN, supra note 109, at 86 (discussing current version of Paris Convention, supra note I, art. 5 quinquies); 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 827-40 (discussing
evolution of this provision).
See supra notes 97-109, 319-20 and accompanying text.
See. e.g., Oratler, supra note 564, at 892 (citing and quoting authorities); Crouwel, A
Designer's View of Plagiarism, in DEsIGN PROTECTION, supra note 8, at 155, 161-62
(stating that, to the designer, "[e]xamples exist to be further developed and copied").
See. e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 832.
Id. at 828; see also Benussi, supra note 8, at 61 (stating that "the widespread view that
designs are the 'poor relations' of the industrial property family, and of only limited
interest from a legal point of view, corresponds to an ever smaller degree with reality").
See, e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 833-36 ("An industrial designer, who must reconcile ... competing considerations, is ... part artist, part artisan, and more than a little engineer."); see also Dratler, supra note 564, at 891.
See, e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 831-32; Bougeard, Les origines equivoques de Ia
Loi de 1909: Des dessins et mode/es au dessin ou mode/es, in LES DEsSINS ET MOD~LES
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copyright laws everywhere accept low standards of originality and creativity (although seldom as low as those traditionally applied in the United
States),820 the bulk of all appearance designs become potentially eligible for
long-term protection on soft conditions once the door swings open In
response to such pressures. 821
The .mature copyright paradigm then perversely invests successful
designers with market opportunities that are denied to other creators of literary and artistic works. The powerful reproduction rights, strong remedies
and long duration of copyright law normally presuppose the existence of an
infinite range of variables through which acts of independent creation give
expression to the human personality in original works of authorship.822 In
regard to ornamental designs of useful articles, however, the range of variables actually available to would-be innovators is narrowed by an array of
external constraints.
For example, the designers' subjective inputs are conditioned by objective functional requirements and by the need to work within the style trend
prevailing for any given class of goods. 823 Other constraints include: standardization; the current emphasis on nonpersonalized, corporate design
solutions for mass-produced goods; a need to fulfill consumer expectations
concerning marketable designs of particular products;824 and the growing
reliance on human factors engineering, which uses psychological and sociological data to increase the sales appeal of certain products by rendering
them more "user friendly" to the relevant class of consumers. 825 These con-

820.
821.

822.
823.
824.

825.

EN QuESTION, supra note 8, at 9, 24-32; Cohen Jehoram, Specific Design Protection and
Copyright in Benelux and Dutch Law, in DEsIGN PRoTecnoN, supra note 8, at 21, 26
[hereinafter Cohen Jehoram, Specific Protection] (stating that for judges to evaluate the
aesthetic character of candidate designs is "an anathema to copyright").
See, e.g., Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 683-88; Ljungman, The
Scandanavian Approach in Design Protection-Aims and Outcome-in Comparison
with the New Benelux Legislation, in DEsIGN PROTECJ1ON, supra note 8, at 117, 123.
See, e.g., Finniss, The Theory of "Unity of Art" and the Protection of Designs and
Models in French Law, 46 1. PAl: OFF. SOC'y 615, 618-19 (1964). See generally PerotMorel, Specific Protection of Designs and Its Relation to Protection by Copyright in
French Law, in DEsiGN PRmccrION, supra note 8, at 45-46,56-65 [hereinafter PerotMorel, Specific Protection] (criticizing the extension of French copyright law to the
head of a grease gun, a light socket, an armchair devised to increase relaxation, and the
design of an umbrella, when no aesthetic effect was intended).
See, e.g., 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 26-31, 116-20.
See, e.g., id. at 76; van der Put & Komamicki, supra note 748; Crouwel, supra note
815. See generally J. HESKETT, supra note 493, at 127-44 ("Corporate Design and
Product Identity").
.
See, e.g., E. MANZINI, THE MATERIAL OF INVENTION 53-54 (1989) (stressing abstraction, immateriality, a multiplicity of parameters, and "the mass of knowledge ... that
[makes] design ... increasingly ... a collective activity"); see also StrunkmannMeister, Leistungsschutz und industrieform, 66 UFITA 63, 64-67 (1973); StrunkmannMeister, Systematische Betrachtungen zum Neuheitsbegriff und Geschmac/csmuste"echt,
58 UFITA 14, 14-16,20-23,36 (1970).
See, e.g., D. UGHANWA & M. BAKER, supra note 263, at 291; McCoy, Forward, in
DEsIGNS IN THE INRlRMATlON ENVIRONMENT 1, 5 (P. Whitney ed. 1985) (stating that
designers "must position themselves as the experts at humanizing the machine for their
users. . .. [T]he concept of human factors must be expanded [beyond the physical
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straints increase the likelihood that different designers will independently
arrive at similar results, and they determine the number of design solutions
that second comers must use in order to compete effectively on the relevant
market segments. 826
Given the incremental nature of most design innovation, the lack of any
obligation to specify copyrightable claims at the time protection arises, and
the restricted range of variations available to competitors who need to stay
within parameters set by the market, the classical defenses of copyright law
lose much of their bite. The first to introduce a commercially successful
design onto the market will try to stigmatize the competitors' posterior
designs as infringing copies merely because they partake of a general style
trend or of a common idea or of other fublic-domain matter, and these
harassing lawsuits are costly to defend. 8 7 Wary competitors sometimes
prefer to work around unprotectable design features rather than face the
threat of litigation. 828 Once litigation occurs, even the most laissez-faire
courts may incautiously erect barriers to entry around miniscule design variations that second comers should be able to avoid with equally miniscule
variations of their own. 829 The more industrial designers succeed in integrating form and function, moreover, the more likely it becomes that copyright owners can impose variations ostensibly pertaining to form that actually affect the capacity of third parties to imitate noncopyrightable functional components in a cost effective manner. 830
All the risks of overprotection that inhere in equating ornamental

826.

827.

828.
829.

830.

interface) to include the psychological, cognitive. and perceptual interface with the
user."); see also Moody. The Role of Industrial Design in the Development of New Science-Based Products, in DEsiGN POLICY. DEsIGN AND INDUSTRY 70, 73 (R. Langdon ed.
1984) (hereinafter DEsiGN POLICY); Curtis, Engineering Computer "Look and Feel":
User Interface Technology and Human Factors Engineering, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 51,
63-75 (1989).
See, e.g., Ljungman, supra note 820, at 123; Curtis, supra note 825, at 74-78 (stressing
limited number of ways to perform simple tasks, designer's aim to achieve most
effective method, and users' demand for consistency of design in computer software
packages); see also Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Applicalion Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1053-58, 1066-71 (1989).
See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905,910-11 (2dCir. 1980) (stating that "to extend copyrightability to miniscule variations would simply put a weapon
for harassment in the hands of mischievous copicrs"); L. Batlin & SOil, Inc. v. Snyder,
536 F.2d 486, 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (involving lawsuit sought to restrain
competitor from using public-domain matter, not just plaintiff's contribution), cerr.
denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); see also 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 66-71 (criticizing judicial tendency to protect nonoriginal subject matter, including "fundamental
design elements" lacking originality or expressive content, in fabric design cases); id.
at 78-80 (noting same tendency in regard to three-dimensional toys and dolls).
See, e.g., Drader, supra note 564, at 913-.16.
See generally Comment, Copyright Protection, supra note 6; cf Reichman, Programs as
Know-How, supra note 23, at 684-85; supra note 827. Most commercial designs will
lack the stamp of the creator's personality, which remains a key prerequisite of eligibility in foreign copyright laws. See, e.g., Ljungman. supra note 820. at 123.
See, e.g., P~rot-Morel, Specific Protection, supra note 821. at 56-60; cf Curtis, supra
note 825, at 76-78 (stressing subservience of aesthetic values to functional efficiency in
modem industrial design influenced by human factors engineering).
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designs of useful articles with original works of authorship are then compounded by the copyright owner's ability to restrict competition on the general products market and not just oJi the market for artistic objects. 831 This
phenomenon confronts the international intellectual property system with a
major theoretical anomaly, and it can easily disrupt the overall balance
between incentives to innovate and free competition that system aims to
mediate.

b. The Two-Market Conundrum
The mature copyright paradigm of the Berne Union countries, with its
low threshold of eligibility and its long duration, tends to reward authors and
artists more generously than would be the case if the goal of artistic property law were solely to stimulate a sufficient level of investment in the production and dissemination of creative works. 832 This generosity, which
exposes copyright law to the criticism of conservative economists,833
appears in turn to rest on two negative assumptions that tacitly underlie the
copyright and patent paradigms, respectively.834 The first assumption is
that the soft modalities of the domestic copyright laws will apply only to the
market for literary and artistic works as such and will not, for this reason,
disrupt the regulation of industrial property by the patent paradigm. 835
The second negative assumption is that all forms of industrial property that
fail to satisfy the strict prerequisites of domestic patent laws (or allied disciplines) should submit to free competition. 836
831. See, e.g., B. KAPL\N, supra note 6, at 55.
832. Foyer, Rapport de synthese. in OsJECTIF 1992. supra note 46. at 133-34 (stating that
copyright law. as applied to true literary and artistic works. is more concerned with the
recognition of creators' rights than with the protection of the investment in given types
of production); cf 1 P. GOLDSTEIN. supra note 28. at 6-8 (conceding that copyright law
gives more protection than incentive theory alone can justify).
833. See, e.g .• Breyer. The Uneasy Case/or Copyright: A Study o/Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARY. L. REV. 281 (1970); see also R. BENKO, PROTECl1NG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS-IssuES AND CoNTROVERSIES 19-25 (1987);
Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis 0/ Copyright Law. 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325
(1989) [hereinafter Landes & Posner. Copyright Law).
834. For the role of the negative assumptions discussed in the text in establishing a theoretical foundation for the protection of new technologies generally, see J.H. Reichman.
Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms (Nov. 30, 1989) (paper
presented to the Forum on Intellectual Property Issues in Software. Computer Science
and Technology Board. National Research Council. National Academy of Sciences.
Washington. D.C.) [hereinafter Reichman. Legal Hybrids).
835. See, e.g .• Baker v. Seiden, 101 U.S. 99. 103 (1879); Fisher Address, supra note 16, at
209 (stating that the copyright law. "with its long term and a whole series of different
formalities," was developed for totally different purposes from those of industrial production and should not be misapplied to the broad scope of American industry).
836. See Bonito Boats. Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156, 164 (I 989)(stating that the novelty and nonobviousness requirements of the federal patent law "provide the baseline of free competition upon which the patent system's incentive to creative effort depends"; adding that "Sears and CompeD protect more than the right of the
public to contemplate the abstract beauty of an otherwise unprotected intellectual crea-
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Treating designs of useful articles as copyrightable works of art subverts both of these negative economic premises. For example, adherents of
the unity of art thesis disregard the likelihood that the exclusive rights conferred on commercial designs as works of art will enable manufacturers to
control exploitation of the material sup~orts in which these designs subsequently become embodied as products. 37 Because products of routine innovation normally escape price competition only on the hard conditions of
patent law, the availability of copyright protection for industrial art undermines the proper operation of the patent system. 838 It is "precisely the
capacity·of ... applied art to compete in both the market for artistic works
and in the general products market that aggravates the design problem; no
facile invocation of general principles of copyright law will make this two.:.
market conundrum disappear. ,,839
The propensity of industrial designs to violate cardinal economic
premises underlying both the patent and copyright paradigms explains the
resistance to the unity of art doctrine and the destabilizing impact that doctrine continues to exert on the world's intellectual property system. A "twomarket conundrum" also explains the supposed paradox that results from
treating ornamental designs of useful articles less favorably than banal commercial paintings sold as home furnishings. 840 The falsity of the paradox
resides in the fact that sales of commercially successful paintings do not
affect the markets for the material supports in which they are embodied,
namely, the markets for canvas, petroleum, and wood products. In contrast, ornamental designs of useful articles, which typically begin life as
two-dimensional graphic works like any other commercial paintings, end by

837.

838.

839.

840.

tion-they assure its efficient reduction to practice and sale in the marketplace").
Trade secret, however, remains a valid option. Id. at 154-56; see also Brown, Eligibility. supra note 788, at 604-05.
See. e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 13 ("Industrial aesthetics, born under the sign of
the most ferocious competition, is devoted to purely commercial objectives.") (trans.);
Gaubiac, supra note 7, at 40-41 (stating that "the theory of the unity of art entails an
undermining of the [Copyright) Law ... and an alignment with the law of industrial
property" and noting that "industrial and commercial exploitation, the chief characteristic of designs and models, makes the [Copyright) Law ... hard to apply") (trans.).
See. e.g .. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156 (stating that "efficient operation of the federal
patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented
design and utilitarian conceptions"); Note, Protection/or the Artistic Aspects 0/ Articles
0/ Utility, 72 HARY. L. REV. 1520, 1526-27 (1959) (stressing evils of long-term protection for noninventive designs).
Reichman, Designs Be/ore 1976. supra note 17, at 1197. To say that a copyrighted
work of art is normally protected when transformed into a different artistic medium is
not a sufficient answer to questions concerning the desirability of encumbering trade on
the general products market simply because a given product also makes use of a copyrighted work. See also Foyer, supra note 832, at 138-42; Gaubiac, supra note 837.
See. e.g., Truijen, Industrial Design and the Design Law, in DEsiGN PROTECfION, supra
note 8, at 169-70. Because such paintings also serve a utilitarian purpose without forfeiting copyright protection, it can be argued that to exclude industrial designs from
copyright law violates the principle of nondiscrimination.
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driving the markets for, say, automobiles, refrigerators, and dental equipment. 841
Given this two-market conundrum, the economically undesirable
repercussions that ensue from treating commercial designs as copyrightable
works of applied art will vary with the extent to which domestic intellectual
property systems succumb to the claim to recognition as art. 842 As copyright protection for designs of useful articles expands, the disruptive effects
on the general products market induce countervailingg£ressures to restrict
the scope of protection acquired in the name of art. 3 As protection in
copyright law correspondingly contracts, pressures for recognition of industrial art as a legally,srotectable form of industrial property normally
increase once again. 8
Herein lies the perennial fascination with sui
generis design protection laws, which virtually all industrialized countries
(except the United States) have adopted and which many European Community countries have attempted to reform in recent years. 845 The trouble with
these laws, however, is that-with the possible exception of the United
Kingdom's new, unregistered design right846-they uniformly subject
industrial art to a modified patent-law paradigm. 847
841. See. e.g .• Fisher Address. supra note 16. at 286 (stating that the "appearance of the con-

842.

843.

844.

845.

846.

847.

tainer may turn out to be the single most important factor in the marketing, sale, and
distribution of the commodity"); see also Comment, Copyright Protection, supra note
6.
Contrast, e.g., the broad protection of ornamental designs under Belgian copyright law
from 1935 to 1975 with the limited protection afforded similar designs under Netherlands copyright law during the same period, notwithstanding the fact that neither country possessed a special design law at the time. See. e.g., Reichman, Designs After
1976. supra note 17, at 283-97 ("The Benelux Experience").
[d. The case of Belgium from 1935 to 1975 was a prime example. See. e.g .• Braun,
supra note 46, at 99-101.
For example, after the movement to bring commercial designs into international copyright law failed at the Brussels Conference to Revise the Berne Convention in 1948, the
sui generis design laws were assigned a new role. and reform legislation became widespread. The adoption of article 5 quinquies at the Lisbon Conference to Revise the
Paris Convention in 1958 confirmed this orientation. See Paris Convention, supra note
I, art. 5 quinquies; Reichman, Designs Before 1976. supra note 17, at 1164-67 (citing
authorities).
See 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 837-40; supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Copyright, Designs and Patent Act of 1988 [United Kingdom], supra note 202, Part
III, §§ 213-64. "Unregistered design right, or 'design right' as it is referred to by the
CDPA 1988, is a new hybrid concept which draws upon elements subsisting in copyright, registered designs and patents. Its purpose is to provide residual protection for
purely functional designs which do not appeal to the eye and thus do not qualify for
artistic copyright or for registration under the RDA (Registered Designs Act of 1949)."
R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 360. See also infra notes 948-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 8, 82-87 and accompanying text. Although the design law of the Federal Republic of Germany was designated a Design Copyright Law, it evolved the typical patent-like standards of eligibility while retaining a relatively soft form of protection. See supra notes 82, 87, 824 and accompanying text; Katzenberger, supra note
505, at 94-96 (stressing requirements of objective-relative novelty and of qualitative
originality that "must exceed the average skill of a designer in the field in question").
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c. Failings of the Modified Patent Approach

The typical sui generis design law streamlines some of the procedural
inconveniences of the full patent approach while softening its exclusionary
tests of eligibility and retaining the strict registration requirements characteristic of industrial property systems. 848 These tests of eligibility, usually
cast in terms of novelty and qualitative originality,849 disfavor small- and
medium-sized entrepreneurs who contribute the bulk of today's design innovation.
Unlike the largest firms, which develop a few product lines from
scratch,850 the smaller manufacturers launch myriad designs onto the market each year without knowing in advance which, if any, will capture the
public's fancy. In order to maximize protection while fulfilling the novelty
requirements of the special design laws, these producers would have to file
applications on their entire output. This in turn would oblige them to
absorb the costs of preparin elaborate claims as well as substantial publication and registration fees. 8S
I But when small- and medium-sized producers try to reduce transaction costs by selecting those creations that might
better justify such expenditures, they find that they cannot test market their
designs without a loss of novelty under the typical sui generis regime. 852
Once designers spend the sums needed to comply with the sui generis
laws, moreover, they often obtain a disappointingly low level of protection.
If the novelty test does not strike the design down owing to a premature disclosure or sale prior to filing, then stiff qualitative originality and nonfunctionality requirements ·as judicially interpreted in most countries will retroactivelr exclude a large part of the registered designs as unworthy of protection. 85 Proprietors who survive these formal and substantive challenges
848. See supra notes 8, 78-88, 847 and accompanying text. For recent liberalization of the
design law in the Federal Republic of Germany, see supra note 82 and accompanying
text. For atypical features of the French design law, which does not penalize disclosure
prior to registration, see supra note 81.
849. See supra'notes 87, 847 and accompanying text.
850. See infra note 857 and accompanying text.
851. See, e.g., Wibbens, supra note 84, at 258 (stating that "the formal registration requirements-to put it mildly-are intricate and cumbersome," and the "costs involved ...
are often excessively high for a self-employed designer [under the Uniform Benelux
Designs Law of 1975»"; see also Levin, Recent Developments, supra note 87, at 276
(discussing the Nordic Countries).
852. See, e.g., supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text. Japan, however, was an exception,
see supra note 82, as was France, see supra note 81. Other exceptions stem ming from
very recent legislation include the Federal Republic of Germany, see supra note 82, and
the United Kingdom, see supra note 846. The standard eligibility requirements convert most special design laws into legal instruments of primary interest to big firms.
See infra note 857.
853. See supra notes 87, 847 (citing and quoting authorities). For the surprisingly strict eligibility requirements in the Nordic Countries and the Federal Republic of Germany,
see, e.g., Levin, Recent Developments, supra note 87, at 276; Kruger, supra note 393, at
171-76; Katzenberger, supra note 505, at 94-96. But see Kunz-Hallstein, supra note
393, at 71-72 (suggesting that German courts have begun to relax the qualitative origi-
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then discover that courts everywhere seem psychologically unprepared to
protect design concepts against more than slavish imitation. 854
At their worst, the sui generis design laws operating on modified patent
principles either exclude the bulk of the designs they are nominally set in
place to protect or provide ineffective and costly protection against misappropriation8S5 of a kind that some countries make available-to varying
degrees and at various periods-in their laws of unfair competition at a
much lower cost. 856 At their best, the special design laws are of primary
interest to big firms prepared to spend large amounts on research and development, advertisinf' and the legal fees necessary to secure systematic
design protection. 8 7 In either case, the exclusion of commercial designs
from copyright law on a theory that the creators' needs are met by sui
generis design laws all too often turns out to be chimerical because existing
laws do not actually cover the bulk of today's design innovation for one reason or another.
The twice excluded designs are thus headed for the public domain,
with no certain refuge against free-riding imitations, unless their originators

854.

855.

856.

857.

nality standard that was judicially stiffened in 1968 and citing a recent decision allowing protection for the design of an automobile fender (1987 BGH GRUR 518
(Kortftugel)). While Italian law has consistently been more receptive, see supra note
87, the Benelux reform of 1975 sought to obviate the problems identified in the text by
holding to an objective novelty standard without demanding qualitative originality.
See, e.g., Uniform Benelux Designs Law, supra note 4, art. 4; A. BRAUN & J.J. EVRARD,
DRoiT DEs DEsSINS ET MODELES Au BENEUJX 22 (1975). However, the level of objective novelty readily drifts upward towards nonobviousness when it is the sole criterion
applied, as experience in the Federal Republic of Germany strikingly illustrated at an
earlier period. See, e.g., E. ULMER, supra note 393, at 149-50; Englert, The Law of
Industrial Designs in Germany-Actual State and Reform Proposals, 12 I.I.C. 773,
778-79 (1981). This was not, it seems, the intention of the Benelux drafters. See, e.g.,
Braun, Droit Benelux, in i>RarEGER LA FoRME 168, 169 (INPI ed. 1981). Nevertheless,
this "novelty prerequisite is strictly interpreted" in practice. Wibbens, supra note 84,
at 255, 258. For the uncertain eligibility standards in the United Kingdom under
either the registered or the unregistered design laws after 1988, see infra note 948 and
accompanying text.
See, e.g., Katzenberger, supra note 50S, at 94 (noting that design law of Federal Republic of Germany protects "only against copying and does not grant an exclusive right
against any use of the creation, such as that granted by industrial property rights");
Levin, Recent Developments. supra note 87, at 276-77 (discussing the Nordic Countries). See generally M.A. P£R01'-MOREL, LES PRINCIP£S, supra note 8, at 19.
The more functional the design, the more courts seem prone to exonerate copying.
See. e.g., Ljungman, supra note 820, at 124 (discussing Nordic law). If the nonfunctionality requirement is lowered to counteract this tendency, as occurred in Nordic law,
see id., courts seem likely to elevate the other substantive prerequisites. See, e.g.,
Levin. Recent Developments. supra note 87, at 276.
See Loi federale contre la concurrence deloyale du 19 decembre 1986 [Switzerland),
art. 5, effective Mar. I, 1988 (Federal Law on Unfair Competition of December 1986),
reprinted in 27 INDUS. PROP. (Laws & Treaties Supp. Sept. 1988); see also Probst, supra
note 524, at 108 (discussing this law).
See. e.g., Wibbens, supra note 84, at 258 (discussing Benelux countries). This
oligopolization of the design law appeared very pronounced in the Federal Republic of
Germany in the 1970s, to judge from at least one public survey. See generally B.
ENGLERT, supra note 82. For a detailed description of how one large firm operates in
this connection, see van der Put & Komarnicki. supra note 748.
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supplicate at the portals of unfair comrsetition law or attempt to re-enter
copyright law through the back door. 8 8 To the extent that some courts
respond to these supplications by stretching unfair competition law, they
undermine the policies behind the sui generis design laws and trigger new
forms of overprotection that are still more anticompetitive than the exclusive rights of copyright law. 859 Meanwhile, other courts may sooner or later
allow copyright law to rescue a few exceptional designs from the flood of
refugees, esr:cially if judges perceive their creators to be victims of unjust
enrichment. 60 The latest and most clamorous incident of this kind was the
decision of the ,Netherlands Supreme Court to allow copyright protection
under domestic law for a design that did not qualify for protection under the
Uniform Benelux Designs Law, notwithstanding the express anticumulation
clause inserted in the design law to avoid this very result. 861
Once a copyright tribunal agrees to admit some particularly creative
design, however, it becomes difficult for succeeding courts to justify treating one set of designs more sympathetically than the rest without byzantine
rationalizations that become increasingly arbitrary and protectionist over
time. 862 The zig-zag line of decisions certain to result from trying to distinguish copyrightable "works of applied art" from noncopyrightable "industrial designs" under the traditional criteria, and the subtle controversies this
breeds, then elicit demands for yet another experiment in full copyright protection of all commercial designs under the "unity of art" banner.863 When
this occurs, the cycle is ready to recommence, with no prospects of breaking out of the historical pattern on the horizon , 864 as the recent experience of
the Benelux countries so dramatically reconfirms. 865
858. See Reichman, Designs After 1976. supra note 17, at 371-72.
859. See. e.g., van Nieuwenhoven Helbach, supra note 522, at 6-8, 12-18 (referring to Netherlands law); supra text accompanying notes 734-45.
860. Compare. e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d
Cir. 1980) (fearing a result that "enables the commercial pirates of the marketplace to
appropriate for their own profit, without any cost to themselves, the work of talented
designers who enrich our lives with their intuition and skill") with id. at 999 (Wein-·
stein, I, dissenting) (seeing copying as a purely licit act of competition because "Congress and the Supreme Court had answered in favor of commerce and the masses rather
than the artists, designers, and the well-to-do").
861. See Braun, .~upra note 46, at 98-106 (discussing the ScreenoprinlS decision of May 22,
1987; model of sunscreen for automobiles, denied protection in design law tor lack of
novelty, was allowed protection in Netherlands copyright law, notwithstanding article
21 of the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, which limits copyright protection under
domestic laws to designs. having a "marked artistic character").
862. See, e.g., M.A. ~Ror-MoREL, LES PRINCIPES, supra note 8, at 42-45; Desbois, supra
note 7, at 74.
863. See Desbois, supra note 7, at 74; Braun, supra note 46, at 98-99; supra notes 502-05
and accompanying text.
864. Nevertheless, the "unity of art" regime in France has remained remaritably stable over
time despite its excessive level of protection. See supra note 812; Fran~on & PerotMorel, Conclusion, in LES OESSINS ET MODELES EN QuESTION, supra note 8. For the
significance of this stability in determining a valid future solution, see infra text
accompanying notes 899-972.
.
865. See supra note 861; BraUD, supra note 46, at 105-06 (concluding that, notwithstanding
article 21 of the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, supra note 4, the way is open for abu-
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From Industrial Design to the New Technologies

Most commentators still view design protection law as a marginal case
that does not challeng: the general soundness of the world's intellectual
property framework. 8 In retrospect, however, it appears more accurate to
view industrial design as a precursor of the many legal hybrids that world
intellectual property law would strive to accommodate in the last quarter of
the twentieth century.867 While a thorough analysis of this topic lies beyond
the scope of the present Article,868 it is instructive to identify the ways in
which neither industrial designs nOf the products of new technologies
behave in a manner consistent with the standard assumptions underlying the
international patent and copyright systems.
1. Incremental Innovation Bearing Know-How on Its Face
The bulk of today's most valuable innovations flow from incremental
improvements in applied scientific know-how. 869 Traditionally, unpatentable industrial know-how 87o remained exempt from free competition only so

866.

867.
868.
869.

870.

sive protection of designs and models in the Benelux copyright laws, which may once
again cover such objects as signboards. notepads. the head of a grease gun. and a
stool). For similar excesses in French law. see supra note 821.
See supra notes 813-17 and accompanying text. Compare. e.g., Braun & Evrard. supra
note 520 (discounting objections to modified patent protection of industrial art) with
Cohen Jehoram, Cumulative Protection. supra note 367 (discounting objections to full
copyright protection of industrial art); see also H. HUBMANN. URHEBER- UND
VERLAGSRECHT 35-40, 84-95 (4th ed. 1978) (assimilating the protection of industrial
designs to the protection of skilled efforts in general).
See Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23. at 655, 661-67.
See Reichman, Legal Hybrids. supra note 834.
See generally Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23. at 641-42,648-67,
714-18; see also Kingston, The "Thesis" Chapters (hereinafter Kingston. Thesis], in
DIRECT PROTECTION OF INNOVATION 1-123 (w. Kingston ed. 1987); F. MAGNIN, KNOWHow ET PRoPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE 14-22, 93-94, 38\-88 (1974) (emphasizing the distinctive phenomenology of know-how as a basis for its positive recogrution in international industrial property law); Kronz, Patent Protection for Innovations: A Model (pt.
1),7 E.I.P.R. 178 (1983).
See Reichman, Programs as Know-How. supra note 23, at 656, stating:
Broadly conceived, know-how encompasses the "totality of unpatented knowledge utilized in industry." It is not concerned with major principles or inventive ideas, but rather with "detailed innovation in industrial techniques" of a
practical nature that is often the "fruit of ... experience and trial and error."
The value of know-how is thus measured in terms of commercial superiority
and marketing advantages. It typically accrues from incremental improvements on some aspect of the existing state of an art and not from creative
activity that raises the level of an art as a whole. Because know-how includes
"techniques that are still at an experimental stage." ... it links the kinds of
basic and applied research normally carried out in academic and other nonindustrial institutions with industrial research and development.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see. e.g., 3 S. LAUo\S. supra note I. at 1617; F. DEssEMONTET.
THE LEGAL PRoTEcrION OF KNow-How IN THE UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA II. 16 (2d
ed. 1976); F. MACiNIN, supra note 869, at 14-22.93-94.381-88; Troller. The Legal Protection of Know-How: General Report, in THE PRarEcrION OF KNow-How IN 13 CouN.
TRIES 149, 150, 152 (H. Cohen lehoram ed. 1971).
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long as it was neither voluntarily disclosed. nor reverse engineered. 871
Because the task of reverse engineering took time and cost money, it
endowed innovators with a period of natural lead time in which to secure a
foothold in the market. 872
In contrast, much of today's most advanced technology enjoys a less
favorable competitive position than that of conventional machinery because
the unpatentable, intangible know-how responsible for its commercial value
becomes embodied in products that are distributed on the open market. A
product of the new technologies, such as a computer program or an integrated circuit design, or even a biogenetically altered organism may thus
bear its know-how on its face, a condition that renders it as vulnerable to
rapid appropriation by second comers as any published literary or artistic
work. 813
From this perspective, a major problem with the kinds of innovative
know-how underlying important new technologies is that they do not lend
themselves to secrecy even when they represent the fruit of enormous investment in research and development. 874 Because third parties can rapidly
duplicate the embodied information and offer virtually the same products at
lower prices than those of the originators, there is no secure interval of lead
time in which to recuperate the originators' initial investment or their losses
from unsuccessful essays, not to mention the goal of turning a profit. 875
When innovators turn to the world's intellectual property system for
relief, however, they find that its dominant paradigms are structured to pro871. See, e.g., 3 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 161 7, 1621. In this sense, know-how bears
affinities to trade secrets. F. DEsSEMONTET, supra note 870, at II, 18-20,33-48. But
see F. MAGNIN, supra note 869, at 113-16 (stressing the importance of differentiating
know-how from trade secrets). The line of demarcation between inventions and knowhow is correspondingly uncertain. See Troller, supra note 870, at 151-53, 156-57,
160-64.
872. In simpler days, a conventional manufacturer could "transfer the possession of a new
machine without transferring the know-how involved in manufacturing the machine,"
which would have to be reverse engineered. Galbi, Proposal for New Legislation to
Protect Computer Programming, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 280, 281 (1969). The
protection of traditional forms of industrial know-how is thus entrusted to contracts
and trade secret laws, which make acquisition of the pertinent knowledge unlawful only
when obtained by means that violate private agreements or that are generally forbidden
by law or are against public policy. See, e.g., Troller, supra note 870, at 156 (basing
work on comparative surveys of 13 countries, including the United States); see also
Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683,
688-93,699-701,711-23 (1980).
873. See Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 656-60 (citing authorities);
Galbi, supra note 872, at 280-81; see also W. KINGSTON, INNOVATION, CREATIVITY AND
LAw 122-23 (1989).
874. Owing to its intangible and intellectual nature, know-how remains potentially ubiquitous, like artistic works, despite its embodiment in a tangible medium. See, e.g., F.
MAGNIN, supra note 869, at 115-16; "Iroller, supra note 870, at 151.
875. See generally Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 658-60. While the
know-how embodied in commercial products may still have to be reverse engineered
after duplication, the second comer who obtains the physical support can more rapidly
accomplish this result than when the desired information remained under lock and key
at the factory.
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teet "art" and "inventions." Present-day innovation fits imperfectly.within
either category. Viewed as industrial inventions, advances in the new technologies often appear too incremental and too small in scale to qualify as
major breakthroughs under the "nonobviousness" or "inventive step"
requirements of patent law. 876 At the same time, these technologies serve
impersonal, functional goals that make them alien ·to the spirit of laws
devised to protect literary and artistic works.877 Today's most economically
significant technologies are thus likely to be intermediate technologies878
that fall between the patent and copyright paradigms. 879
2. Industrial Design as the Oldest Marginal Case
Those familiar with the legal history of industrial design will observe
that the conditions facing innovators working in the new technoiogies880 do
not represent such a novel constellation in the intellectual property universe
as is fashionable to pretend. On the contrary, industrial design and the
more recent technologies, such as computer software design, integrated circuit design, and, to some extent, even the products of genetic engineering
share a common behavior pattern that deviates from the standard assumptions underlying the dominant paradigms of the world's intellectual.property system. This pattern may be characterized as "a proclivity to yield
extravagant financial rewards from incremental improvements in know-how
that require considerable capital and effort to develop" coupled with "a vulnerability to rapid duplication by competitors who bear no part of the development expenditure.,,881
The problems of providing adequate legal protection for the new technologies thus resemble those that have plagued the design industries for a
876. See, e.g., Kingston, Thesis, supra note 869, at 31. For a remarkable study of the difficulties of applying patent law to computer programs, see Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer ProgramRelated Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990).
877. See Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 660-61 .
878. These technologies are not "intermediate" in the sense this term is also used to connote
traditional technologies requiring moderate levels of skill that are appropriate for developing countries to absorb in an integrating world economy. The author regrets this
ambiguity but has not found an acceptable alternative for the term "intermediate technologies" as used in this Article.
879. See Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 662 stating:
The fear is that these intermediate technologies, if left to fend for themselves
in this nether world between the dominant paradigms, will attract insufficient
investment owing to the great risk of loss. . . in the innovative enterprise and
to the likelihood that imitators rather than innovators will reap the rewards of
success in the end. Consequently, world intellectual property law has come
under intense pressure to alleviate this perceived risk aversion by providing
modem innovators with artificial lead time through one legal device or
another.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
880. See supra. text accompanying notes 868-79.
881. Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 655 (citing authorities).
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century or more. The designer's know-how consists in giving rhysical
expression to technical, organizational, and marketing demands88 and in
harmonizing these demands with aesthetic features 883 in products that yield
the desired volume of sales within parameters set by the world market. 884
Increasingly, this know-how includes the use of laser holograms, computergenerated displays, and other new techniques,88s as well as the psychological and sociological inputs of human factors engineering. 886
Modern industrial design thus concerns intangible products of skilled
efforts that are embodied in physical supports887 and distributed on the
open market888 with little or no possibility of invoking the trade secret laws
that otherwise protect nonpatentable innovation. 889 In this respect, the
design industries resemble publishers of literary and artistic works who lack
autonomous means of preventing free-riders from appropriating the rewards
of high-risk investments in creations that obtain commercial success. 890 By
882. See. e.g., E. MANZINI, supra note 824, at 54 (stressing the "growing number of actors"
and the "mass of knowledge" which makes the individual design contribution largely
dependent "on an exchange of information, a capacity to establish contact with thase
wha know how to perform certain other processes") (emphasis supplied); C. LoRENZ,
supra note 263, at 10-27, 145-49 (stating that in many companies "the industrial
designer remains the only person directly in touch with both technology and the consumer"); see also Gray, The Role of Design in Strategic Business Development: Methodology and Case Histories, in DEsIGN POLICY, supra note 825, at 32-39.
883. See, e.g., Roy, Product Design'and Innovation in a Mature Consumer Industry, in DESIGN
POLICY, supra note 825, at 91-97;'Dratler, supra note 564, at 890,892; Truijen, supra
note 840, at 170-71. Truijen states: "Now how must we view artistry in industrial
design? The structure, composition, functioning and expression of an ,industrial utility
product we call its appearance ... [nJow the designer harmonizes these ... divergent
elements. Practicing design and even applied science in this creative manner is what I
call artistry of the highest rank." Id. (emphasis supplied); see also J. HESKElT, supra
note 493, at 145-56.
884. See, e.g., C. LoRENZ, supra note' 263, at 145 (stressing globalization of products and
markets as "an extra stimulus to the emergence of industrial design"). See generally D.
UGHANWA & M. BAKER, supra note 263. For legal perspectives on the role of market
factors, see, e.g., Benussi, supra note 8, at 61-62; Fabiani, LA Protezione dell'arte
'
applicata, supra note 18, at 414', 416-17.
885. See, e.g., J. MORRIS & B. QuEST, supra note 3, at 184-89; D. UGHAN~ & M. BAKER,
supra note 263, at 277-95 ("The Impact of Computers on Design").
886. See supra note 825 and;accompanying text; see also Doblin, Information and Design:
The Essential Reliltion, in DEsIGN IN THE INR:>RMATION ENVIRONMENT 18-30 (P. Whiting
ed. 1985); Curtis, supra note 825, at 76 (stating that the design of a modern user interface for a computer program may require the joint efforts of computer scientists, electrical engineers, computational linguists, graphic designers and human factors experts,
among others).
887. See supra note 873 and accompanying text.
888. See supra text accompanying notes 832-47 ("Two-Market Conundrum").
889. Cf. supra notes 874-75 and accompanying text.
890. See supra note 873 and accompanying text. Both works of art and innovative design
solutions must capture the public's fancy in order to yield significant economic returns
on their respective markets segments, even though designs must also embody functional efficiencies that meet industry standards. The diffic;ulties of predicting the public's fancy are thus a source of high risk aversion to investors in art or design. See infra
text accompanying notes 908-10.
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the same token, the deepest affinities between industrial design and works
of art derive less from their common origins in the arts and crafts tradition 891 than from a shared behavioral response to market forces that disrupt
the standard legal mechanisms balancing private and public interests in
free-market economies. 892
Viewed from this angle, a parallel exists between the failure of certain
new technologies to obtain adequate protection under the dominant paradigms of world intellectual property law and the much older and better documented difficulties facing industrial design in that same universe of discourse. In the one case, the patent paradigm will exclude the bulk of today's
costly innovations in applied scientific know-how because they a~pear to
represent slight or merely incremental advances over the prior art. 8 3 In the
other case, design innovation normally reflects only small variations on
established themes rather than major advances in a designer's chosen field of
endeavor, and these variations look "obvious" in the patent sense even when
novel and attractive to consumers. 894 In either case, applying the generous
modalities of copyright law to protect tangible embodiments of know-how
turns out to disrupt the balance between competition and monopoly on the
general products market, which is otherwise a function of the strict patent
paradigm. 895
The foregoing analysis suggests that any long-term solution to the
unsolved puzzle of design protection law is linked with the need for international regulation of the important new technologies falling between the patent and copyright paradigms. 896 The drive for a new intellectual property

891. See, e.g., C. LoRENZ, supra note 263, at II; Dratler, supra note 564, at 890-91 (deemphasizing aesthetic component while emphasizing other important goals including
safety, ease of use, cost of manufacture, ease of repair, and extent to which product is
also "fun . . . to use"); see also Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77
Goo. L.J. 287, 343 (1988) (stressing external constraints that limit the expression of
personality in particular forms of inteIlectual property).
892. When free riders who share none of the risks and burdens of the creative enterprise
capture the innovator's market by selling copies at prices lower than the latter's own
marginal costs, consumers benefit in the short-run by paying less for any particular
design solution. The long-run effects become counterproductive if the aggregate
investment in product design falls chronically short of the aggregate risk capital needed
to sustain healthy levels of international competition based on an innovative mix of aesthetic and technological skills. See generally Brown, supra note 32, at 1386-95; cf C.
LoRENZ, supra note 263, at 25 (stressing the proper "marketing mix"). For the ways in
which intellectual property law serves to organize markets for the efficient exploitation
of intellectual goods, see Lehmann, supra note 263; Ullrich, supra note 263; Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1977).
893. See, e.g., F. MAGNIN, supra note 869, at 15-16, 121-26; Kingston, Thesis, supra note
869, at 31; Galbi, supra note 872, at 281 (stating that "[tlhe patent system can adequately protect inventive concepts; however, the patent law does not have any means of
protecting the investment which goes into developing noninventive innovations").
894. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 564, at 892; Crouwel, supra note 815, at 161-64, 167.
895. See supra notes 832-47 and accompanying text.
896. See supra note 879.
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regime to protect applied scientific know-how has barely got under way, 897
however, and it will take time to form a consensus concerning the real
nature of the problem let alone the difficulties of negotiating internationally
acceptable legal machinery to deal with it. 898 Meanwhile, as the oldest and
most unruly marginal case in the history of intellectual property law, industrial design has left a long record of failed solutions that are eminently
worthy of study, and new design protection laws constitute a kind of living
laboratory in which to test solutions that may later acquire much broader
applicability.
3. Logic of a Modified Copyright Approach
It follows that reformers could address the regulatory problems posed
by the newest legal hybrids with greater confidence if progress were made
in curtailing the disruptive effects of the one legal hybrid that has been
around for the longest period of time. Assuming that a drive to harmonize
the intellectual property laws of the industrialized countries within a GATT
Code of Conduct could provide sufficient impetus to make this effort,899 a
logical point of departure is to reexamine the peculiar attraction that the
copyright paradigm has continually exerted upon the design hybrid notwithstanding its formal collocation within the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. 900
a. Why Know-How Seeks the Copyright Modality

The persistence with which certain industries exploiting new technologies parrot demands for copyright protection long voiced by sectors of the
design industries and their supporters suggests that more is at stake than the
mere avoidance of free competition. 90 1 A plausible explanation is that cer897. See generally OIRECr PROTECTION OF INNOVATION (w. Kingston ed. 1987); Reichman,
Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 660-62, 714-18.
898. Not all observers are equally pessimistic, however. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, New Information Products: A Challenge to Intellectual Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
897 (1988); Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 50, at 884-85 (contending that the
Uruguay Round of GAlT trade negotiations could feasibly produce a pact concerning
.
slavish duplication of new technologies).
899. See generally Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 50, at 857 (discussing designs);
id. at 854-61 (discussing general problems of harmonization). For the difficulties of
harmonizing the copyright laws of the European Community countries, see generally
Schricker, Harmonization of Copyright in the European Community, 20 I.I.C. 466,
483-84 (1989); Dietz, The Harmonization o/Copyright in the European Community, 16
I.I.C. 379 (1985).
.
900. See supra notes 1-2,43-46 and accompanying text.
901. For analogies between industrial designs and artistic works and the criticism they
elicit, compare, e.g., E. POUILLET, supra note 502, at 49-54 and Cohen Jehoram, Cumulative Protection, supra note 367 with F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 246 ("By evoking
scholastic examples of Benvenuto Cellini's saltcellar or candelabra by Raphael, one has
supposedly justified drawing into the orbit of copyright law a body of intellectual products that bear only an apparent resemblance to the creations covered by this regime.")
(trans.). Similar analogies between computer programs and literary works stress the
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tain regulatory features of the mature copyright paradigm inherently provide a unique response to the needs of these same industries notwithstanding the industrial character of the subject matters at issue. 902
With this hypothesis in mind, one may postulate that the mature copyright paradigm has largely evolved its present physiognomy because it deals
with intellectual goods not protectable as trade secrets that require no
reverse engineering to appropriate. 903 The dissemination of literary and
artistic works to the public in tangible mediums of expression automatically
exposes them to refined technologies of copying904 apt to nullify their creators' natural lead time. 90S The copyright system responds by supplying
artificial lead time to all independent creations without regard to merit906
and without requiring originators to preselect works thought to be worth the
costs of formal registration. 907 Wary of unreliable value judgments about
creative, quasi-artistic content of program design and downplay both functional constraints and industrial exploitation. Compare, e.g., Clapes, Lynch & Steinberg, Silicon
Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1493 (1987) with Karjala, Copyright, Computer
Software, and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMIITRIC;:S J. 33, 33-36 (1987) and
Samuelson, supra note 25, at 663, 705-53. Even the case for protecting integrated circuit designs was based on false analogies to works of art. See, e.g., Kastenmeier &
Remington, supra note 205, at 417,444. These aberrations have lately given rise to
claims that biogenetic innovation should also qualify for copyright protection. See,
e.g., Kay ton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50 GED. WASH. L. REV.
191 (1982).
902. Although these analogies tend to advance self-serving protectionist claims that weaken
the conceptual underpinnings of the world's intellectual property system as a whole,
one should not assume that the protective modalities of the copyright paradigm are
entirely unsuited to any of these controversial subject matters. See, e.g., Ladd, To Cope
With the World Upheaval in Copyright Law, 19 COPYRIGHT 289,293 (1983) (arguing that
international organizations should develop "new kinds of copyright-like protection outside copyright itself" rather than extending traditional copyright law to "technologycontaining works"); see also Dietz, Mutation du droit d'auteur-":'changement de
paradigme en matiere de droit d'auteur, 138 R.I.D.A. 22-32,4246,60-62 (1988).
903. See supra notes 870-75 and accompanying text.
904. See, e.g., Gaubiac, Les nouveaux moyens techniques de reproduction et Ie droit d'auteur,
123 R.I.D.A. 22,26 (1986).
905. See, e.g., R. BENKO, supra note 833, at 21: "The currently predominant economic
rationale for copyright protection is that ... knowledge goods ... create problems of
market failure, externalities, and appropriability." See also Landes & Posner, Copyright Law, supra note 833. When the creator is affiliated with smaller- or mediumsized firms and the copier is an oligopolist with distributive power, the latter's copying
can reduce the former's natural lead time to minus zero by enabling the copier to arrive
on distant markets ahead of the innovator. Cf International News Servo v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
906. See, e.g., S. RICKETSON, supra note I, at 231-32; WIPO GUIDE, supra note 368, at 17
("(M]any national laws ... provide that ... works must be original in the sense that
they possess creativity. But originality must never be confused with novelty. . .. ").
The copyright paradigm thus formulates no doctrinal criteria for distinguishing literary
and artistic works worthy of protection from those of lesser merit, in order to avoid
unacceptable risks of censorship and judicial bias. See, e.g., A. DIETZ, COPYRIGHT LAw
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF NATIONAL Copy.
RIGHT LEGISLATION 30-31 (1978).
907. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note I, art. 5(2) ("The enjoyment and the exercise of
these rights shall not be subject to any formality."); A. DIETZ, supra note 906, at 23.
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art908 and incapable of predicting which of even the most successful authors' .
future works will capture or recapture the public's fancy, the mature copyright paradigm embraces all literary and artistic works simply by virtue of
their being creations909 and leaves the assessment of merit entirely to the
market.
In practice, the exclusive rights of copyright law provide a pecuniary
reward onlfc JO those authors and artists who successfully explore the public's taste. 9/ By securing a winner-take-all return for those relatively few
creators able to capture the public's fancy, the copyright incentive overcomes high risk aversion otherwise apt to discourage investment in the dissemination of cultural goodS. 911 Unlike the patent paradigm, however, the
copyright paradigm never prevents third parties from independently creating works of authorship similar to those already on the market. 912 Nor does
copyright law invest authors with any generally recognized right to control
the end use of protected works as SUCh. 913 On the contrary, by encouraging
third parties to make free and abundant use of nonprotectable matter underlying the protected expression, copyright laws foster a built-in process of
908. See supra note 906; Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 US. 239 (1903). As
regards core literary and artistic works, Bleistein postulates that the act of independent
creation manifests the unique personality whose imprint is stamped upon the creative
outpUt. However, this postulate often breaks down when applied to borderline utilitarian matter, such as industrial designs and computer programs, for the reason that no
personal imprint may be feasible or desirable. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 891, at
343.
909. See supra note 906 and accompanying text; see also I S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 269-75 (1938) (explaining why
imposition of a legally attributive registration system would cause unacceptable technical forfeitures to artists too poor or too distracted to comply with its procedural intricacies).
910. Apart from direct pecuniary rewards, the exclusive rights of copyright law enable
authors to control the environments in which they will allow physical embodiments of
their personal expression to circulate. See, e.g., 17 US.C. § 106(2)-(3) (1988). The
Berne Convention further requires member states to protect moral rights. See Berne
Convention, supra note I, art. 6 bis.
911. Cf R. BENKO, supra note 833, at 21; supra note 905 (quoting Benko). Arguably, copyright law thus protects the economic fruits of a quasi depletable resource in much the
same way that mining claims protect any mineral deposits the prospector is lucky
enough to find. Cf Kitch, supra note 892 (stressing role of prospecting function in
patent system). Functionally, this means that legal protection of literary and artistic
works often produces a sweepstakes effect. Until commercial success is achieved, the
exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation and public performance enable authors to
secure the proceeds arising from unknown but statistically predictable winning entries
without requiring them to select particular winning entries in advance. 17 US.c.
§ 106(1)-(2), (4) (1988). Later, these same rights prevent second comers from prematurely siphoning off the fruits of any lucky strike that happens to result and thus permit
creators to defray the costs of past failures.
912. See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984); 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at
19-21. See generally WIPO GUIDE, supra note 368, at 17-18; S. RICKETSON, supra
note I, at 231-32.
913. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 US. 99 (1879); Reichman, Programs as Know-How,
supra note 23, at 693 n.288 (discussing droit de destination in context of Baker and citing authorities); see also Brown, Eligibility, supra note 788, at 590:
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"reverse engineering" that enables many copyrightable works to cluster
around common themes or ideas. 914
To the extent that the soft modalities of the copyright paradigm constitute an economic response to the behavior of literary and artistic works
under free-market conditions, one may logically postulate that similar
modalities of protection would suit technological know-how that behaves in
the marketplace like works of art and literature notwithstanding its industrial character. 915 From a behavioral standpoint, investors in applied scientific know-how find the copyright paradigm attractive because of its inherent
disposition to supply artificial lead time to all comers without regard to
innovative merit and without requiring originators to preselect the products
that are most worthy of protection. The peculiar modalities of this paradigm then protect the market-determined values of eligible innovation on a
nondiscriminatory basis, against copying only, for a lengthy period of time.
These same modalities, however, exculpate fair followers who independently fashion their own creations by exploiting the unprotectable ideas
revealed in the process of public distribution, a strategy likely to improve
the technology available to the public at large.
If these insights proved accurate, it would not follow that either industrial design or the new technologies should obtain all the benefits of the
mature copyright paradigm. The opposite is true. Developed with different social purposes in mind, the full copyright paradigm provides too many
creations with too much protection for much too long a time to satisfactorily
promote technological progress. 916 The foregoing analysis does suggest
that the legal protection of intermediate technologies as a class could benefit
from a judicious adaptation of the copyright modality that did not unduly
disrupt the workings of a competitive market for industrial products. The
task, in short, is to bring that much of the copyright paradigm to bear on .
intermediate technologies as will perform needed protective services, while
discarding such technical features (and all of the mystique) as are inconsistent with the industrial nature of these same technologies.
b. Measured Exploitation of a Possibly Fatal Attraction

It follows that a copyright approach to intermediate technologies falling between the patent and copyright paradigms could yield unexpected
social benefits, even though application of the full copyright paradigm to
these same technologies tends to hinder innovation and produce intolerable
914. See. e.g., WlPO GUIDE, supra note 368, at 12-13; 2 P. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at
26-28; see also Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965 (1990).
915. See supra notes 873-79 and accompanying text. When the length of protection exceeds
that needed to induce the appropriate level of investment, consumers are unduly prevented from purchasing lower priced copies of the protected contribution. When the
scope of protection is similarly excessive, it unduly inhibits second comers from building on the earlier contribution.
916. See, e.g., Reichman, Programs as Know-How,supra note 23, at 696-98.
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burdens on trade. 917 By the same token, the most promising solution to the
historical quest for a workable design protection law, when viewed in the
context of a larger drive to protect advanced technological know-how, consists of a sui generis regime built around modified copyright principles.
(1) Thnets of a Tailor-Made Regime

Ideally, the general provisions of a law or treaty devised for the protection of know-how as such would be supplemented by more specialized legal
nuances that took account of the different physical supports in which knowhow became embodied and of the market factors pertinent to each class of
supports. 918 Within this framework, the distinction between aesthetic and
functional designs would lose conceptual vitality as the protective boundaries of a new paradigm congealed over time. Because such a solution
remains a long way off, however, any present-day reform of design protection law must necessarily retain its autonomous character without the
immediate advantages of integration into a larger legal matrix. A transitional reform of this nature should disrupt competition no more than is necessary to augment investment in improving the appearance of products destined for a discriminating global market.
Consistent with this goal, a model design law would make short-term
protection of quantitatively creative appearance designs919 easy and cheap
to acquire without demanding either absolute novelty or qualitative originality in the patent sense. 920 It would thus leave a broad area of routine or
generic designs free for the public to use while recognizing an intermediate
range of protectable design innovation921 whose value was determined by
917. See supra notes 832-47 and accompanying text.
918. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 834.
919. Cj. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 E2d 905,909-11 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying
nontrivial variations doctrine of L. Batlin to designs derived from works still in copyright); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 E2d 486, 490-92 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(requiring substantial variations for copyrightable reproductions of commercial
designs already in the public domain and denying eligibility to products of "physical
skills"); see also John Muller & Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer 'Jearn, Inc., 802 E2d
989 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding logo not copyrightable for lack of creative contribution).
920. See. e.g., S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (O'Mahoney-Wiley-Hart Bill), refining
H.R. 8873, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957) (Willis Bill). S. 2075 had been put together by
a high-level committee of experts that included Register Arthur Fisher, Barbara Ringer,
and Judge Giles Rich. The drafters were determined that a design law should "rest
generally on the concept of originality, which in a broad sense can be called the principle of copyright," duly adjusted to reflect a quantitative creativity standard. See
Ringer. supra note 790. at 25. 30-31. To qualify for protection. only a minimum
degree of creative content was required, but standard, commonplace, or staple designs
were expressly excluded. The term of protection was short (five or ten years), registration was allowed within six months from the time the design was "made known." and
designs dictated by function or by the purpose of the article embodying it were
excluded. See generally Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1186-1200
("Toward an American Regime of Sui Generis Protection").
921. Cj. Stern, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U. Prn: L. REV. 1229,
1249-50 (1986).
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the market and not by artificial legal standards or by the subjective evaluation of a patent examiner.922 Within these limits, an autonomous regime
should protect eligible combinations of line, shape, color, and texture
against copying only but not against independent creation, a result consonant with actual practice under existing design laws despite their patent-like
character. 923 This regime would exclude functionally determined design
features as such,924 although it would recognize that the overall image or
configuration of most useful articles necessarily combines external visual
features with highly utilitarian components. 925
A modern design law should also permit test-marketing and other
forms of disclosure prior to registration under a grace period of suitable
length,926 an approach that can be used to exempt candidate designs from
registration altogether for a specified period of time. 927 It would make provision for (but not mandate) a marketable certificate of title to a discrete
body of innovative matter that could be sold and policed as needed, without
necessarily provoking technical forfeiture for a failure to comply with
streamlined procedural formalities. 928 At the infringement stage, such a
law could recognize an "experimental" or "analytical use" defense that
would allow designers to study available models in order to find elbow room
on crowded market segments. 929 Defendants that otherwise established
independent creation should also avoid liability for copying design features
that had become market standards or that were essential to a competitor's
ability to enter and stay on particular market segments. 930
In keeping with a modified copyright approach, the proposed regime
would not provide moral rights nor would it afford non salaried designers the
922. See supra notes 906-14 and accompanying text.
923. See supra notes 853-55 and accompanying text.
924. See, e.g., S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(c) (1959); supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
925. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13, 279-302.
926. See, e.g., S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4, 9(a) (1959); supra notes 82-88, 850-52
and accompanying text.
927. Compare the American design bills of the 1950s, see supra note 920 (providing a sixmonth novelty grace period and allowing alternative protection under design patent
law) with Draft European Design Law, arts. 10-11, published April 3, 1990 by the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law,
Munich FRG (allowing a choice between formal protection of up to 25 years by registration or informal protection against slavish imitation for a two-year period). The current design bills pending in the United States would permit a one year grace period
between the time a design is made public and the final date of a mandatory application
for registration. See, e.g., H~R. 3017, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); supra note 771.
928. See supra note 927 and accompanying text; cf Stern, supra note 921, at 1247-49. The
bundle of remedies can be varied to reward registration and disclosure without necessarily diluting the bundle of exclusive rights as such.
929. Cf. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1988); R. STERN,
supra note 205, § 5.5 ("Reverse Engineering"); see also Eisenberg, Palents and lhe
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017
(1989).
930. See supra notes 746-57 and accompanying text.
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advantages that copyright law confers on commissioned authors and artists. 93t Above all, the low standard of eligibility would combine with high
anticumulative barriers that foreclosed the possibility of long-term, concurrent protection under the full copyright paradigm. 932 Nevertheless, such a
regime could exist side by side with the stricter requirements of a more traditional patent system, in order to accommodate industries that deemed this
a valuable option. 933
A sui generis law along these lines would, in effect, constitute a "Ieadtime" law that substituted a very short period of artificial lead time for the
lack of natural lead time that occurs under modem marketing conditions. 934
It would provide a limited form of protection against the appropriation of
specific design know-how by technical means of duplication, without pretending to inhibit independent creation and without succumbing to the logic
of either "art" or "inventions."
(2) Empirical Models in Search of a Consensus

Models for such a regime are not lacking, even though one looks in
vain for any single exemplar on the statute books of the industrialized countries at the present time. For example, the ingenious design protection bill
fashioned in the United States during the late 1950s was largely conceived
along these very lines. 935 Had that law been enacted in 1976, even in the
slightly shopworn version it acquired after protracted negotiations with special interests, the design problem in this country would appear far more
manageable than it does tOday.936 World intellectual property law might
also have obtained valuable empirical data bearing on the regulation of the
new technologies that have proliferated since the 1960s. In this connection,
it is worth noting that the Draft Proposal for a European Community Design
931. See 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988) (definition of works made for hire); id. § 201(b); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. CI. 2166 (1989).
932. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976. supra note 17, at 1167-72, 1192-95. If an international consensus were formed around a short-term copyright-like modality, the line
of demarcation with other regimes need not remain as intractable as in the past. Given
such a consensus, the reduction of technical forfeitures should make courts more likely
to respect the chosen line of demarcation in order not to undermine transnationa' policy
goals embodied in the special regime as a whole. However, cumulation in trademark
and unfair competition law could remain a problem. See. e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at
1400-01; van Nieuweuhoven Helbach, supra note 522, at 12-15.
933. See supra notes 926-27 and accompanying text; S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
934. See supra text accompanying notes 903-07. The tendency to establish a fifteen-year
period in some of the design laws enacted during the 1970s results from an international compromise with no compelling legallogi~ behind it. See. e.g., Cohen lehoram,
Specific Protection, supra note 819, at 25 (criticizing the compromise figure as too
short). The Italian design law, supra note 4, provided only four years of protection
when enacted in 1940, i.e., it was a true lead-time law. Although the period was
extended to fifteen years in 1977, the initial very short term of duration may explain
why invalidation for lack of qualitative originality was rare.
935. See S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); supra note 920.
936. See supra notes 22, 72-77 and accompanying text.
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Law, launched by the Max Planck Institute in 1990, independently arrived
at some of the same innovative solutions set out in the American bills of the
1950s. 937
At least three further experiments with a modified copyright approach
to advanced technological know-how have found expression in positive law
since that lost opportunity in 1976. 938 One was the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984,939 which other industrialized countries have emulated under pressure from the United States. 940 A second was the French
decision to protect computer programs under a modified copyright
approach,941 in defiance of the "unity of literature" gospel preached by the
United States. 942 A third was the recent enactment of an unregistered
design right as part of the United Kingdom's Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act of 1988. 943
In the short run, the French law concerning computer programs seems
the most important of these experiments. To be sure, the cryptic measures
. hurried into law in 1985 lacked the elegance of the design protection bill
that the United States Congress debated between 1957 and 1976. The
French law on computer programs suffers particularly from inattention to
the scope of protection issues that have recently become so prominent in this
country.944 But the French law of 1985 takes a critical step forward by recognizing the inherent linkage between "industrial art" and "industrial literature. ,,945 In so doing, it concedes by implication that the full copyright
paradigm still governing ornamental designs under that country's regime of
total cumulation amounts to overkill. 946
In contrast, the decision to protect integrated circuit designs under the
United States Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984947 and, more
recently, the decision to protect both functional and aesthetic designs under
937.
938.
939.
940.

941.

942.

943.
944.
945.
946.
947.

See supra notes 927-28 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 22.
See supra note 203.
See R. STERN, supra note 205, at 377-444; S.M. STEWART, supra note 201, at 333-42;
see also McManis, supra note 205.
Law No. 85-660 [France], arts. 45-51 (Des Logiciels), July 3, 1985, Journal Officiel,
July 4, 1985, p.7495, tit. II, reprinted in RECEUIL DALLOZ SIREY 357,361 (1985); see,
e.g., R. PLAISANT, PRoPRIETE LITTERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 14-15, 22-23 (Supp. Mise a
Jour No. I, Aug. I, 1985); Gaud rat , La protection des logiciels par/e droit d'auteur, 138
R.I.D.A. 76 (1988).
See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text. A close parallel thus exists between the
United States extension of copyright protection to computer programs and the aberrations that occurred when France pressed the Berne Union Countries to absorb industrial designs into their domestic copyright laws under the "unity of art" rationale. Cf
Foyer, supra note 832, at 138-42 (noting contradictions between treatment of industrial
designs and computer programs in French law).
See supra note 846.
For searching recent criticism on this score, see generally Gaudrat, supra note 941.
See supra notes 941-42.
See supra notes 43,942 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
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the United Kingdom's Unregistered Design Right of 1988,948 are mixed·
blessings at best. On the positive side, these measures constitute tentative
steps in the direction of a regulatory system, based on a modified copyright
approach, that actually deals with embodiments of technological know-how
in tangible mediums of expression. These laws accordingly serve to break
the stranglehold of the dominant inteIlectual property paradigms, they provide new models for the elaboration of future solutions, and they will enrich
tlte pool of empirical data concerning the operational feasibility of nontraditional regimes in general. 949
948. See supra notes 202, 846; W.R. CoRNISH, supra note 202, at 190-91 (stressing

influence of United States Semiconductor Chip Act on United Kingdom Unregistered
Design Act). Prior to 1989, the United Kingdom protected aesthetic designs under
either the Registered Designs Act of 1949, supra note 3, which operates on the patent
model, or automatically under a terminable copyright, lasting fifteen years, if derived
from drawings, sculpture or the like. See Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46, at 371.
Functional designs not protectable under the Registered Designs Act of 1949 [RDA
I 949J, supra note 3, became increasingly protectable under the copyright law if
derived from engineering drawings or blueprints, at least until the British Leyland decision of 1986 removed automobile spare parts from copyright law. See Fellner, New
U.K. Law, supra note 46, at 372-75; see also R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 361. In contrast, the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, entitled both aesthetic
and functional designs to the unregistered design right, in addition to any registered
design rights they mayor may not retain. Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46, at
376-77. This right arises automatically on fixation, but the level of "originality" to be
required by the courts was reportedly unclear in the text of the law and remains to be
determined at the time of writing. Id. at 377-78, 380. The exclusive right is subject to
unique exceptions ("must fit," "must match"), id. at 378-79, which are meant to
"remove all protection from functional spare parts." R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 362.
Duration is 10 to 15 years from fixation or first sale. Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note
46, at 383. The new law appears to abolish the possibility of cumulation between
copyright law and the design rights, but in some cases there may be cumulation
between the registered and unregistered design rights. Id. at 386-87, 389-91. The
Registered Designs Act of 1949, supra note 3, has also been amended, with some possible softening of the eligibility requirements and a lengthening of duration to a minimum of 25 years. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, Part IV, §§ 265-73;
R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 308-36. The precise level of "novelty" to be required
under the RDA 1949 as amended remains unclear, since the prior requirement of "originality," which meant qualitative originality akin to nonobviousness, was deleted, perhaps without any intention to lower the preexisting standard. See id. at 317-18.
The net result of these dispositions cannot be gauged at the time of writing, although
there is a clear, if clumsy, attempt to reduce the scope for "unmeritorious," heavily
functional designs under the RDA 1949, see id. at 318, and to eliminate full copyright
protection of purely functional designs altogether. Id. at 361. Ms. Fellner regards the
new provisions as a move towards the more restrictive regimes of Italy and Germany.
See Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46, at 392. However, neither of these regimes
operates on modified copyright principles, and they protect functional designs only as
utility models subject to relatively stiff formal and substantive requirements.
See supra notes 8, 82-87,196-99 and accompanying text.
949. See R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 297, stating:
The [U.K.] government ... rejected the 1983 registration proposals ... [asJ
unduly bureaucratic and expensive. It further rejected the introduction of an
unfair copying law. . .. Consequently, the government opted for what it
described as a "modified copyright approach," which in essence meant the cre-
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On the negative side, these legislative r~sponses to sectoral protectionist demands are crafted with the tinkerer's tools and without any unifying
goal or concept in mind. They add to the clutter of ad hoc legal initiatives
currently being thrown at applied scientific know-how without addressing
the hard questions that need to be answered in order to achieve a universally
valid approach. 95o Despite the formal accouterments of intellectual property laws, such measures look like thinly disguised trade barriers that
benefit some industries but not others for reasons that defy scientific investigation.95 I Cumulatively, these laws may undermine free-markcrt principles
more than a simple unfair competition law charged with protecting investment in new technologies from misappropriation for a short period of
time,952 such as the law Switzerland enacted in 1986. 953
In the long run, an international intellectual property regime seriously
concerned about advanced technological know-how would have to accommodate both aesthetic and functional designs within a common universe of
discourse. 954 That the United Kingdom's new design law already covers
both types of designs955 undoubtedly gives it a futuristic dimension of considerable experimental interest. 956 This experiment results, nevertheless,
from a concatenation of purely local events and conditions dating back to a
legislative miscue in 1968957 and to a traditionally restrictive view of unfair

950.

951.
952.
953.
954.
955.

956.
957.

ation of a new right, the unregistered design right, to operate alongside copyright and the RDA [Registered Designs Act of) 1949.
Id.; see supra notes 846; 848, 948.
See Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 662-67. For example, both
the chip laws and the unregistered design law fail to clarify what the appropriate standard of eligibility for purely functional designs should be in a universe of discourse in
which comparable designs are traditionally protected as utility models. See supra
notes 196-202 and accompanying text; cf Higashima & Ushiku, A New Means of International Protection 0/ Computer:. Programs Through the Paris Convention-A New Concept 0/ Utility Models, 7 COMPlITER L.J. I, 15-22 (1986).
See generally Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 205; Cornish, supra note 226, at
300-09 (critically viewing developments in the United Kingdom).
See generally Reichman, GAIT Connection. supra note 50, at 875-78; see also
Dreyfuss, supra note 898.
See supra note 524 and accompanying text.
See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 834.
The new right is defined as .. 'a property right which subsists ... in an original
design' .. and "no distinction is drawn or intended between aesthetic and functional
designs; both are intended to be covered." Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46, at
377.
See supra notes 846,848,948-49.
A hurried amendment to the Copyright Act of 1956, known as the Design Copyright
Act of 1968, installed a regime of partial cumulation for fifteen years between the
copyright law and the Registered Designs Act of 1949, supra note 3, without expressly
excluding functionally dictated designs. To very literal minded courts, this opened the
door to copyright protection of functional designs depicted in two-dimensional drawings. See, e.g., Stevenson, Protection/or Industrial Designs Under the British Copyright
Act 0/1956,8 A.P.L.A. Q.J. 369 (1980); Wallace, Protection/or Designs in the United
Kingdom, 22 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 437, 437-39 (1975). The current round of
design legislation and its vagaries is largely conditioned by recent judicial decisions
limiting copyright protection of industrial designs in response to the notion that reverse
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competition law. 958 It thus lacks a theoretical foundation capable of justifying the grant of privileged monopolies, and it is doubly suspect because its
privileges are not exchanged for any specified levels of creative activity.959
Successful implementations of this law may well depend on the willingness of British courts to devise differentiated standards of eligibility according to the degree of functionality embodied in the particular designs under
litigation. 960 Even if courts mustered the technical sophistication needed
for this task, however, to attempt such a synthesis in an ad hoc domestic
design law having no well-defined subject matter boundaries, no settled
standard of eligibility, and no underlying theory of protection seems a formula for mischie(J61 that could raise GATT problems962 and that should not
be emulated by the United States. 963

958.

959.

960.

961.
962.

963.

engineering constitutes infringement; by a government decision to curb prior restrairits
on trade; and by the resistance of vested interests. See, e.g., R. MERKIN, supra note 3,
at 283-98, 360-62; supra note 948; see also Cornish, supra note 226, at 299-306. In
contrast, the United States Copyright Office forestalled a similar situation by codifying
aspects of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), in § 113(b) of the 1976 Act. See 17
U.S.c. § 113(b) (1988); supra notes 356-59 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the
authorities declined to extend the principles underlying § II3(b) to industrial literature
(i.e., computer programs) in the 1976 Act, which leaves the courts to puzzle it out from
Baker. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Cornish, supra note 226, at 306-07 (stressing that copyright law in the United
'Kingdom had "become one vehicle for preventing specific kinds of misappropriation
through copying, and this approach has in part made up for any broad concept of unfair
competition").
See supra notes 846, 848,948; W.R. CORNISH, supra note 202, at 384 (predicting that
the operative standard will be independent creation). But see Fellner, New U.K. lAw.
supra note 46 (predicting that courts will read "original" to mean more than independent creation as regards functional designs under the unregistered design law).
See supra note 959. But it remains to be seen how judges in the United Kingdom will
cope with such a complicated and unorthodox intellectual property regime when they
are prevented by tradition from interpreting it in the light of the pertinent legislative
history. See Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46. The British courts' approach to eligibility under the unregistered designs law, difficult under the best of circumstances,
will be further complicated by the uncertainty surrounding the eligibility standard
under the Registered Designs Act of 1949 as amended in 1988. See supra note 948; R ..
MERKIN. supra note 3, at 316-18.
See, e.g., Cornish. supra note 226, a(300-09; cf Fran~on & P~rot-Morel, supra note
864, at 420-26.
See Reichman, GAIT Connection, supra note 50, at 888, stating:
This law necessarily styles itself an intellectual property law for purposes of
avoiding the basic GATT discipline under the exceptions of Article XX(d).
Yet, it can be construed as protecting purely functional designs under a standard of zero creativity that rewards no innovative activity familiar from the
history of intellectual property laws. while proclaiming itself exempt from the
national treatment provision that governs all industrial property under the
Paris Convention. . . . Protectionist legislation of this ilk arguably uses intellectual property laws to create disguised barriers to trade, contrary to article
XX(d) of the GATT and to the express mandate of the Uruguay Round.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also W.R. CORNISH, supra note 202, at 385-86 (questioning
requirement of reciprocity at the expense of national treatment).
See supra text accompanying notes 769-80.
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Reformers should, instead, concentrate their efforts on devising a more
workable sui generis framework for appearance designs without attempting
to integrate functional designs into an overall solution until such time as
industry itself welcomes disinterested investigation of the rationale underlying a broadened protective regime. 964 Absent a more enlightened consensus concerning the real basis of protection,96S those countries seeking to
harmonize their intellectual property systems within a GATT framework966
should resolutely exclude functional designs-including structural designs
of computer programs-from full copyright protection in all domestic legal
systems. 967
The most logical step would then be to align a sui generis law protecting industrial art on modified copyright principles with a similarly constructed law to protect industrial literature. The successful alignment of
appearance designs and computer programs along a single; coherent axis
could in turn trigger long-term international decisions to accommodate
these and other borderline subject matters within a new, paradigmatic frame
of reference supported by an appropriate international convention. Short of
this goal, a generic international arrangement to limit technological freeriding could be added to article 10 his of the Paris Convention as part of a
GATT accommodation,968 and an anti-misappropriation norm of this kind
could retain its validity independent of future projects to harmonize design
laws or event to regulate the protection of applied scientific know-how as
such.
Meanwhile, the need to harmonize copyright laws within the European
Community creates a unique opportunity to persuade these countries to
adopt a modified copyright approach to their common design problem.
964. The distinction between aesthetic and functional designs is solidly but not uniformly
established in present-day domestic legal systems, apart from the United Kingdom's
unregistered design right of 1988. See supra notes 846, 948, 959 and accompanying
text. At the extreme, French copyright law remains capable of protecting purely functional designs, unless barred by criteria that guard the line of demarcation with patent
law. See, e.g., Franc;;on & Perot-Morel, supra note 864, at 424-26. See generally PerotMorel, Specific Protection, supra note 821. Recently, however, French couns have
reacted to these excesses by elevating the functionality barrier to the point where many
or most utilitarian designs are liable to invalidation under either the Copyright Law of
1985 or the Design Law of 1909, owing to judicial subordination of these laws to the
patent law. See Perot-Morel, Le systemefran~aise de La double protection des dessins el
modeles industriels, in DJSEGNO INDUSTRIALE E PRarEzIONE EUROPEA 40; 44-48, 52-54
(1989). The design laws of the Nordic countries tolerate a high incidence of functional
content while formally protecting only the exterior aspect of an object; but this is offset
by exigent novelty requirements. See Levin, Design Protection in the Nordic Countries-Basic Provisions and Recent Developments, in DtSEGNO INDUSTRIALE E
PRorEzIONE EUROPEA 139, 141-43 (1989).
965. See supra notes 869-900 and accompanying text.
966. See supra note 899 and accompanying text.
.
967. For evidence that critical authority in most industrililized countries increasingly disfavors full copyright protection of computer programs, see Reichman, Programs as
Know-How, supra note 23, at 714 n.388.
968. See Reichman, GAIT Connection, supra note 50, at 876-78,884-85.
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Such an approach would enable leading Berne Union members to break the
historical impasse that continues to block serious reform efforts at the international level. It would provide both the European Community and eventually the United States with most of the advantages that France has obtained
under the "unity of art" approach, but at a much cheaper cost and without
the trade restraints inherent in a regime that systematically overprotects
industrial designs. Once implemented, moreover, a sui generis design law
along these lines could shed much needed empirical light on the problems of
regulating incremental innovation generally, and it could become a model
for later, more ambitious efforts to manage the many legal hybrids falling
between the patent and copyright paradigms. 969

969. See supra notes 866-79 and accompanying text; see also Reichman, Legal Hybrids,
supra note 834.
.

